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Ancillary Pilot Study for the Educational Policy Research Center Program. Final Report.

Hudson Inst.. Groton on Hudson. N.Y.

Spons Agency Office of Education (DHEW). Washington. D.C. Bureau of Research.

Report No-HI-1043-RR Bureau No- BR-7- 1005 Pub Date 28 Jun 63 Contract - OEC- 1 - 7- 07 1 005- 4252 Note- 534p.

EDRS Price MF-S2.00 HC-S26.80 Descriptors- Comparative Education. ♦Demography. Economic Progress. ♦Educational Planning. *Educational Policy. ♦Enrollment Trends. Higher Education. Illiteracy. Industrialization. Learning. Memory. Poverty Programs. ♦Predictioa Student Reactiorv. Technological Advancement

The role of the Hudson Institute in the policy research center program was to build on and adapt current studies of the future for the purpose of assisting the Office of Educatio- .^nd its five pilot centers. Part 1 of this report comments briefly on some methodolor * and substantive issues that arose during the pilot phase and suggests how portic .= of the work might be continued. Parts 2~9 are papers that summarize some of .. ' background studies. The authors and their papers are (1) Raymond D. Gastil. "Problems in Demographic Projection for Educational Policy Planning." (2) Raymond D. Gastil. "Education and Anti-Poverty Measures." (3) John Karlik. "Implications of Long-Range Economic Prospects for US. Education." (4) Mark Wehle. "Notes on World-Wide School Enrollment and Illiteracy to the Year 2000." (5) Richard Brown. "A Role for Higher Education in Post-Industrial Society." (6) Lottie E. Mackay. "Drugs to Improve Memory and Learning." (7) Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kahn. "Faustian Powers and Human Choices: New Issues for the Educational System." and (8) Andrew G. Caranfil. "World-Wide Aspects of the Student Movement: A Preliminary Report on a Continuing Study of Student Movements." (HW)

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POLICY RESEARCH CENTER PROGRAM

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FINAL REPORT TO THE U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION BUREAU OF RESEARCH

JUNE 28, 1968

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HUDSON INSTITUTE

HUDSON INSTITUTE

CROTON-ON-HUDSON. NEW YORK

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ANCILLARY PILOT STUDY FOR THE EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER PROGRAM

A Final Report to the

Bureau of Research Office of Education Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Contract No. OEC-1 -7-071 005-4252

HI-1043-RR

June 28, 1968

Herman Kahn, Project Leader

Anthony J. Wiener, Deputy Project Leader

In accordance with standard Hudson Institute policy, all reports, papers, briefings, and visual aids are the sole responsibility of named authors or speakers. No statements should be attributed to Hudson Institute or to any other associated individuals or agencies.

HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC. Q.uaker Ridge Road C roton-on-Hudson New York 10520

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ANCILLARY PILOT STUDY FOR THE EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER PROGRAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PART ONE:

EDUCATIONAL POLICY STUDIES: OVERVIEW OF THE PILOT

PHASE 1-1

PART TWO: PROBLEMS IN DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTION FOR EDUCATIONAL

POLICY PUNNING (by Raymond D. Gastil) 2-1

PART THREE: EDUCATION AND ANTI-POVERTY MEASURES (by Raymond D.

Gastil) 3-1

PART FOUR: IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR

U.S. EDUCATION (by John Karlik) 4-1

PART FIVE: NOTES ON WORLD-WIDE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND ILLITERACY

TO THE YEAR 2000 (by Mark Wehle) (With notes on U.S. graduates prepared by Laurie C. Rockett) 5“i

part SIX: A ROLE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST- INDUSTR lAL

SOCIETY (by Richard Brown) 6-1

PART SEVEN: DRUGS TO IMPROVE MEMORY AND LEARNING (by Lottie E.

Mackay)

PART EIGHT: FAUSTIAN POWERS AND HUMAN CHOICES: NEW ISSUES FOR

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM (by Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kahn) 8-1

PART NINE: WORLD-WIDE ASPECTS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT: A Pre-

liminary Report on a Continuing Study of Student Movements (by Andrew G. Caranfil) 9“1

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PART ONE

EDUCATIONAL POLICY STUDIES; OVERVIEW OF THE PILOT PHASE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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A. The Role of Hudson Institute in the Policy Research Center

P rog ram 1~1

B. Proposal for the Continuation of Hudson Institute's Ancillary

Role 1-3

C. Comments on Policy Research for Education 1-12

1. Lead-Time 1-12

2. Need for Shared Ideas 1-13

3. Special Educational Needs for Decision-Makers 1-14

4. New Skills Needed In the Post-Industrial Society 1-17

5. Expectations and Policy Decisions 1-18

6. The Standard World and Variations 1-26

a. More Integrated, stability-oriented 1-27

b. More Integrated, development-oriented 1-27

c. More Inward-looking, with an eroded communist

movement 1-28

d. With eroded democratic morale and some communist

dynamism 1-28

e. With a dynamic Europe and/or Japan 1-28

f. Greater disarray, with an eroded communist movement . 1-29

7. Introduction to the Mosaic Society 1-29

8. Regional Variations I-3I

D. Conclusion I-32

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A. The Role of Hudson Institute in the Policy Research Center Prop ram

Hudson Institute was not in competition with the five pilot centers which were candidates to become operational policy research centers, but was to render ancillary services to the five pilot centers and to the Office of Education. Specifically, we were called upon to build on and adapt our current studies of the future for this purpose, describing alternative futures and trends both for education and for aspects of society and technology impinging upon and relating to education policy. W* summarized much of our previous work on the future in The Year 2000;

A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years by Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (New York: Macmillan, 1967), which was

published during the period of this report. Copies were distributed to members of the pilot centers, the Office of Education, and the re- view committee.

A seminar was held September 26-29, 1967, attended by members of the Bureau of Research, members of the pilot policy research centers, and members of the review committee. The seminar was intended to help those responsible for establishing the operational centers in initiating the research program under the centers, as well as those responsible for overseeing and using the work of these centers, it was also used to in- troduce proposed concepts of policy research and educational futures to

potential staff members, consultants and other contributors to the oper- ational centers. A second seminar was held January 8, 9> and 10 in San Francisco. At this meeting, there were further presentations of Hudson

Institute work on future contexts for educational policy, and an oppor- tunity for all participants in the policy research center program to

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discuss, to formulate col laborat ive ly , and to crystalline their plans for further participation in the operational centers, in the light of the Bu- reau of Research's decisions.

In order to give a sense of the importance of the seminars in the Hudson program for the Office of Education, it is worth noting that direct costs associated with these two seminars (expenses of all guest partici- pants other than travel, direct staff time, briefing notes, etc., not in- cluding research time for preparation of material presented or discussed in the seminars) amounted to about one-half of the $50,000 granted by the Bureau of Research to Hudson Institute for this pilot study, leaving only about $25»000 for the preparation of the seminars and the preparation of background papers such as those included in this report.

The purpose of Part I of this final report is to comment briefly on some methodological and substantive issues that have struck us, during this pilot phase, as worth pointing out once more, to suggest how portions of this work might be continued, and to add some brief speculative notes that have to go somewhere. The following sections summarize some of our background studies that were intended to serve such substantive purposes as context, guidance and stimulation for other studies in the program, as well as to provide bases for continuing work by Hudson Institute staff members. There were some additional studies (mentioned in the progress report under "Work in Progress") that were not ready for distribution at this time. Some of these have been discontinued, at least temporarily, while work is continuing under other auspices on others. The papers by Wehle, Karlik and Gastil in this report are probably final in their cur- rent form, but some of the other papers in this report will be expanded

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and revised as part of a new Hudson Institute project on “Issues Before the Next Administration."

B. Proposal for the Continuation of Hudson Institute's Ancillary Role

Education is centrally related to much current and proposed Hudson Institute research, particularly our development of teaching techniques for the education of policy-makers, as in our current Analytic Summary Project (described below). In addition, our ongoing studies of alterna- tive world futures, technological prospects, socio-political change, the future of poverty, race relations, economic development, urban problems, and long-range planning for national science policy and federal budget priority allocations, are closely interconnected with issues that affect the study of future educational policy. Therefore Hudson would be strongly interested in a continuing role in educational policy research in addition to its continuing relation with both the operational centers.*

We believe this role can best be carried out under a separate con- tract with the Office of Education, which would provide for a subcontract from Hudson Institute to the Syracuse EPRC, and/or to other sources of specific expertise in educational policy. (The general terms of this ar- rangement have been agreed upon by those concerned.) If funding at an optimum level is not available in Fiscal 1969, we believe it would never- theless be extremely valuable if a small project were supported, designed to explore and prepare for future activities.

'^e have a subcontract from the Syracuse EPRC providing for consult- ing services in the setting up of their program and aid in the design and construction of an instructional program for participants in the educational system. In addition, Anthony J. Wiener has agreed to serve as a consultant to the Stanford EPRC for several weeks during their first year.

This direct relationship to the Bureau of Research would be especially useful for the purpose of preparing and delivering a course on future edu“ cational policy. The objectives of the course would be:

1. To present a consideration of alternative educational strategies for various situations and levels of analysis, as part of the process of teaching the use of deliberate alternatives in policy- making;

2. To acquaint educational policy-makers with the desirability and techniques of comparing alternative strategies or programs in the process of decision-making. This might be thought of as a proc- ess of teaching "qualitative" systems analysis, as it would be applied to only partly quantifiable areas, such as education;

3. To present to academic policy-makers information and concepts of alternative world futures in order to improve their knowledge and understanding of long-term prospects relevant to education.

The course would, through the collaboration of the EPRC's, and through direct involvement of all participants, also serve functions such as the following:

1. Contribute to the construction of paradigms for educational

policy researchers. By "paradigm," we mean something much less formal than an analytical model in the mathematical sense, but more elaborate than a metaphor and more structured than a frame- work.* The paradigms we will seek to construct will be based on

Robert K. Merton has demonstrated the value of paradigms for socio- logical analysis in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, rev. ed. 1956), and the points he makes apply equally to the analysis of problems of pulbic policy. (See The Year 2000. pp. 403-405.)

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provisional efforts to Integrate the relevant Insights of a num- ber of disciplines. While we would hope to maintain scholarly standards of rigor, thoroughness, and depth, these standards must not be so rigid as to defeat our primary purposes of synthesis and St Imulat Ion— thus unfortunately the Integration will occa- sionally but necessarily be relatively Intuitive or subjective- even If this dependence on Intuition or subjectivity |s explicated. In any case, explicit Insights, concepts, metaphors, and paradigms, even If tentative and Incomplete, seem preferable to unstated. In- explicit assumptions.

2, Contribute, In part as a by-product of Its general program of work on the future, a broader and deeper perception of future

technology. Including the study of technologies not obviously

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related to education, than the operational centers would be likely to be able to maintain.

3. Furnish, through its general program of work in international relations and foreign and military prospects, as well as its general program of projections on U.S. economic and social prospects, a rich source of alternative possibilities for International and domestic social change which could impinge upon the educational system^

There is no need, we think, to point out the usefulness of teaching future technology. The faster people understand these issues and can cope with them in various ways, the faster they introduce and use the changes (which, we agree, has its negative aspects, but on the whole is a positive trend). More important, the social problems associated with new trends become much clearer — and because of planned flexibility, the ability to muddle through increases enormously.

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4. Serve the operational centers as consultants on their studies and help them avoid parochialism or inbreeding, sharpen the relevance of their studies to policy decisions and enhance the likelihood of utilization, bring in important ideas from seemingly unrelated as well as obviously related fields and provide stimulation and enrichment in a number of ways, on the basis of broad and continuing experience with future studies, policy research, and consultation on f*>licy implementation in a wide range of fields*

One of the products of the co*irse would be a set of materials de- signed for the use of other institutions, who could hold similar courses or incorporate portions of our course into a regular academic curriculum. The development and presentation of this course should be planned over a five-year period. One of its uses would be to reach large numbers of people influential at one or another level of the educational system who in turn can impart the benefits of the course to others. The course should become a major agent of change in the U.S. educational system. Initial versions would probably be designed for five-day presentations to groups of 30 or 40 selected participants. The course would evolve each time it was presented. Later, longer and more intensive courses would be developed as well as shorter sessions intended for very large groups. A subsidiary course might deal with alternative futures for education. The presentation would be organized around issues relevant to educational policy-makers, and designed to serve two purposes. The first is to stimulate the audience and provide information and ideas use- ful to them in their work in education. This would be presumably the

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iDajor attraction for its potential audience, but the presentation would serve a secondary purpose of introducing the idea of a deliberate and systematic examination of alternatives for the purpose of policy formu- lation and decision.

This course would focus attention upon the value-issues raised by policy choices in education, as a step toward the formulation of a teaching device: "alternative basic educational policies." (A paper

discussing an analogous topic, "Notes Toward the Choice of a Basic National Security Policy," was distributed at the September seminar.)

This formulat ion—a systematic comparison of groups of basic themes, values, and emphases affecting basic foreign and military pol icies--has been found an effective teaching tool in the regular Hudson Institute semina recourse. For example, it might be useful to distinguish, in any formulation of edu- cational policy, among the following "levels of analysis":

1. Societal values and contexts

2. Educational objectives

3. Educational theories and strategies

4. Educational techniques and tactics

5. Administrative implementation

6. Educational resources, capabilities, and constraints

7. Societal resources, capabilities, and constraints

Next, one might consider, in terms of the above hierarchy of con- siderations, the kinds of roles educational systems may play. For example, they may be used to:

1. Further social, political and cultural ends: skills, knowledge,

habits, styles, attitudes, and values

2. Do same for vocational ends

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3. Encourage, cultivate, or satisfy various individual desires, talents, or needs

Evaluate, certify, and select for various individual, educational, vocational, governmental, and other purposes

5. Further mental and physical health

6. Provide different kinds of custodial care, entertainment, social opportunities, social status, or in loco-parenti s roles

7. Display skill, concern, wealth, modernity, etc., of parents or community and political leaders

8. Provide economic and prestigious opportunities

In achieving these purposes, a large range of "values," such as the following, may be involved, either as ends-1 n-themsel ves or as subsidiary norms:

1. Respect and recognition (competitive and mutual)

2. Wealth (access to commercially available resources)

3. Physical well-being (safety, health & comfort)

4. Physical power (over things — territoriality?)

5. Political power (over people & community decisions)

6. Change, stability and/or continuity

7. Rectitude, duty and responsibility (fulfilling ethical, moral and/or religious imperatives)

8. Achievement (gaining and using skills, meeting challenges)

9. Play, spontaneity & self-expression (being oneself?)

10. Enlightenment and understanding

11. Friendship, companionship, affection & love (to give and/or to receive)

12. Spiritual, mystical, & religious experiences, codes and/or f ul f i 1 Iment

13* Adventure, excitement, danger

14. Loyajty to or su^ergence in familial (shared fate, common commitment, ego-identlf Icatlon) structures

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15* Sensual satisfaction (food, sex, music, art, aesthetic and pleasant surroundings and experiences)

16. Egoistic immortality (recognition)

17* "Perversions" (masochistic, sadistic, nihilistic, etc.)

18. Praise, reassurance, attention, etc.

19. • Satisfaction of feelings of anger, revenge, other hostile

emot i ons

20. Assurance and confidence about any of the above

To what extent are such values capable of being integrated into vari- ous alternative basic educational policies? Clearly some cluster more easily than others; some would be difficult to apply in a manner consistent with the others.

We rather assume that the educational system will continue to concen- trate its planning on educational and societal resources, capabilities and constraints rather than more abstract perspectives. However, in our course we will discuss other perspectives so that some participants may choose and learn to explicate these perspectives better--and so that others may improve their understanding of the arguments against these perspectives. The ob- jective is not to impart a superficial knowledge about one of these per- spect ives--any particular perspective, if posited in isolation, is likely to seem extremely persuas ive--but enough knowledge of all the perspectives so that there will be at least a minimum level of competence and reliabil- ity in dealing with them, or in effect a significant raising of the general level of discussion of these issues.

It should be noted that other sources of support permit us to carry on a general program of designing alternative world futures in other areas of both foreign and domestic policy. For example, we have a contract for a three-year program to develop for the Advanced Research Projects Agency

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of the Department of Defense (on behalf of the Office of the Director of Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs) an "Analytic Summary of U.S. Basic National Security Policy Issues." This analytic summary will be presented both in written and in course form. The program for the Department of Defense will com- bine an organized presentation of substantive material with a considera- tion of policy analysis as applied to national security policy.

Our principal clients for both the defense and the education courses are similar — heads of departments with broad responsibilities but techni- cal backgrounds (e.g. the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering) — as well as both the faculty and the students of advanced professional schools such as the National War College, the Naval War College and the Air War College, and undergraduate colleges such as the Air Force Academy and West Point (with all of whom we happen to have established wc^rking relationships), and other professionals engaged in policy research in organizations such as RAND, IDA, SRI, MITRE and SDC, etc. There is thus an overlap in the content and method of the courses appropriate to these various groups, which, in our experience, can be fruitfully exploited. This overlap can probably be made to work equally well with educational policy-makers and adminis- trators at the federal, state, and local levels, including superintendents and members of Boards of Education or Boards of Trustees, as well as pro- fessors of educational philosophy or psychology, faculty members in other university departments, and primary and secondary school teachers.

The policy analysis part of the program proposed in this report would be an attempt to apply (with appropriate modifications) some relevant por- tion of Hudson Institute methodological approaches and concepts in an

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analogous way to educational policy. It would Include, for example, both a consideration of the relevant levels of analysis for educational policy questions and a cross-cutting discussion of alternative educational strate- gies. We believe it would be particularly Illuminating to investigate further how differing values, assumptions, and calculations with respect to education lead to different educational policies. We have made a start toward dealing with these issues under our current contract. The purpose of this, of course, will be to help make the educational policy-makers who attend the course capable of making the decisions for which they are re- sponsible in a more sophisticated way, and in particular with a fuller understanding of the alternatives that are available to them.

in addition to the work we have done and will be doing for the Depart- ment of Defense on policy analysis, many of the ideas and pedagogical tech- niques developed in earlier work by Hemian Kahn for the RAND Systems Analy- sis course would be applicable here. While many of the ideas discussed above are oriented toward educational considerations in a general way, we would make a further proposal to do special new work on educational policy jger. S£.. The presentation of the ideas and approaches developed in this work may be primarily as examples in connection with the methodological points discussed above, or it may be desirable to give them separate attention.

To propose an example of a study we might undertake, it would be quite useful to draw up a "h i stomap"--a systematic description at suc- cessive points in time--of the U.S. educational system and possibly of some of the systems of other countries. Our report on literacy in the year 2000 (see Part V) indicates that at least as a tentative conclusion the educational systems of various countries even with very different

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cultures tend to follow a similar pattern, needing about a century to educate a population from illiterate to literate. One of the crucial tasks of the educational system is that of acculturation, of converting pre-industrial to industrial, industrial to mass-consumption, and mass- consumption to post" industrial societies. And many of the issues that have appeared in the past are likely to recur. The study of them and the consequences of various patterns of handling them should be relevant to the future as well as to the past, and to the most advanced as well as to the less advanced states.

C. Comments on Policy Research for Education

1 . Lead-Time

Educational policy-makers are becoming acutely aware that a child who finished kindergarten this year will be graduated from college in the class of 1984, and more than half his life may be lived in the twenty-first cen- tury. There is increasing concern that we have done little to assess the adequacy of the preparation he is already receiving for the distant future, when its effects will still be felt, but we can sketch some broad parame- ters along which future worlds are most likely to vary. Such an exercise, even if only partially successful, can provide a fruitful context in which to carry out five- to ten-year stud ies--wh ich can influence immediate policy choices.

There is also the problem of timing. Much more than in, say, weapons systems, decisions made today shape our educational situation and commit- ments in the 1970' s and 1980's. We estimate that the educational system, as a whole, spends less than 10% of the proportion of its budget that the Defense Department spends on long-run policy research and planning. Yet

the need to plan ahead is as great: the development and implementation

of new cu rr i cu 1 a“"to say nothing of new teachers, new teaching methods, and new school systems— take many years. Curricula must be devised now if they are to affect, from grade one onward, those entering the world of adults from high school in 1980, from college in 1984, or from profes- sional schools toward the turn of the millenium.

2. Need for Shared Ideas

The "exponential" growth of knowledge popularized by Derek Price is now a well-known idea. This burgeoning of knowledge can be handled, if at all, only by the development of new "intellectual technologies." The issue becomes crucial for the planner or decision-maker who must make "rational choices" between fuzzy alternatives under concrete and immediate pressure. By supplying new knowledge in capsule forms, by focusing it spe- cifically on the immediate area of decision, by presenting it "propaedeu- tical ly" and "heuristically," the policy researcher can help bridge gaps

among knowledge, program, and action.

Beyond that, policy research must also recognize the larger problem, namely that this abundance of information, tied to enormous political and economic power, will be giving us an ever wider range of social choices; yet our present philosophies and institutions do not afford us the scope of vision and the flexibility to make these choices with the wisdom and responsibility they demand. Our crisis is not one of too much knowledge, for advancing learning should lead to greater simplicity, and greater ease of learning and instruction. It is rather that we lack a synthesizing view of man, a view that would constellate the randomness of our new knowl- edge and give direction to our new power of decision. Yet this very

circumstance forces us to ask whether such a view is possible and what, after all, is the role of education as a transmitter of culture and of values.

As Douglas Bush, among others, has pointed out:

...for centuries Europe had a cultural solidarity that transcended national and religious boundaries. All or almost all the great original thinkers and writers had more or less the same kind of classical education and read, spoke, and wrote the same language, literally or metaphorically or both...''

But for post-industrial and post-Cartesian man, the unity of the world has been shattered. In education, each discipline has its own increasingly eosteric symbols, concepts, and jargon--and students are seceding from institutions of higher learning on the ground that they no longer educate and that because of this they are, in the word of the drop-outs, irrelevant,

3. Special Educational Needs of Decision-Makers

The desirability of explicitly educating decision-makers so that they are better able, in effect, to plan the destiny of the nation, or to carry out the plans formulated through a more democratic process, should be very seriously considered. One facet of this procedure would be the creation of a shared set of concepts, shared language, shared analogies, shared references. The authors of the Federalist Papers, the Declaration of In- dependence, and th^^ U.S. Constitution may have done more long-range analy- sis and planning between 1775 and I787 than has been done in any comparable historical period. These men shared a relevant frame of experience: they

all had practice in business, law, public office, or local politics, and they had all read Locke, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Tacitus, Plutarch, and the

'‘Quoted in Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 108-109.

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Bible, from which they could illustrate their points without confounding their audience. In short, they could draw on a vast body of shared con- cepts and metaphors.

The quality of American discourse today--or lack of it— can be seen as a result of our loss of sLzh a common conceptual vocabulary, partly because of the fragmentation of education. Universal re-teaching in the spirit of the humanistic tradition of Europe — at least for a comprehen- sive leadership group--might be useful in many ways. For example, there is a great deal of concern expressed today--among otiierj^ by many city p lanne rs— about the problem of checks and balances and the obstacles they create to getting things done. Anyone familiar with Greek, Roman or even modern European history understands that very often the tyrant or the Caesar represented himself--and v^/as accepted--as the champion of the masses against the ol igarchs--that is, of the interest in getting things done for the masses over the interest in maintaining checks and balances held up by the vested interests and status quo groups. This understand- ing should enhance awareness of the rationale for checks and balances.

To the extent that we wish the educational system to preserve, enlarge and enhance democratic procedures, this kind of historical perspective may be of extreme importance, but clearly we will not be able to do anything like returning to the "classic" European tradition in education. We could, however, encourage certain kinds of courses, in history, politics, economics, the social sciences, which would be in

effect courses in the study of the future, designed to present the relevant aspects of these disciplines. There is a certain super- ficial similarity here to the great books programs and the great ideas programs and the "man in civilization" courses of the past — and in

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fact there would be some overlap of material. The great difference would be in the attempt to focus on what is useful for thinking about the future, and to Interpret ard explain the future. Previously there was a kind of elitism in such studies, which were moreover inspired by a tendency to ape European culture; this meant the courses were both obviously superficial and apparoitly irrelevant to any serious concern in modern life. The courses we suggest, on the other hand, are delib- erately designed to prepare people for modern life and for the future.

They will be able consciously to use or consciously to reject the analo- gies of history, thus preventing many glib and inaccurate manipulations of such analogies, as well as encouraging their relatively valid and relevant — or at least dependable — uses. Although such metaphors can be misused, they carry too much useful information to be dispensed with al- together, For example, labeling a concession a "Munich" can be a useful categorization in the raising of important issues--to reject this cate- gorization means, of course, to argue that the appeasement actually will appease the would-be aggressor, or is actually a compromise that simply conforms to current norms of international justice.

The policy researcher should also seek to recreate more effective discourse by identifying or inventing new metaphors appropriate to current experience and needs. Just as conceptual clarity can enhance the elucida- tion of issues in general, the judicious use of metaphors can effectively denominate the various possible views on an issue and the arguments that can be brought to support them.

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if. New Skills Needed In the Post- industrial Society We cannot train people for Jobs that do not exist, in industries that have not been created. But we do know that routine and labor-intensive

jobs will be increasingly computerized and automated, and we can antici- pate a preponderant need for people who are more proficient than ever in

at least four areas of human "skills."

a. Cognitive processes — the traditional emphasis of education. As our society comes more and more to live by innovation and growth, greater primacy will be placed on the ability to codify particular knowledge into general theoretical systems which can be related to many diverse situations, as distinguished from more specific kinds of information and technical skills.

b. Emotional growth. Effective management is quintessential ly an exercise of sensibility in human relations, for example in "fitting the man to the job" and creating the conditions in which various personalities can work creatively together. In the complex organizational structures of the future, made possible largely by computers and other managerial hardware,

the "soft" skills of face-to-face sensibility will be needed at least as much as today. Moreover, emotional development as an end In Itself has

often been neglected in the schools in comparison with intellectual devel- opment, and for a number of reasons not all of which are lik 'v to remain persuasive under future conditions.

c. Aesthetic concerns. Increased affluence and leisure will be re- flected in an expanded social concern and consumer market for artistic activities, in the broadest sense of that term.

d. Ethical development. Ethical speculation is far from being con- sidered a traditional economic activity. However, in the near future the vastly enlarged range of choices open to individuals and organizations.

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and the growing awareness of the complexity and the consequences of ac- tion, should greatly increase the public as well as the private value of more sophisticated and systematic, perhaps more formally organized, effort devoted to ethical issues.

Education for proficiency in these general activities, as well as in the traditional skills imparted by the educational system, represents not only individual and social gain, but an attractive and vital long-term national capital investment.’'

5. Expectations and Policy Decisions

The proposed Hudson Institute course--and many other educational of- ferings of the future--should be concerned with technological, economic, political, and cultural prospects, and the opportunities and dangers they seem likely to present in the next several decades.

The purpose of speculating about the relatively distant future is not to "predict." A "crystal ball" is impossible; the future does not exist, and is indeterminate in crucial respects. In the usual "forecasting" model, one "looks at" the "future," and on the basis of what he "sees," forms ex- pectations, and makes decisions that "change the future." (See Figure A.)

However, Figure B illustrates a more real’ tic procedure. The purpose of developing expectations about the more distant future is simply to furn- ish a better perspective on current trends and tendencies and thus to make decisions that are intended to intervene in these trends, in order to make future improvements. Moreover, expectations concerning the future are based, necessarily, on trends that connect the past with the present. Thus

*These issues are discussed in somewhat greater detail by Richard Brown in Part VI, "A Role for Higher Education in Post-Industrial Society."

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O

FIGURE A. CRYSTAL-BALL FORECASTING

FIGURE B. LONG-RANGE POLICY PLANNING

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trends, and therefore history, play central roles In long-range planning. One must expect many "surprises" In the future, so that a simple continua- tion of current trends would In Itself be extremely surprising. Yet any specific scenario containing particular surprises would be even less plausible. Thus the "design case" for long-range planning Is the "sur- prise-free" projection. This rasies the question, "What are the very long-range tendencies that, in the absence of surprises, would probably continue?"

Among the Important respects in which modern industrial society has differed, and differs increasingly, from pre- industr ial societies are its unprecedented degrees of affluence, its even more extraordinary develop- ment of technology, and the institutionalization of secular, manipulative rational I ty.

Manipulative rationality is the basis not only of further economic and technological development but of certain typical cultural patterns and ways of life. These basic trends of Western society can be seen as a part of a common, complex trend of interacting elements— most of which can be traced back as far as the twelfth or eleventh centuries. For analytic purposes, we have separated them into thirteen rubrics,* as follows:

1. Increasingly sensate (empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, pragmat i c ut i 1 i tar ian , contractual, epicurean or hedonistic) cultures. This means in effect humanistic criteria for innovation and social norms, as opposed to traditional or religiously absolute criteria.

2. Bourgeois (including revisionist communist), bureaucratic, "meritocratic," democratic (and nationalistic?) elites. This means, in effect, decision-making by groups interested in rational calculation of costs and effectiveness, in "sensate" terms, of various alternatives, some of which may be novel.

“Described in more detail in The Year 2000. op. cit . . Chapter I.

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3. Systematic accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge

4. Institutionalization of change, especially research, develop- ment, innovation and diffusion

5. World -wide industrialization and modernization

6. Increasing affluence and (recently) leisure

7. Population growth

8. Urbanization and (soon) the growth of megalopolises

9. Decreasing importance of primary (and recently) secondary occupations

10. Increasing literacy and education

11. Increasing capability for mass destruction

12. Increasing tempo of change

13. Increasing universality of the multifold trend

These processes of change, each facilitating the other, have become rout inel y--one might even say inexorably--exponent ial ly cumulative. As a result the rate of change itself has also increased exponentially; while it is not likely that many of the changes that are in process will begin to decelerate during the next third of a century, it does seem likely that some of these trends will reach limits at some foreseeable point. Some of these trends present serious issues; indeed some of the problems created by our successes in achieving unprecedented kinds of economic and technological powers may even prove overwhelming.

The proposed course should examine in some detail hypotheses such as

the following:

1. On the whole, given current political, economic, technological, and military developments, the likely instabilities do not seem to include major nuclear war or other dramatic military setbacks for the "old" nations, at least within this century.

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2. Looking further ahead, however, the potential results of "pro- gress" in military technology and in other forms of "Faustian" technological and economic powers seem to be reasons for sober concern, and perhaps even dread.

3. In any case, in the affluent societies, there should be a change toward a "post-industrial" and to some extent post-business (or perhaps "post-productive") society, characterized by dominance of the service, rather than the manufacturing sector, of non- profit motivation, and perhaps an erosion of advancement-oriented, work-oriented and achievement-oriented values. These likely changes would have marked cultural and aesthetic consequences which may be as important as the direct economic and political effects.

k. In the underdeveloped world, there is a serious danger of in- creasing disarray and irrational reactions .to modernization and the impact of the West.

5. There are, however, attractive prospects for very high leverage and other new economic development prospects, which suggest some- thing about patterns of innovation and development in many areas in the underdeveloped nations.

One of the great tasks of the future will be to facilitate intellec- tual preparation for the kinds of social decisions that will be required in the very affluent, extremely technological, rapidly changing, and partly post- industrial society that seems likely to come into being in the next few decades.

While it is usually desirable to solve old problems even when the solutions themselves give rise to new problems, it has becoriie increasingly clear that our technological and even our economic achievements are mixed blessings. Through progress such issues arise as the accumulation, aug- mentation, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the loss of privacy and solitude; the Increase of governmental and/or private power over individuals; the loss of human scale and perspective and the dehumani- zation of social life or even of the psychob iolog ical self; the growth of dangerously, vulnerable, deceptive, or degradable centralization of adminis- trative or technological systems; the creation of other new capabilities

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so inherently dangerous as seriously to risk disastrous abuse; and the acceleration of changes that are too rapid or cataclysmic to permit suc- cessful adjustment. Perhaps most crucial, choices are posed that are too large, complex, important, uncertain, or comprehensive to be safely left to fallible humans.

Intellectual preparation will probably require better understanding of issues such as the following:''

• iF.suFS PAibPp PY HAPID '‘TFrHr; )Lor- icAr

1. OANGFPPUi T' CM'J-.l. GY

Z. GR.Al'l,.AL AMD/OP. NATIONAl C!jNTA^< ||;AT I -In OR rjEGRAOATION OR THF ENVIRONMENT

3. SPECTACULAR AND/OR MULTINATIONAL CONTAMINATION OR DEGRADATION OF THE ENVIRONMFNT

A. OANCtf-OUS INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES

liFSi.r.'ING INTEPNATIONAl. CUNSFQUFNrFS

6. DANCFROl'S PERSONAL CIIOICFS

7 RIZARRE ISSUES

F''Pi,0S! Vrs, tUG'-iPtEO "AS CE i FOGES , FT'.

L. RESEARCH '"■SSIlL'j. S.*TELLnE LH‘JNUIEF.i, COfMERH A'FCP./r^ >.T .

t. r.iCi jr iCAL A'll CHFMir. !. 'i'P?CP' S'."

E. i'..7LL.".AR BI0L.’GV and GEiJETI-C.S

G. "f'lNj CONT'nC'l'

H. NEV/ TECHKiOiJES "uR IN:UKGLNCY, CRIMINALITV OR OP.DINARi ‘-OLENCr

!. NEW TFCHNivCCS f,.r cO’NTEP I NSI'-RGENC- OR iMP.RsIT'ON 0" ORDE.R

J. Nl> -SERENPlPITiEs ' -aND SYNERC'EM'.

AtJlj/OP NATIONAL CONTAMINATION OR : p7n.t.An..riC.N OF THE ENVIRONMENT

• ■.n'l ‘C f'EBR'S FROM ''ARIOUS PFACLF'JL NU'.'LEAP. i'SEC

.. • • t.RFEHHOU'..E OR OTHER EFFECTS FPCM INCREASED I,. HE ATMCSF-HFRE

■*. .J.-mT

• Eii^' waste:

, ..;.-,CT[ . '.f-PRIS. AND JUST PLAIN GARBAGE

. • • f.-c.. ArSOCJAlE:. WIT^h mOO'"RH

‘ ■ '.iN

» ' R .n' "I 'i

1 I

3. SPECTACULAR AND/OR MULTINATIONAL CONTAMINATION OR DEr=RADATiON OF THE ENVIRONMENT

A. NUCLEAR WAR

B. nuclear TESTINo

C. BACTERIOLOGICAL AMD CHEMICAL WAR OR ACCIDENT

D. ARTIFICIAL MOONS

E. PROJECTS WE'' STORM FURY, STArsflEL, ETC.

F. ri'Pnr.sntii.'. '• ‘fT| fv shctk l.*'

G. WFATHEK fONTP...

►. L!': ' -flCI • .'rxXL /ia

i. m'Llion- roM ’ • • •■i . v i.-Ns" . •/ - '"u.' \ . i ,P?5 ^

AND Ml.! I ;j. .

J. (VHCR LNT[Rr'!i..E • ' nr ’.mESSIVE' SiZE

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• , DANGEROUS INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES

. np’jterized records

' •-HER COMPUTERIZED SURVEILLANCE

. OTHER ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOR SURVEILLANCE

t.XCESSIVELY DEGRADABLE (OR UNRELIABLY REASSURING) ;‘iTHAI.!ZCD CAPABILITIES

Mt’KOVED KNOWLEDGE OF AND TECHNIQUES FOR AGIT-PROP AND r»ER MFANS OF CREATING DISTURBANCES

' •tf'ROVED KNOWLEDGE OF AND TECHNIQUES FOR PREVENTING ■>' >T.JRBANCES

■IMPLEX OR CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES LEADING TO EITHER ■ TECHNOCRACY" OR "CAESARISM"

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFFECTING INTERNAL POLITICS

EvCtSSI ./ELY ILI.US10NED ATTITUDES

LiANGERCliS ATTITUDES

6. DANGEROUS PERSONAL CHOICES

A. CHOOSF SEX OF CHILDREN

B. GENETIC ENGINEERING

C. SUPER-COSMETOLOGY

D. LENGTHY HIBERNATION OR PRESERVATION OF CORPSES FOR POSSIBLE LATER REVIVAL

E. PSYCHEDELIC AND OTHER MOOD -AFFECT I NG DRUGS

F. ELECTRONIC STIMULATION OF PLEASURE CENTERS

G. OTHER METHODS OF SENSUAL SATISFACTION

H. DROPPING OUT AND OTHER ALIENATION

i. OTHER EXCESSIVE PERMISSIVENESS AND SELF-INDULGENCE J. EXCESSIVE NARCISSISM

A DYSTOPIAN SEQUENCE

!. A SERIES OF RELATIVELY SMALL CHANGES IS PROPOSED.

... IN EACH CASE THE CHANGED SITUATION IS THOUGHT TO BF PREFERABLE (BY, SAY, A VOTE OE THE RELEVANT DECISION- MAKERS OR COMMUNITY) TO THE OLD SITUAtlGN.

5. THE CHANGES ARE CUMULATIVE.

i* ONlY after THE SERIES OF CHANGES HAS BEEN MADE CO •'‘••UPLE THINK OF THE MEW SITUATION AS UNDESIRABLE (UX L'lSASTROUS (OR DOES THE SITUATION BECOME ONE WhiCH WE WHO INITIATED THE PROCESS WOULD .lUDGE UN- r:'‘.!F‘'BlF) .

. .■[ . =7 IS NOW IMPOSSIBLE TO REVERSE THE SEQUIN'/L

.'..'BF OF IRREVOCABLE CHANGES, TOO GREAT AN •N. •• .T,-irNr, OR CHANGED V/H.UE3.

I V. UPSen'ING INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

A. BOTH NEW AND "TRADITIONAL" DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS

B. TECHNOLOGICAL OBSOLESCENCE OF "UNSKILLED" LABOR- POSSIBLE

C. NEW SYNTHETICS— E.G., COFFEE, OIL, ETC.

D. FORCED MODERNIZATION

E. GROWING GJILT FEELING? BY many IN WEALTHY NATIONS — PARTICULARLY AMONG THE ALIFNATED OR YOUNG

F. INEXPENSIVE AND WIDELY AVAILABLE "REALISTIC"

COMMt'VI CATION? AND PHYSICAL TRAVEL

G. ACCCLERATED "BRAIN DRAINS"

H. CHEAP (SYNTHETIC?) FOOD

I. CHEAP EDUCATION

J. CONTROL AND EXPLOITATION OF THE OCEANS, SPACE, MOON, AND EVEN THE PLANETS

L. BIZARRE ISSUES

A. GENER^\TIONAL CHANGES. £. G. EXTENDED LONGEVITY

B. MFCHANICALLY DEPENDENT HUMANS, E.C. PACEMAKERS, DImBETICS

C. LIFE AND DEATH FOR THE INDIVIDUAL, E.G. ARTIFICIAL KIDNEYS, ETC.

D. NEW FORMS OF HUMANITY, t.G. "LIVE" COMPUTERS

E. "FORCIBLE" BIRTH CONTROL FOR "IMPOSSIBLE" GROUPS OR NATIONS

F. OTHER EXTERNAL CONTROLS OR INFLUENCE ON WHAT SHOULD BE A PERSONAL OR EVEN INSTITUTIONALLY PRIVATE CHOICE

G. LIFE AND DEATH OR OTHER CONTROL OF "OUTLAW" SOCIETIES WHICH HOWEVER HAVE NOT YET COMMITTED ANY TRADITIONAL CRIME

H. EVEN THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM

I. CONTROLLING AND LIMITING CHANGE AND INNOVATION

J. RADICAL ECOLOGICAL CHANGES ON A PLANETARY SCALE

K. INTERPLANETARY CONTAMINATION

WAYS TO GO WRONG

1. CRITERIA TOO NARROW

2. DECISIONS AT INAPPROPRIATE POINT IN THE STRUCTURE (FOR THE END IN VIEW)

3. INADEQUATE THOUGHT

4. BAD LUCK: UNKNOWN ISSUES

5>. BAD LUCK; UNLIKELY EVENTS

6. CHANGES IN AC'ORS

7. INAPPROPRIATE MODELS

8. IN,AFPRGPR?ATr VAI.-JFS

9. OVER- OR UNDtP-DISCGUNTING OF UNCERTAINTY OR OF THE FUTURE

10. THE BEST MA'- BF TUP ENEMY OF THE GOOD (AMD SOME- TIMES vicr. versa)

I

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iH' 'tlTf'tS or rUTURE -ORIENTEO FDliCv RF rMt^Cn

1-25

THE BARGAIN OF FAUST

I. f.TIMULATE AND STRETCH THE IMAGINATION AND IMPROVE THE .PECTI VE

^ '.lARlFY, DEFINE, NAME, EXPOUND, AND ARGUE MAJOR ISSUES

formulate AND STUDY ALTERNATIVE POLICY "PACKAGES" AND CONTEXTS

■REATE PROPAEDEUTIC AND HEURISTIC HF.THOOOLOG I ES AND ‘^'■'RADIGMS

S IM''rCVE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION

f. , iJCREASE THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY NEW PATTERNS AND CRISES ANO UNDERSTAND THEIR CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE

]. FURNISH SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND GENERATE AND DOCUMENT '■ONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

8. .'LAPIFY current choices— (hedging, CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AND COMPROMISING)

9. BROADEN AND IMPROVE THE BASIS FOR BOTH POLITICAL DECI- SION-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS IN DEALING WITH HEW TRENDS AND CRISES

FAUST;

■ ■ , '"Ui'LU, n pep OF SuTTH,

YOU Li/^Y DLiTFC'r Mt ‘ AKl THCki:.

IF EVEF FiATTLRINC YOU SHOULD WILE ML THAT IN MYSELF I FIND DELIGHT,

IF WITH ENJOYMENT YOU BEGUILE ME,

THEN BREAK ON ME, fTERNAL NIGHT'.

THIS BET I OFFER.

ME PH IS TO:

I /• iT.

IF TO THE H'thfK'- I SHOULD £AV;

Asir:, YOU ,APi Si , a>!k—

PUT ME IN tetters OS T'-'AT DAY,

I WISH TO PERISH THEN, I SWEAR.

THEN LET THE DEATH PELL EVER TOLL,

YOUR SERVICE DONE, YCU SHALL BE FREE, THE CLOCK ‘tsy STTF, ’’HE HAND MAY FAIL, AS TIHF ''OMF.S TO AN FND FOR ME.

'Goethe's oi‘s t . He. ly iian. lateo viili ar Introriuctio Wo'-.'" KauFfiann, DouLledav f Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1961 O') . ’ S3 .

Deciding, as a society, what should be done with new scientific, technological, and economic capabilities means developing a capacity to make judgments, or to appreciate judgments that have been made by "ex- perts," on matters such as the evaluation and comparison of costs and benefits of alternative policies, and problems of various institutional arrangements for protecting interests such as those that comprise the following three pairs of related dilemmas:

1. A) preserving a willingness and capability for efficiently

exploiting new technological opportunities,

B) yet, at the same time, making social decisions to refrain from exercising dangerous options;

2. A) regulating centrally such choices as may be, in the aggre-

gate, socially dangerous,

B) yet, at the same time, preserving freedom of individual choice;

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3. A) dealing publicly and explicitly with certain issues that

have been heretofore left to the discretion of individuals or private groups (e.g., of physicians),

B) yet, at the same time, preserving, in selected cases, the advantages of deferring or delegating explicit decisions.

6. The Standard World and Variations

The basic long-term multifold trend we described in some detail in The Year 2000 has many implications for the social and cultural context in which the graduates of the educational system will have to live, the demands that will be made on them as well as the opportunities open to them. For example, it will be a very small world, with massive tourism and people maintaining residence in more than one country. This implies the need for more cosmopol i tan attitudes, for training in foreign languages (dialects?) or in cross-cultural and trans-cul tural issues, communica- tions and the like. The educational system will also substitute for the possible absence of stark 1 ife-and-death political and economic issues in the old nations, for this kind of reality testing. We may wish to teach much more macro-history, particularly much more about Greek and Roman cul- ture and about other ancient cultures, their rise and fall. Man may have managed to gain control of his destiny for the first time in history; he ought to have some idea what has happened to the various societies before h im.

We may make a surprise-free projection of the school system and the various demands on the system, keeping in mind the fact that in many situ- ations the most surprising thing that can happen is to have no surprises. However, in The Year 2000 we considered several variations from the sur-

prise-free projection for the world as a whole. Let us list them here.

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and ask what they might mean, briefly, for the educational system,*

a. More integrated, stabi 1 itvoriented: This is a world in which

there is relatively little emphasis on altruism on the part of the wealthy nations of the world, though they do a reasonable and competent job of taking care of the poor nations. In this world there might even be some difficulty in finding enough challenging "natural" projects to satisfy the needs on the part of youth to do something significant. One could imagine an expanded Vista and Peace Corps type activities to satisfy altruistic urges, although there will never be any lack of less dramatic, but still worthwhile projects. The components of national security are even less pressing concerns than they are today, and the phenomena of the dropout may grow, as a revolt against the society which seems to be inter- ested only in material goods, peace and prosperity. The educational sys- tem can try to design individuals to fit this system, which means turning out good administrators; the traditional gentleman, the epicurean, even the stoic all have roles here. On the other hand, some effort might well be expended in trying to complement the system, that is, to create people much less oriented to the dominant values.

b. More integrated, development- oriented: Here is a situation in

which the developed world makes a major attempt to improve the economic, social and political prospects of the underdeveloped world. There is a world-wide sense of mankind; everyone is his brother's keeper. Without question the educational system is being asked to train large numbers of people for work in the undeveloped world, and many large numbers of

*See The Year 2000. op. cit. . Chapter VI j for full discussion of these ( ) "Canonical Variations."

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civilians come from the undeveloped to the developed world for training. The difficulties here have to do with the possibility of frustration, of ingratitude and revolt against the excessive paternalism of the developed world, of failure, of cultural aggression rather than cultural empathy, and so on.

c. More inward- looking, with an eroded communist movement: Here

again are many of the problems of the more integrated, stability-oriented world, except that there is not quite so much self-satisfaction in the world-wide sense. If the introversion comes from frustration and low morale, the phenomenon of the dropout and other kinds of erosions, such as the erosion of work-oriented, advancement-oriented, achievement- oriented values, may become quite severe. Again, the fundamental question the educational system has to ask itself is, "fight or further it?"

d . With eroded democratic morale and some communist dynamism : This

would of course result in part from the educational system, which had failed to supply the needed values to fight communist dynamism, and its reversal will depend in part on the educational system's creating new values which have their own dynamism.

e. With a dynamic Europe and/or Japan: Here the issue may well

turn out to be either an attempt to compete with these areas on the basis of more universal values and to overcome the i nward-looki ngness, or a return to older nationalistic values. There might be need for a great deal of training, and cultivation of the work-oriented, achievement- oriented, advancement-oriented values to compete with the revival or intensification of these values in Europe and Japan, so that we do not become another England, in effect a noncompetitive nation.

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f. Greater disarray, with an eroded communist nx>vement: Here the

Issues of why are you not your brother's keeper, why do you Intervene In undeveloped nations, when do you stop the war between Bol'vla and Paraguay, tend to be uppermost. There may be others such as the draft, volunteer soldiers, advisers; or an attempt at more or less throwing weight around to preserve order, or an attempt simply to watch what happens.

Of course one of the most fundamental decisions educational authorities have to make Is whether to live with a trend, accelerate It, retard It, cope with It or expand It. Our own suggestion, for the time being. Is that they

encourage a "mosaic" school system to take account of the needs of what Is likely to be a "mosaic society," with varying demands frcm different parts of the mosaic.

7. Introduction to the Mosaic Society

We might conceive of various kinds of character structures, all of them buried In an American national character, emerging in discrete groups: Americanized cynics (less hippy than the hippies but also less

ascetic than the Greek cynics), Americanized epicureans (a v-^/i thdrawal to personal, family, and emotional values), stoic reactions (the people who actually run the country have a sense of duty) and, of course, materialists, hedonists, the classic American gentlemen, and so on. There is a real possibility that their differences will be deliberately enhanced by the individuals invol ved--for example, by wearing characteristically different costumes--so that their styles of life v-^/ill be conspicuous. When the sense of hierarchy disappears a large part of our alienation and so-called identity crises may be dissolved in openly exhibitina individual identifi- cation with some subculture, or sub-community. Similarly, one would expect

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various kinds of schools, particularly universities, to tend to identify with one or another of these subcultures. It also seems reasonably clear that the three major communities we have discussed elsewhere,* Boswash (from Boston to Washington), Chipitts (Chicago to Pittsburgh) and Sansan (San Diego to Santa Barbara), would not have uniform distributions of these various subcultures, and the tendency to harbor more members of one sub- culture than another will have spiraling effects. That is, those communi- ties with more hippies are friendlier in various ways to the hippies and therefore acquire more hippies, both by emmigration and by nurture, while those which are more commercially, technologically, and business-oriented both create and absorb people of that sort. This might develop into a rather broad “division of labor" among the three areas, although they win not become Internally homogeneous. And, of course, areas such as Cambridge will be flowering with subcultures, and to some degree indi- viduals living there will belong to ail the subcultures more or less si- multaneously, though in varying degrees. In much the same way that ad- vertisers selling essentially similar products deliberately attempt to achieve product differentiation, these essentially similar Americans will attempt to achieve personality and identity differentiation, and, of course, they will not be quite so similar. In short, the need to be dif- ferent is very much likely to come to the fore; the desire and means to display differences will be there, and the cost will be very low. In the kind of “personal society" we project for the future, there will be little or no pressure to conform, except, of course, in those subcultures which insist on conformity, such as some, hippies and most squares.

*The Year 2000. op. cit. . pp. 61-62.

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{

8. Regional Variations

The problems of what we have called Boswash are likely to raise Is- sues that call first of all for regional government of these areas, very possibly including regional educational systems, though these are less likely to be operative at the elementary level than at the post-graduate level. They are most likely to come about through the taxing power; a regional planning authority would become at least financially heavily in- volved in educational issues, simply by trying to equalize the poor and the rich neighborhoods within the region. It is even more likely that the federal government would assume this role, or there might be some combination of the two.

To the extent that the three megalopolises think of themselves almost as separate nations, they could easily adopt very different educational policies. This suggests that the three areas may encounter conflicts of interest, require separate representation, blocs in Congress, for example, or some other organizational expression which in itself might play an im- portant role in causing the acquisition and dispersing of funds for edu- cat ion.

It may be useful to offer some "wild" and exaggerated speculations about how far these variations might go. Sansan might tend to be much more leisured, permissive, "hippie" than the others, while Chipitts would probably try hardest and longest to preserve traditional American values, and Boswash would probably opt for the elite position. The school sys- tems might well turn out to be quite different, if the culture of the re- gions begins to vary dramatically. In fact, if our mosaic hypothesis is f I correct the mosaics may not be structured only within these geographical

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areas: the enormous mobility of the American population in the year 2000

could result less in amalgamation than in centrifugation, with like flock- ing to like. Geographical macro- improvisation would follow the micro- improvisation that occurred among families and individuals.

It is easily conceivable that such relatively minor differences could escalate into major differences. Thus, for example, small col leges might attempt to attract and maintain faculty and students with the appeal of some moral style of life and objectives rather than geographical conven- ience or academic specialization. It is easy to imagine the West Coast having many more hippie colleges than the East Coast and the Midwest hav- ing many more religious requirements or issues than either of the coasts. The schools would in turn tend to change the area around them and along with many other spiraling influences woujd have the effect of making high culture in these various areas very different. Specifically, one could imagine Boswash with ivy-league colleges and many more and more classical European models, the Sansan universities and colleges emulating the South- ern California Bar-B-Q. culture, the sport and open life, and the hippie and casual attitudes, and Chipitts steadily pursuing technology, business and commerce.

D. Conclusion

The need for more historical perspective on the future may be the most crucial issue for future educational policy. Our suggestion for a "mosaic" education system to fit the coming mosaic society hedges on the issue of historical perspective. Of course, from some points of view, for example Sorokin's, this mosaic society is in fact cultural chaos, both the cause and effect of a transition. But even if we accepted this

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argument we would still wish to mitigate some of the worst consequences. Whether or not one accepts Sorokin's pessimistic position, or one more hopeful} it seems clear that the mosaic emphasis permits a great deal of flexibility to the society, satisfies a great many conflicting needs, takes the edge off some of the major controversies and confrontations, and fits in very well with the pragmatic attitudes of the planners.

PART TWO

PROBLEMS IN DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTION FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY PLANNING

By

Raymond D. Gastil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 2-ii i

I. Projections of the U.S. Population 2-1

la. Population Projection by Segmented Analysis 2-22

lb. Projecting Illegitimacy 2-31

II. Projected Distribution of the Population 2-34

I la. Speculative Suggestions on the Application of Segmented

Analysis to Future Patterns of Mobility and Distribution . . 2-49

III. Final Note

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2-i i i

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEMS IN DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTION FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY PLANNING

Perhaps in education more than in any other area a correct understanding of demographic trends in the American population is crucial for planning.

This paper is an attempt to examine a number of issues which will help to i 1 luminate the education projection problem. First, the most recent popula- tion projections of the Bureau of the Census and the theories behind them will be critically analyzed. The discussion will then turn to a theoretical method to improve prediction by looking at the fertility behavior of "segments*

of the population, examining possible trends in the size of these segments.

One conclusion will be that the "best guess" is a lower future population projection than that now generally used for planning.

The discussion will then turn to a description of the mobility of the American population, and considerations involved in its future distribution.

We have less to offer here. The discussion will end by suggesting how the segmented analysis developed for fertility behavior might be applied to an understanding of mobility aspects of the population projection problem as

well.

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2-1

I . Projections of the U.S. Population

Most of those concerned with areas other than population itself confine themselves to considering an average of the Bureau of the Census' latest projections. Such an average is presented in Figure 1,* If plotted on semi- log paper we would see that the projected average essentially presents an even curve of the growth of the American population. In fact, following this curve the rate of growth would be seen to be declining slightly.

The age composition of the population for this kind of prediction is presented in Figure 2. Because of the nature of projections, there should be few surprises here. In the late 1990's the 55"64 group will still re- flect the depression period, and will be abnormally small, while the 35"^^ group will be relatively large as a result of the "baby boom" of the 1950's. It should be added to Figure 2 that the high school population will rise to a peak in the late 1970‘s as a result of the boom and then taper off. Falling numbers of births since 1961 will mean that the smaller first grade coming to school next fall will be followed for at least five years by smaller classes. Of course, for educators the question is: Will this

be only a five year "wave" of smaller classes, a twenty year wave, or a permanent condition? In order to answer questions such as these we will need to go behind a simple averaging of the work of the Census Bureau, look in some detail at the alternative projections being offered by the Census Bureau, and examine the theoretical suppositions upon which their work is based .

^Unless otherwise indicated the reference in section I is Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, "Projections of the Population of the United States," Series P-25, No. 381, December 18, 1967. They do not give an average projection, but this is a rough average of Table FF, p. 46.

A slightly higher (B) projection has often been used in forecasting for other purposes.

I

2-2 HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 1

[

!i

Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports "Projections of the Population of the United States," Series P-25, No. 381, December 18, 196? (rough average of Table FF, p. 46)

! O

I ERIC

HI-1043-RR

2-3

FIGURE 2

U.S, Population by Age (ooo)

1965

2000

2020

Under 5

20434

32,940

43.000

5-9

20,519

30,380

40,000

10-14

18,956

28,990

38,000

15-19

17,052

28,210

36,000

20-24

13.667

26,430

33.000

25-34

22,358

44.480

60,000

35-44

24431

41.390

54,000

45-54

22,045

35.140

43.000

55-64

16,966

22,260

36,000

65 and Over

18,156

28,200

38,000

Total All Ages

194.583

318,420

421,000

SOUKCES: 1965: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P*25, no. 321, 1965, p. II. Year 2000: two*thirds of the way from the B to the C projec- tion of the Census Bureau in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965, p. 6. Year 2020: based on projections in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re- ports, series P-25, no. 286, 1964, pp. 27. 56-57. 64- Census Bureau projections for population in 2010 were used, and bur projection was postulated at two-thirds of the way from their B to their C projection. These figures were then carried ahead using five-year survival rates for 2005-10, age-specific birth rates for 2005-10 two- thirds of the way from the B to the C projected rates, and projected immigration rates.

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000. The Macmillan Com- pany, New York, 1967, p. 169, based on Bureau of the Census, P-25, No. 321.

2-4

HI-1043-RR

The average projection is really based upon an interpolation of four projections (Figure 3). The variations among the four projections are not great for the next ten to twenty years for total popul ation ,al though they may be very important for projecting numbers of births or numbers in school in these years. For example, in I966 there were over 36 million persons age 5-13; the projections for this group in I98O range from less than 33 million in the lowest, (D)'' to 45 million in the highest (A), The implication of this range for educational planning is obvious.

The reasons for the differences among projections are fairly simple.

They are not due to mortality changes. Mortality is expected to change very little in the next forty years, with longevity increasing at least as slowly as it has in the recent past (Figure 4), Incidentally, conquering cancer would increase average life expectancy about 2 1/2 years while "solving" all forms of heart trouble including stroke would increase expectancy more than ten years according to recent estimates.'^' Nonwhite mortal i ty wi 1 1 decline more rapidly than that of the general population. It will be reduced by a combination of rising living standards and changing attitudes toward medicine,

Net immigration is projected to be the same for all four projections.

At 400,000 a year this is 100,000 more than in projections developed three years ago, and is slightly above current experience.

^Bureau of the Census. Series P-25. No. 381. op. cit., p. 80.

^Ibid. . p. 37.

)^n^0n the latter see also Bureau of Labor Statistics/Bureau of the Census, BLS Report, No. 33^* "Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States," October, I967, PP. 61 -65.

ERIC

MMiffjlffTlTLiU

HI-I043-RR

2-5

FIGURE 3

FOUR ALTERNATIVE PROJECT IONS (REPORT #380 Hn Mill ions)

I I I i •

1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

1995 2000 2005 20 IP 2015

Bureau of the Census, P-25, No. 381, 0£. cU . , Table FF, page 46.

2-6

HI-1043-

FiGURE 4

LIFE EXPECTANCY OF MALE AND FEMALE

Statistical Abstract. 1967, P. 53, Table 61.

A, <4. wr 1 fc »i

2-7

!

i )

HI-1043-RR

All variation in the projections, then, is due to alternative assump- tions as to future fertility of American women and of the ages at which they will have their children. Figure 5 plots the four assumptions as to future levels of the "total fertility rate" in the four alternative Bureau of the Census projections. Total fertility rate is an artificial measure, calculated for each year, of the number of babies which 1000 women between 15 and kk would have during their period of fertility if they continued to have children at age-specific fertility rates recorded for the year in question. The (A) rates are slightly below those recorded in the height of the '.'baby boom" while the (D) rates are slightly above those in the worst years of the depression.

Let us then turn to the arguments for or against accepting one or another of the four alternative projections. In order to do this we should consider some of the history of changes in birth and fertility rates.' Recent variations are recorded in Figure 6. If we extended fertility rates back into time we would see that it is estimated that the rate has fallen more or less steadily from 1800 to 1910, starting off at about 280/1000. In Figure 6, I have added at the right hand margin the fertility rates calculated by the Bureau of the Census for the four alternative projections in the year 1970. It can be seen that rf the authors of the Bureau of the Census projec- tions think that their best guess projection would lie between (B) and (C), then the current trend of the fertility rate is expected to rapidly reverse itself. To some extent the present down trend should be halted simply be- cause of the changing relative size of the chief childbearing group

^he fertility rate is the number of children born per 1000 women during the year in question.

VwVHistorical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1957 , Bureau of the Census, I960, B-19-30.

2-8

HI-I043-RR

FIGURE 5

Burisau of the Census, P-25, No. 381, p. 3Ut Table T.

HI-1043-RR

2-9

FIGURE 6

FERTILITY RATES: UNITED STATES

RATES PER 1,000 FEMALE POPULATION AGED 15-44 YEARS

0 ri ! 1 I ; i I ! I ! T I I 1 , , i _i 1_L- 1 ■ ■ . 1 : ■ ■ .1 0

1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

U.S. Department of Health, Education an: welfare, Heasth Educctioi and Welfare Indicators, September, 1 965 and Public Health Service, Mon t h 1 y Vi tal Statist ics Report , December, I967.

2-?0

HI-1043-RR

(20-30 years old) relative to the whole population to which the rate is applied (15"^). It is also reasonable to suppose that the population will not move toward extinction (e.g, 70/1 000)^., But it requires a more complicated argument, which we should now examine, to explain why the trend will turn back up as much as the Bureau of Census apparently expects.

Previous to the 1940‘s explanation of the fall in the birth rate in industrialized countries was based primarily upon relating this fall to the process of urbanization. Experience in America seemed to indicate that there was a direct relation between movement to the cities and a falling rate. It was assumed by some that this down-trend would even off at bare replenishment (about 2100/1000 total fertility rate) and thus produce eventually a stable population. Others feared that fertility rates might drop still lower unless the government intervened.

A supplementary explanation of variations in fertility rates on the bases of economic conditions has perhaps an equally ancient history, and in a very much modified form is perhaps the most influential theoretical model in use today. According to this theory, shorter term fluctuations in fertility can be explained by the economic experience and prospects of those who should be forming families at the time. According to this theory, low fertility in the depression is an illustration of the avoidance of births by people in difficult financial straits, while the large number of births in the 1950‘s correlated with a period of relative prosperity.

I think, however, that it is important to note that a "man from Mars" without this theory might conclude from Figure 6 that the depression stopped and then reversed a falling fertility rate. Indeed, the fertility rate fell as fast in the 1920's as it did even in the early 1930' s.

To this analyst it appears curious that the falling fertility rate since I96I continues to be explained in terms of this economic theory.

We are told that the young are "poorer" today than they were in the 1950's.

The greatest convolutions are gone through to show us this "fact."'' Actually, the figures simply do not show any trend of this sort. Figures 7 and 8 in- dicate that the last five years have been relatively good times for those most likely to have children.

One variety of the economic theory of fluctuations looks to the effect of economic conditions upon first marriages. Figure 9 illustrates recent variations in the median age at marriage for females. It does appear that a rapidly falling median age did accompany the "take-off" of the baby boom and improving economic conditions. However, the slow and indefinite rise in this age in the last five years does not seem to be enough to account for the recent decline in births.

More generally marriage rates and birth rates as shown in Figure 10 have not always followed one another closely. In the 1920's as marriage rates remained level birth rates fell rapidly. Since the middle 1950's the rates seem to behave differently. Figure 11 presents dramatically the way in which these trends have moved in opposite directions since 1963.

Figure 12 suggests that one accompaniment of this pattern of many marri- ages and fewer children seems to be that the important change from i960 to today has been in second through sixth births. There has been relatively little change in the fertility rate for first births. (Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that since the depression there has also been little change in the rate for births at birth orders from seven up.

VfMore detailed discussion of some of this material may be found in R. D. Gastil and Paul Berry, Alternative Birth Rate Projections to 1975 for Maternal and Child Health Planning, HI-607-RR» Jsnuary 24, 1966, pp . 1 4-2 1 .

2-12

Hl-1043-Rf(

FIGURE 7

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

WHITE

N0NWH1TE

<950

4.9

9.0

1953

2.7

4.5

»956

3.6

8.3

•959

4.8

10.7

1962

4.9

10.9

• 965

4.1

8.1

•967 (PREL.)

3*4

7.3

HI-1043-RR

2-13

FIGURE 8

UNEMPLOYMENT

RATES FOR MARRIED

MEN

WHITE

NONWHITE

1962

3.1

7.9

1964

2.5

5.3

1966

1.7

3.6

1967

(PREU)

1 .6

UNEMPLOYMENT 16-19

WHITE

NONWHITE

1963

15.5

30.2

1966

11 .2

25. if

1967

(PREL.)

11 .2

26.3

o

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 0£. ci t . . pp. 31 arid 33-

FIGURE 9

MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE (FEMALE)

Statistical Abstract. 1967. P- 64, Table 75-

o

HM043-RR 2-15

FIGURE 10

COMPARISON OF BIRTH AND MARRIAGE RATES RATE PER 1000 POPULATION

Statistical Abstract. 1967, based on Figure V, p. 44.

0

i o

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2-16

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 11

RECENT MARRIAGE AND BIRTH RATES (Per 1,000 Population)

Public Health Service, Monthly Vital Statistics Report. December 1967.

BIRTH ORDER

FIGURE 12

FERTILITY RATE

BY LIVE

BIRTH

ORDER

196!

1940

(per 1000) 1945 1950

'95?

I960

1

30

30

34

33

31

29

2

20

24

32

39

29

23

3

11

13

18

23

23

16

4

6

7

8

13

14

10

5

4

4

4

6

8

6

6

2

2

2

3

4

3

7

2

2

1

2

2

2

8 +

3

3

2

2

3

2

78

iT

103

114

113

91

Statistical Abstract. 1967, P* 50, Table 5^.

2-!8

HI-1043-RR

Growing out of the economic explanation, Rascal Whelpton developed In the 1940's and 1950's the "cohort projection" method. It Is particularly important to realize that the Bureau of the Census seems to accept its approach and assumptions. This acceptance can be shown to have had a good deal o.” influence upon the current projections which we are considering

here.

Whelpton believed that it could be shown that fertility rates appeared to show more variation in family size desires than in fact existed. He argued that the apparent variation was primarily the result of postponing or advancing childbearing in response to changing economic or other condi- tions. In line with this theory the 1930's were a time of postponement and the 1950's a time of advancing. To some extent the 1950's reached unusually high levels because of the combination of these effects. In addition, a falling age at marriage will tend to "pile up" births, but when this age levels out, then the birth rate will fall during the period of readjustment.

An essential ingredient in the Whelpton method is to look at actual groups of women born in particular years (birth cohorts) and then trace them through the childbearing years in terms of their marriage and fertility behavior. An aspect of this "tracing" is to use national interview samples of married women in order to determine a number of aspects of their fertility behavior. In particular the surveys attempt to determine how many children the different birth cohorts have had and expect. On this basis Whelpton and his colleagues were able to show that the very high fertility in the 1950's was probably a passing phenomenon and that fertility rates were bound to fall somewhat in the early 1960's. They could make this prediction

because more women were telling them «.hat they had completed their families

*Pascal Welpton, Forecasts of the Population of the United States.

1975 . Bureau of the Census 19^7; and the Growth of the American Family Studies; R^ld Freedman, P. Whelpton and A. Campbell, Family Planning, Steri 1 itygpdPopiJ: lation Control. McGraw Hill, 1959, and Whelpton, Campbell and Patterson 1

and Family "pT^nninq in the United States. Princeton University Press, 1965.

HI-1043-RR

2-19

than a simple extrapolation of age-specific fertility rates would have suggested. There was also some evidence developing by i960 that the youngest childbearing cohorts in national samples were going to have fewer children than their older sisters.

The cohort projection method is limited in predictive value by the fact that the primary childbearing years are 20-30, and many women who will bear children at these ages cannot be usefully interviewed even 3-IO years ahead. Thus, the Whelpton material did not predict, and could not ha>»e predicted, the continuing and rapid fall in fertility rates since 1964.

Popularly, of course, the 1950's were seen as years in which parents simply wanted much larger families than they had wanted previously. The fac^ that every mother's of all ages were having more children in the I950's than before can also be explained as a fad or fashion which swept over large parts of the society. Support for this position can be found in the pattern of rise in fertility. The peak of first parities was 1947, for second 1952, for third 1957, for fourth I96O-6I, for fifth, sixth, etc., I96I. Age-specific fertility rates for ages 15-19 reached their height in 1957, for 20-24 the peak is 1957-1960. For 25-29 it is 1957-1961. For those 30-34, 35-39 and

40-45, 1957 was also the peak, followed by slow decline to 1961.“

In drawing up its current series of projections it appears that the

Bureau of the Census was guided by two types of influences. First, it did not want to seem to be superficially responding to current information. Secondly, this conservative inclination was buttressed by the Whelpton method's assumption that short-term fluctuations are due less to changes in desired family size than to changes in age at marriage and desired spacing i nterval s .

*This discussion is taken from GastM and Berry, 0£. ci t .

2-20

HI-1043-RR

Popularly, many people believe that the improved methods of birth control, and their wide use in the population is responsible for the present down-turn. Demographiprs can, however, point to fertility behavior for both whites and nonwhites in the depression (Figure 6) which would seem to indicate the relative irrelevance of these methods. Thus, there is a reluctance among demographers to give much credence to the affect of birth control devices — except possibly to slightly raise the age at first marriage.*

This reluctance to respond to current trends is also evidenced by an important change in the basis of alternative projections between 1964 and today. If we look back to the Bureau of the Census projections in 1964 (Series P-25, No. 286) we will notice that there were also four projections (A,B,C,D) but that they were all somewhat higher than those today. The earlier project ions, however , assumed the same number of children by completed fertility per 1000 women in an eventual leveling-off period (i.e., as in Figure 5 above). Ha-^ever, all four projections in 1964 were based upon the same age-specific fertility rates as in 1959-61. For the 1967 projections, the Bureau of the Census decided to vary age-specific rates according to "historical experience." Actually their historical experience consisted only of the experience of that group of cohorts which passed through their chief childbearing years in the 1930's. Thus, because fewer children seemed to be related to bearing children at later ages in the depression, the Bureau of the Census applied this experience to the late 1960's and 1970's in spite of a paucity of evidence that such trends are occurring today. Figure 13

Vi^They are more likely to see this also in terms of economic conditions See the report on a recent Population Association meeting (The New York Times). December 31, 1967. But see W. F. Pratt, "A Study of Marriages Involving Premarital Pregnancies," Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1965-

FIGURE 13

AGE SPECIFIC BIRTH DISTRIBUTIONS

PERCENTAGES OF BIRTHS FOR ALL COHORTS

AGE

REPORT 286 (ALL PROJECTS)

REPORT 381 -D

15-19

12.6

10.6

20-24

34.8

26.9

25-29

27.1

273

30-34

15.5

20.5

35-39

7.8

11.4

40-44

2.1

3.1

45-49

0.1

0.2

1 00 %

100 %

Bureau of the Census, 0£. ci t . , Reports P-25, Nos. 286 and 38I (cf. 286, Table N and No. 38I , Table S, p. 24.

2-22

HI-1043-RR

shc?ws the comparison of the projected birth rates for the lev/ or D In pro- jection B and the rates projected for D in 1964 (No. 286). the difference In these rates and the reason for them is important, because if we try to look at current experience and place this in relation to current forecasts, the "low" or D projection is below current behavior. But i f we go back^to the ^964 projections of what evolution toward 2450/1000 completed fertility would look like if we were moving toward it in the middle 1960's, then it would look as though current birth rates were falling well below the lowest projection (cf. Figure 14). My own feeling is that while there is likely to be some slight rise in average age at childbearing, if we were to take the last two years seriously, which is dangerous, we would project future completed fertility at the 2450/1000 level or lower.

Ja. Population Projection by Segmented Analysis

In a recent Hudson Institute study,* we experimented with using a seg- mented analysis for thinking about birth projections. We believe this has a number of uses, being capable of application as a methodology to a wide variety of analogous questions. In addition, our experiments here supported the hypothesis that a lower birth rate is likely to continue. For there should be a slight downtrend in completed fertility over the next few years, irrespec- tive of changes in fashion. However, without changes in fashion and in birth control effectiveness,’’^’*^ the severity of the current drop could not be ex- plained by this methodology.

The segmented analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first we attempted to look at completed fertility rates for standard segmentations. That is,

^ee Gastil and Berry, op. cit.. pp. 23-58 for a fuller exposition and references .

^WcOn the possible influence of improved birth control see ibid . . pp. 55“57 and 87-94. The segmented analysis Incorporates on these pages the birth control possibi 1 Itles.

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 14

COMPLETED

FERTILITY

REPORT 286-D

381 -D

FINAL COHORTS

PROJECTED POPULATION 1985-1986

2450

248,000

2450

(EARLIER)

242,000

YEARS

ACTUAL

B 1 RTHS/1 OOO-NUMBERS (1000)

1956-1957

25.3-4310

1960-1961

23.9-4350

1963-1964

21 .6-4119

20.9-3977

1964-1965

20.4-3944

20.4-3944

1965-1966

19.1-37^2

20.2-3936

1966-1967

(18.2-3600)

19.9-3928

17.9-35^6

1967-1968

19.7-3930

17.8-3548

1968-1969

19.7-3992

17.6-3555

Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No. 381, ojd. ci t . . p. 22, Table R, pp. 51~52, and P-25, No. 286, especially Table I, Series 0. Also Monthly Vital Statistics Report, December, 1967.

2-24

HI-1043-RR

we looked at rates for whites, nonwhi.tes, catholics, protestants, or those with different levels of income or education. Since education and income are continually changing and have been >hown to be related to fertility rates, we were particularly interested in breakdowns in these terms.

Figu>'e 15 shows the estimated effect on completed fertility of changes in educational levels. Women born between 1923 and 1932 played a central role in the baby boom of the late 1940's and 1950 's. We could estimate their complet fertility on the basis of the i960 census, the Growth of American Family studies, the work of Westoff and others at Princeton and other data. The educational differentials were primarily taken from the i960 census (Women by Children Ever Born). This material was compared with the educational attainment projected by the Office of Education and on other bases for the women born between 1950 and 1954. These latter cohorts will be of central importance in the childbearing of the 1970' s. If we hold completed fertility constant, and change only the percentages in the boxes, then the expected completed fertility falls by about 175/1000.

Figure 16 illustrates the basis upon which the same process might be applied to income. We did not al; the time have income projections of suf- ficient reliability and so did not follow the exercise further.

We next attempted to carry the segmentation approach a step further by considering "family planning segmentations." What we were looking for here were subgroups in the population whose fertility behavior has more internal consistency than that of persons falling into statistical categories broken down by income or education. There was a wide variety of different sources of information vjhich went into this work. The interview data was first. Figure I7 shows, for example, that a large proportion of those having

HI-1043-RR

2-25

FIGURE 15

PROJECTED COMPLETED FERTILITY (PER 1000)

EVER MARRIED NONWH ITE

YEARS OF

SCHOOL

COMPLETED

0-7 8-11 12 +

PERCENTAGE

FERT 1 L ITY

'23" '32

2.5

4.5

3.5

'50-'54

0.5

4.0

9.0

'23-'32 '50-'54

5000

4200

2700

WHITE

CATHOLIC

24.0

23.5

3700

NON-CATHOLIC

0-7

4.5

1.0

4200

8-11

19.5

11.5

3150

12 +

37.0

46.0

2650

NEVER MARRIED

4.5

4.5

100

TOTAL POPULATION

lOOoO

100.0 ca 3100 2925

Raymond Gastll and Paul Berry, "Alternative Birth Rate Projections to 1975 Maternal and Child Health Planning," Hudson Institute, January, 1966, pp. 28 and 32.

2-26

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 16

ESTIMATED COMPLETED FERTILITY (PER 1000) (COHORTS OF 1923-1932)

EVER MARRIED BY FAMILY INCOME

% IN CLASS

FERTILITY

NONWHITE BELOW $2000

$2000-$4000 $4000-$7000 $7000 AND OVER

2.0

3.0

4.0 1.5

4900

4000

3300

2500

WHITE

CATHOLIC

24.0

3700

NON-CATHOLIC BELOW $2000

2.5

4000

$2000-7000

32.5

3150

$7000 AND OVER

26.0

2550

NEVER MARRIED

4.5

100

TOTAL POPULATION

100.0

ca 3100

o

R. Gastil and P. Berry, 0£. c!t. , p. 29.

7

n

HI-1043-RR

2-27

FIGURE 17

WOMEN WITH UNWANTED MOST RECENT CONCEPTION (BY PARITY)

PARITY

WHITE

NONWHITE

0

_*

_*

1

.*

*

*

2

11%

21%

3

28%

39%

k

41%

60%

5

45%

1 77%

6 +

47%

J

Pascal Whelpton, Arthur Campbell, John Patterson, Fertil } ty and Family

Planning In the United States, Princeton, 1966, Table 200, p. 365. R. Cast and P. Berry, op^. cit . , p. 91.

o

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2-28

HI-1043-RR

five or more children report that they do not want them. This Is especially true of the nonwhite population. Figure 18 suggests that for the relatively uneducated women, farm background has a great Influence on fertility behavior, even If the women now live In the city. It was necessary that this extra cultural Information be fed back Into the standard segmentations to get an Idea of the numerical Influence of these factors and the probable size of the groups.

Figure 19 presents a segmentation In terms of this kind of more specu- lative numerical treatment. The same cohorts of women are compared as In the educational segmentation above. The figures In parentheses are, of course, those for the 1950-54 cohorts. The reader will notice that the urbanized large, the wealthy suburban family Is expected to become more common In percentage terms. Yet the effect of this growth Is apt to be more than counterbalanced by reductions In the size of those groups which studies have shown have particular problems In planning families, by re- ductions In the numbers of those still following rurallstic cultural tra- ditions, and In the numbers of those still desiring a large family for religious reasons. The urban small family corresponds to the fertility behavior of the more urbanized European societies, and has for many years.

As It becomes still more dominant in America, fertility should drop. This more speculative approach suggests, then, a fall of 200/1000 In completed f'^rt 1 1 1 ty .

The figures advanced in this last method are highly speculative, but they offer a considerable Improvement In understanding. They suggest, for example, the scale of effect that a radical new decision of the Pope on

2-30

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 19

FAMILY PLANNING SEGMENTATION:

% OF WOMEN BY ESTIMATED COMPLETED FERTILITY (PER 1000), COHORTS OF 1923-32 AND (1950-54)

smz

MARRIED

WHITES

CATHS.

NON-

CATHS.

NEVER

MARRIED

TOTAL

POPULATIOl

COMPLETED

FERTILITY

1000

URBAN-

RURAL-

RELI-

INEFFECTIVE

TOTALS

URBAN

CATH.

IZED

ISTIC

GIOUS

PUNNERS

SMALL

SMALL

LARGE

LARGE

LARGE

LOW

HIGH

10.5

3.0

2.5

1.5

3.5

03.5)

(6.5)

(1.0)

(2.0)

(2.0)

(2.0)

24.0

6.0

3.5

2.0

1.5

8.0

1.5

2.0

(23.5)

(7.0)

(5.0)

(3.0)

(1.0)

(5.5)

(1.0)

O.o)

61.0

40.5

6.0

6.0

5.5

3.0

(58.5)

(42.5)

(8.0)

(3.0)

(3.0)

(2.0)

4.5

(4.5)

100.0

49.5

3.5

8.0

10.0

8.0

8.5

8.5

(100.0)

(55.0)

(5.0)

(12.0)

( 6.0)

(5.5)

(6.0)

(5.0)

3100

2250

2700

3900

4500

4000

3700

6000

(2852)

(2250)

(2700)

(3900)

(4500)

(4000)

(3700)

(6000)

R. Gastil and P. Berry, 0£. ci t . . pp. 55 and 57.

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birth control would be likely to have. They point out the possible effects of more adequate and generally accepted birth control methods on certain groups of the population. They point to possible trends in the size and characteristics of certain parts of the population. For example, as the nonwhite population moves through the cycle to small urban and finally to urbanized large, there may be a dramatic change in the outlook of this population-. The number of lower class, often unwanted Negro babies, has statistically overwhelmed the production of middle class nonwhite babies in the 1950's. Thus, in spite of perhaps 35% middle class Negro adults, 80% of Negro children continued in the 1960's to start life in lower class homes.

With present economic, educational, and birth control trends, this relation- ship may soon change, with very significant and snowballings effects upon the quality of the nonwhite population.

Ib. Projecting Illegitimacy

As a note it might be pointed out that the per cent of all births which are illegitimate continues to rise (Figure 19a). In terms of future pro- jections of the need for special services for children and of welfare burdens this is important to realize. It needs to be mentioned because a decline in illegitimacy, particularly among nonwhites is being reported, this optimism arises from the measure of illegitimacy which is most often reported. This "illegitimacy" ratio relates the number of illegitimate births to the number of unmarried females between 15 and 44. This rate is going down, but it is evidently not going down as fast as the rate of legitimate births.

If we examine Figure 19 we would expect that illegitimacy should decline with more education and with improved availability of better means of contracep'

"'The New York Times. December 31, 1967 report on meeting of Population Association of America.

FIGURE 19a

ILLEGITIMACY BY

PER CENT OF BIRTHS

WHITE

NONWHITE

1940

1.8%

13.7%

I9S0

1.7%

17.0%

i960

2.3%

21.6%

1^5

4.0%

26.3%

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2-33

to the poor. However, it may be significant that the rise in reported illegitimacy seems to correlate with a rise in the availability of welfare support under ADC (Aid to Dependent Children). Although conditions are changing, today it may be as easy or easier to obtain welfare support for an illegitimate child as for a legitimate one. For lower class women who have little faith in men in any event, the change for them in the degree of economic disutility of an Illegitimate birth may have played a considerable role in the rise in illegitimacy, and certainly in the rise in reported illegitimacy. Future changes in welfare laws in a direction which would reward rather than punish "father's" presence in the home could be expected to influence the future of illegitimacy. This is especially true among the poor, for it is here that illegitimacy becomes a problem of the community. Although there is some motion today toward change in these laws, I am not sure how decisive it will eventually be. Moreover, the rise in illegitimacy may well be due more to fundamental changes in social customs and attitudes than to the welfare programs.

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1 1 . Projected Distribution of the Population

The writer has much less definitive and new to offer in the area of projecting the location of future generations. However, for the individual state or community localized projections are likely to be more important than the over-all projection of the U.S. population.

All of us are aware of increasing urbanization and suburbanization.

While there is talk of people tiring of the dull suburbs and returning to the city, the net movement to the suburbs continues. Raymond Vernon has suggested some very good reasons why this is so. Indeed, he sees the dreary rows of houses in Queens as the forerunner of a movement that will continue and for which there is plenty of land for at least another 25 years. In- creasingly there also is a growing tendency for the poor and nonwhites to move to the suburbs.** They are following the Jobs. Vernon's suggestion that only the very wealthy and the managerial and cultural elite really have any long-term interest or need for the city suggests that future trends may dissolve entirely the urban concentration which we have known as the city.

The United States has been characterized since its beginning by migration West. This continues. In the projected regional distribution for 1985 of the Bureau of the Census (Figure 20), the most rapid growth will continue to be in the West, and nearly all of this growth will be in California. However, it is interesting to note that the relative sizes of the regions of the country will be the same in 1985 as today. Moreover, Figure 21 points out that the South will grow in absolute terms more rapidly than the West over this twenty year period. It is also well to note that

VcRavmond Vernon. The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems. Harvard University Press, 1962 (66). Herbert Gans, "The White Exodus to the Sub- urbs Speeds Up," The New York Times Magazine. January 7, I968.

VrtV Raymond Vernon, Letter to the Editor, December 3I » 1967.

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FIGURE 20

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES; 19^0 to 1985

Bureau of the Census, "Revised Projections of the Population ci Stales 1970 to 1985“ Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No 37, Ocr^'b^r, !96? (cover) .

1

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 21

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION (IN MILLIONS) l-B

1965 1985

NORTHEAST 47.6 61.0

NORTH CENTRAL 54.1 68.7

SOUTH 60.1 82.7

WEST 32.0 51.3

Bureau of the Census, P-25» No. 375» op . c i t . , p. 1, Table A.

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HI-1043-RR ^

the population projection used to project distribution was the Census (B) projection. In terms of our discussion in Part I above, the absolute reQional populations will be likely to be smaller than those suggested here.

States with particularly important changes are listed in Figure 22.

It should be noted that generally the states with high net in-migration rates are also growing much faster from natural increase than those with low or negative migration rates. This is because out-migration is con- centrated among those of childbearing age, giving a particularly unfavorable (high dependence ratio) age profile to the declining state. Thus, the effects of fertility and net migration are cumulative for both growing and declining states. The exception here is Florida, with its large retirement population. ’

Figures 23 and 24 suggest that the movement is intra-state as much as it is between states. Almost every state has its metropolitan area which continues to draw people out of the rural areas.

There are, however, a limited number of area-wide growth patterns which can be discussed in the period 1940-1960, patterns of gro^Jth which are con- tinuing today. Figure 24a sketches the areas in which this growth is con- tinuing. Other maps could be drawn, for example with certain bands in the interior South, West Texas, and the Northwest. Generally, however, the rest of the country shows more of a pattern of scattered metropolitan growth than of rapid area-wide expansion. Much of the Gulf Coast and South Atlantic Coast growth areas (Figure 24a) still have counties with low

al«;n National Planning Association. Looking Ahead, June, 196?»

pERlC

hniiniiiimmiqaa

iilliii

1

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FIGURE 22

POPULATION CHANGE,

SELECTED STATES 1965-1985 (PERCENTAGES)

(A)

(B) WITHOUT MIGRATION

(C) ^

ARIZONA

80.6

5^.1

26.5

CALIFORNIA

72.3

43.8

28.5

FLORIDA

81.5

34.2

47.3

UNITED STATES

36.0

IOWA

11.6

27.7

16.1

PENNSYLVANIA

15.3

24.6

9.3

WEST VIRGINIA

-0.3

26.9

27.2

Bureau of the Census, P-25i No. 375i op . c i t . , Table C, p. 5*

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1

/

mssk

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Bureau of {.he Census, I960 Census of Population, Vol . I, Part I, page S-27, Figure 26.

PERCENT OF CHANGE IN TOTAL POPUUTtON, BY COUNHESi 1950 TO 1960

HI-I043-RR

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Bureau of the Census, I960 Census of Population, 0£. £[1. p. S-20, Figure 2k.

-« i'fil'Yliittltlilf'ii

HI-1043-RK

FIGURE 24a

2-41

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2-42 HI-1043-RR

population densities. In these areas the appearance of rapid growth here may be misleading, for rapid growth on a relatively small population base is not necessarily predictive of the future.

The reasons for movement to the Southern coasts and California are largely combinations of technology, distance and changing politics and culture. California is a more desirable climate for most people than the South, but it is further away from "home" for most of America. The acceptance of the technology of air conditioning developed more slowly than that of heating (central heating and car heaters). But in the South and the deserts today most classes afford and expect to live in air conditioning. This opens up much larger areas of the South to acceptable year around living for most Americans.

Ease of living draws together businessmen and high quality job aspirants into forms of production and service which are relatively divorced from primary sources of raw materials and heavy industry in the North. More jobs today are of this nature, and this trend will continue. In addition, the Aerospace Industry prefers Southern locations for instrumental reasons.

To these "new" elements for population movement may be added the chance factors that certain industries such as aluminum, oil and natural gas have located in the South primarily because of the location of natural resources which are now greatly in demand.

Movement to the Eastern and Midwestern megalopolises is largely due to an increasing tendency to centralization in many industries and a de- creasing reliance of the economy on primary sources of materials. Of course, to a considerable extent what is happening in these areas may be an illusion.

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It is simply true that when industrialization took growth away from agriculture, there was already a greater concentration of urban centers in the Chicago- Pittsburg and Boston-Washington areas. As urban and suburban areas every- where grew (see Figures 23 snd 24), only in the latter areas did urban areas seem to grow together to form what is apparently an areal growth. But, to the development of a way of life, the intervening nonurban area between St. Louis and Kansas City may be of no greater significance than that between New York and Phi ladelphia.

Ease of travel, the reliance on the nuclear family, the depersonaliza- tion of our industrial society also makes more acceptable the idea of moving away from one's lifelong home to settle in a retirement area toward the end of life. Increasingly members of the upper middle class have had no life- long home, so their choices are much freer. In addition, with the homogenization of society, the Southerner fears less to move North and the Northerner South, Indeed, in-migration to the Southern coast has already made many such areas as much Yankee as Southern.

The metropolitan areas of the country cannot continue to grow at current rates. In general as a metropolitan area grows, it finds it hard to keep doubl- ing. The pool from which in-migrants are to come also is becoming progressively smaller. It has been pointed out that if all of the SMSA's grew at the rates being projected for them, in a few years they would have more than 100% of the projected U,S, population. Moreover, the total mobility rates for the country have not been rising (see below), therefore, the pool of mobile people is not enough to support continued rapid growth in the next generation in the same places and at the same rates it has occurred in the recent past. Figure 25 illustrates for Dade County (metropolitan Miami) one example of this general of tailing off of growth in favored metropolitan areas. Although still

HI-1043-RR

DADE

FIGURE 25

COUNTY POPULATION GROWTH

ACTUAL

PROJECTED

}SkO

267,739

1950

A95 ,084

I960

935,047

1965

1 ,154,000

1966 (EST.)

1 ,145,410

1970

•

I ,467,000 (1 ,357,000)

I960

•

2,079,000 (1 ,845,000)

1990

2,813,000

Dade County Development Department, "Reflections of a Growing Industrial Community," 1967.

I

HI-1043-RR 2-45

very successful, and bolstered in recent years by the Cuban influx, Miami

is not going to make the median projections which seemed reasonable a few

years ago on the basis of Miami 's recent growth taken in isolation from the

problem of grov>Jth and migration in the nation as a whole. The low projection

(parenthesis) is probably more accurate.

Figure 26 suggests that there has been a slow but fairly steady growth

in the movement of the population from state to state since I9OO. It Is

interesting that this increase should be as slow as it has been despite

radical changes in transportation and communication. Of course, while the

ease of moving to a point has improved, the ease of returning to the point

of origin has improved as much. This may account partially for the fact

that places with high net in-migration have as much out-migration as these

with high net out-migration (see below). Figure 27 points out that mobility

out of county of birth on a yearly basis has been remarkably stable since

1948. About half of those moving out of a county move to another state and

half of these again move beyond neighboring states. These percentages have

also been quite stable over the last twenty years.'*

Mobility rates vary with a number of factors. White mobility out of a

county is twice as high as nonwhite mobility. Higher education and income

are related to greater mobility. For example, long distance moves are twice

as common for the college educated as for other educational levels. Those

20-34 are more than three times as likely to move as those 6O-8O. More detailed

studies have pointed to the fact that those with property and businesses are

much less likely to move than those with none, while certain professionals

such as teachers and ministers are quite mobile.'*'

*Everett Lee, "Redistribution in the United States," in R. Freedman (ed.) Population; The Vital Revolution. Aldine, 1964(65), pp. 123-136 (128).

**Everett Lee, 0£. ci t . Also Henry Shryock, Jr., Population Mobility with the Uni ted States , University of Chicago, 1964. James Beshers, Popul at 1 on Processes in Social Systems, The Free Press, 1967, esp. p. 146.

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FIGURE 26

PERCENT OF NATIVE POPULATION lORN IN STATE OTHER THAN STAH OF RESIDENCE, FOR CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES: 1900 TO 1960

OtPAtTMCNT OF COMMf RCf •UOCAU OF THC CtNSUS

Bureau of the Census, I960 Census of Population, op. eft., p. S-42, Figure 62.

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* i » ^

FIGURE 27

MOBILITY STATUS (DIFFERENT COUNTY)

MOBILE (1000‘S)

PER CENT MOBILE

1947-1948

9,008

6.3%

1956-1957

10,262

6.3%

1960-1961

1 1 ,246

6.2%

1965-1966

12,538

6.5%

Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, and "Continuation to 1962," C-80-88, and Statistical Abstract, 1967, p. 34, Table 34.

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HI -1043 -RR

In a recent study of movement between SMSA's, i ra Lowry has pointed

out that nearly all variance in movement could be explained by the difference

ic

in the employment attractiveness of the destination. Thus, less unemploy- ment and higher wages were the primary causes of in-migration. But this can- not be the whole explanation. A recent study by the National Planning As- sociation points to the fact that the North Central region has a higher than national per capita income and is yet an area of net out-migration. Rela- tively low cultural attractiveness and the worst climate in the nation by most people's standards may well account for this anomaly.

As mentioned above, SMSA's with high rates of net in-migration also

ieiek

have very high out-migration rates. Thus, the difference between California and West Virginia is not that the West Virginians are leaving faster than the Californians, but that the effectiveness of out-migration is less than zero in California and quite high in West Virginia. Thus, the Negroes have not been moving relatively rapidly out of the South, but they have had a relatively much greater disinclination than whites to move back into the South.

*lra Lowry, Migration and Metropolitan Growth: Two Analytic Models. Chandler, 1966.

**Looking Ahead. June, 1967i PP. 4 ff.

***l ra Lowry, og^. ci t .

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2-49

One of the chief sources of significant or "effective" migration'*' has been the movement off of the farm. This has been going on since 1800, and especially since the civil war. Figure 28 shows that surprisingly this movement shows little sign of abating. Yet Figure 28 also demonstrates that in another 20 years this aspect of our migration patterns must change from one of great significance to insignificance.

1 1 a. Speculative Suggestions on the Application of Segmented

Analysis to Future Patterns of Mobility and Distribution

While projecting fertility can be conceived as a one-stage problem, projecting population movement can be broken down into a two-stage process. Thus, we are interested in fertility per se. while we are interested not primarily in mobility but in mobility and direction. The first stage can be conceived in a manner analogous to that suggested above in section la for fertility. A standard segmentation approach would look again at varia- tions in mobility by educational level. Figure 29 suggests the approximate levels of education for the most mobile age group in the population twenty years from now. Students of mobility claim that education Is closely related to mobility. If, for example, mobility of those with educational levels 0-11 was half of that for those with I6 or more years of school ,'”*' then one might project about a ten percent increase in mobility by 1975. Yet the observation that mobility has been fairly stable since 1958 during a period of rising educational levels must be explained away.

^Kf. Shryock, op. cit., pp. 287 ff.

VrtVFor example, Everett Lee, 0£. cit. , esp. p. 129.

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FIGURE 28

NET MiftRATiQN FARM TO CITY 0 OOP’S)

FARM POPULATION

1920

32,000

1956

18,712

1957

17.656

1958

17,128

1959

16,592

I960

15.635

1961

14.803

1962

14.313

1963

13.367

1964

12,954

1965

12,363

1966

1 1 .595

NET MIGRANTS BIRTHS/DEATHS

627

261

-1295

239

- 748

220

- 740

203

-1142

184

9

-1000

168

- 646

156

-1086

140

- 533

121

- 703

112

- 853

90

Statistical Abstract. 1967» P* 605, Table 892.

i»i,iiiftlHMM-fiiii[iiiaiiMi

D

HI-1043-RR

FIGURE 29

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT MALES 20-35 (ESTIMATES)

YEARS OF SCHOOL

1365

198?

0-7

5%

1%

8-n

25%

15%

12-15

56%

52%

16 -1-

14%

32%

Estimated from Statistical Abstract. I967, P. II6, No. 158, and PP. m-n6.

o

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Figure 30 attempts to carry this speculative exercise further by suggesting that we look at characteristic mobility subgroups, and examine projections of their size in the future population. While there is a great deal of motion, some groups participate in this to a much greater extent than others. Again a great deal of evidence should be brought together to estimate the size and mobility behavior of these groups. 1 have only used the references cited above to gain some feeling for what a properly researched table might look like. The"immobi1e middle class" is the group bound by property and tradition to their local communities. New England, for example, has had relatively low mobility rates in the past, and probably contains a higher percentage of this group. The "immobile lower and working class" group is bound by ties of family and tradition and ignorance more than by property. These are the people who balance the "footloose" lower and middle class mentioned below. They keep over-all lower class mobility below middle class levels in spite of the latter. Both of these groups will decline in size with the increasing breakdown of traditional attitudes and loyalties. In labeling group (3) the "migrant lower and working class" I have used the word "migrant" in the special sense of a group moving with fairly high effective- ness from one place or type of life to another. Most of the farm to city motion has been in this group. As suggested above, most of this movement should decline rapidly by 1985 as the sources of this mobility are used up.

The "fluid lower and working class" consists of migratory workers, construc- tion teams for dams, bridges, etc., and other subgroups which have become accus tomed to life in motion, but do not have the standards of life of group (6). These are the trailer and shanty people. The "migrant middle class" is that group of people looking for a better way of life, but not for a life

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FIGURE 30

MOBILITY BY MOBILITY SUBCULTURE

% 1965 % 1985

CLASS RATE POPULAT I ON POPULAT I ON

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

IMMOBILE MIDDLE CLASS

4.0.

15%

10%

IMMOBILE LOWER AND WORKING CLASS

2.5

38%

25%

MIGRANT LOWER AND WORKING CLASS

o

00

15%

8%

FLUID LOWER AND WORKING CLASS

15.0

10%

5%

MIGRANT MIDDLE CLASS

(LIFE AND JOB)

8.0

10%

17%

(RESORT)

10.0

2%

5%

FLUID UPPER MIDDLE CLASS

12.0

10%

30%

OVER-ALL RATES

6.5

7.9

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HI-I043-RR

on the move. (Of course, in fact once a person moves there may be a greater chance he will move again.) The first subgroup contains persons in their working years. They are looking for a location with good Job or business prospects, but with a better climate, or better "way of life" as well. A still small subgroup here consists of their older generation class fellows who plan to move to a retirement area. The "fluid middle class" (6) is the upper middle class "professional" class with college or more education. Men here may look on the whole nation as one job market, or they may work for a large corporation with several different facilities scattered about the country.

If one decided that the mobility rates assigned to the classes in 1965 were correct and stable, and that the classes would change as sug- gested, then Figure 30 suggests there would be something like a 20% change i n mobi 1 i ty rates .

But the foregoing exercise appears to tell us little about destination. There could be more mobility but zero effectiveness. In fact, it can be shown that unless we change the direction and rate of net migration flows between 1940 and I96O in our projections of the future we will run up against a limit imposed by the relative size of the out-migration and in- migration populations. This would be sooner if as suggested in Part I population growth follows Bureau of the Census projection (D) rather than (B).

In order to determine the direction of net migration in the future we would need to rely on technological forecasting which could relate prospective technological change to impact upon the economic subregions of the United States.* But the foregoing discussion of future mobility subgroups should also help us here. Thus, while the migrant middle class will continue to

‘‘Using such works as Donald Bogue and Calvin Beale, Economic Areas of the United States. Free Press, I96I and Walter I sard, Methods of Regional Anal ysis . M.l.T. Press, I96O.

HI-1043-RR

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move from areas of impoverished culture and poor climate to what they feel is a better way of life, probably in the South and West, the "fluid upper middle classes" and the first four classes will be responding to more purely economic motivations. Again it can be seen how the more complex segmentation theoretically should allow a more meaningful projection of future migration trends.

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III . Final Note

We have discussed some standard information on future projections, but have interjected some new or different ways of looking at these projections or directing new research in this area. Here I wish only to add two points about projecting which are of particular relevance to the projection of edu- cational needs and of the future distribution and quality of life in the United States.

First, the planner should consider what are the relative gains and losses of making errors in over- or underestimating the future population of the nation or of some subdivision of it. Frequently planning should be conservative in the sense of slight overestimation. If the (D) projec- tion is most likely, perhaps C should be taken as a basis for planning in many areas. Secondly, and closely related to this fact, is the consideration that future needs are often not as closely related to future population as are changes in the demand patterns. Anyone who predicted 1968 health needs in 1958 on the basis of I958 use of medical services per person would have been more in error from failure to predict the increases and changes in social services, income, hospital versus office treatment, etc., than he would have fallen into errors stemming from projecting the gross populations in 1968. This may also be true in many fields of education. This is not the case for all aspects of the problem of educational projections. For example, nearly 100% attendance today implies that many future educational requirements will be quite directly responsive to the size of future age-

groups .

PART THREE

EDUCATION AND ANTI-POVERTY MEASURES

By

Raymond D. Gastil

HI-1043-RR 3-i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 3-iii

A. The Poverty Subculture 3“1

1. The Concept of a Poverty Subculture 3“1

2. Describing the Culture of Poverty and Its Carriers. . . .

3. How Stable Is the Culture of Poverty? 3“i7

Note to Section A: Should Cultures of Poverty Be Preserved?. 3“27

B. Means of Increasing Movement Out of the Culture of Poverty . . 3“33

1. Introduction 3-33

2. The Possible Cost of Financing Mass Movement Out of the

Poverty Subculture Through Training 3“37

3. A Training and Relocation Program to Activate the Poor. . 3-48

a. Recruitment, Motivation and Discipline 3~51

b. Training Camps 3~53

c. On-The-Job Training 3-56

d. Relocation and Housing 3~57

e. Cost of the Program 3“59

4. Integration for Equality of Educational Opportunity . . . 3“62

5. Some Alternative Considerations in Judging Training

Programs 3~71

a. The Effectiveness of Training the Already Educated

Upon the Opportunities of the Lowest 20% 3“7i

b. The Relative Effectiveness of General over Technical

Education in a Rapidly Changing Society. ..... 3“73

c. The Possibility of Character Education 3“74

d. Paternalism in Career Development as a Positive

Mode of Education 3~75

e. The Double Effect of Adult Education, Training and

Placement 3~76

6. A Suggested Direction of Penal Reform 3“77

ANNEX (i). A Critique of the Proposed School Desegregation of

New York City 3“83

Note 1. Motivation for Education of Lower-Class

Parents 3-IOO

Note 2. A Discussion of Some of the Dangers Arising from Neighborhood Control of the Schools in New York City

3-102

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3-1 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

ANNEX (i). (Continued)

Note 3. The Possibility of School Decentralization Triggering a Much More General Decen- tralization of City Government 3-109

Note 4. General Remarks on Solutions of Inequality

Through Segregation 3“H2

ANNEX (ii). Character Training in General Education 3-117

Basic Problems in Evaluating Educational Systems • • • 3~117

The Loss of Boundaries in Liberal Society 3“124

The Development of Character Through General Education 3“I27

PREFACE

Perhaps the most urgent question facing education today Is the question of educating the poor for equality. If this Is purely a techni- cal question of providing training In certain skills, of providing better teachers or longer hours, then the subject Is largely one of economics.

If technical training is not sufficient to attain equality, it may be because there are not sufficient jobs even for the trained (in some cases because of job discrimination), or because poverty itself develops at- titudes of mind and modes of behavior which inhibit productivity. The solutions then become more complicated, but remain basically simple. The job market can be expanded, perhaps artificially, and the poor can be given a guaranteed income level sufficient to change their mode of thought and behavior.

We believe that the answers suggested above would be sufficient for equalizing the opportunity of many of the poor (although they might cause other problems for other persons). However, we feel that most of the poor with children suffer from cultural disabilities considerably more serious than current approaches suggest. Most of the poor are bringing up their children in a particular educational tradition that may be called the poverty subculture. We realize that a good many people concerned with poverty have claimed that there is no such thing as a "culture of poverty," but rather only general reactions of poor people to certain formal educa- tional and economic disabilities. Much of their evidence is based upon polling and the examination of social welfare records and statistics. Nevertheless, we feel this critique of the poverty subculture concept is not sufficiently convincing. It goes against both the common knowledge

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of many employers and others working with the poor in this country and overseas, and against the evidence of innumerable community and class studies by social scientists over the last century,

Viewing poverty and equality this way, we have come also to see edu- cation in its broadest terms as the process of enforcing or retarding cultural change, bringing groups together or separating them out. Taking this approach, we have developed a number of alternative suggestions as to how the educational experiences of the poor might be changed through a variety of means ranging from integration to training to penal reform. In some cases we have suggested what might be the magnitude of the effort and the expected returns of alternative programs.

*For a fuller explication of this argument see R.D. Gastil, "Toward a New Basis for the Evaluation of Anti-Poverty Programs," Report II, in A.J. Wiener, ed.. The Future of American Poverty: Some Basic Issues in EvaluatinqAlternative Anti-Poverty Measures. HI-1006-RR, Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y,, April 15» 1968, Much of this paper is based upon portions of HI-1006“RR, prepared for the Office of Economic Opportunity,

er|c

1

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f\

A, THE POVERTY SUBCULTURE

1 . The Concept of a Poverty Subculture I

There has been a wide currency to the phrase "culture of poverty," but the shared term masks some quite different views about the things to which it refers, and hence different implications regarding their significance for the education of the poor. The different viewpoints start from the common observation that there is a pattern of attitudes, beliefs, values and behavioral styles that is ^

frequently to be observed among the poor. It is to this "culture of poverty" that| the middle-class American may frequently be responding in judging whether an |

individual is poor. But from that observation of a common culture among the poor, the analyses diverge sharply. From the sociologist's point of view, there is debate about whether this is a genuine and autonomous sub-culture most of whose members are poor, or whether the "culture" is simply a pattern of defenses and adaptions to the economic and social facts of not having money. | For public policy, the key issue is whether a change in the "culture of poverty" i is 3 p rerequ I s i te to eradicating poverty, or would be a consequence of eradicating poverty, and in particular how the "poverty culture" would be affected by exter- nally induced changes in income— or how the "culture" might affect such measures.

(a) Poverty as an autonomous culture. Under this view, the group should more properly be called "the lower class" rather than "the poor."

They may be considered a sort of ethnic minority, with a distinctive culture, just as subcultures are distinguished on other ethnic bases within the U.S., or within other countries. The argument that aspects of traditional culture have marked consequences for achievement and entrepreneurship is old, spanning both Tawney's analysis of the interactions of Protestantism and enterprise

in the development of European commerce, or McClelland's more recent work on ''Parts of this section were contributed by Paul C. Berry.

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"need for achievement" in both ancient and contemporary cultures. Applied to the U.S, poor, It may be argued that they exhibit some traits that directly impair their productivity or effectiveness in the U.S, economy, some characteristics which are especially relevant to income include lack of ambition, lack of planning for the future, small regard for the investment in education, a skill, or the capital goods that it would take to get ahead, and/or excessive family size. These, of course, are not the only attributes of this subculture, but those that are of direct concern to anti poverty programs.

(b) Poverty as an autonomous and equal culture." A subdivision of those viewing the poor as a sort of ethnic tradition adds the further remark that this is a distinct and equally valuable culture. This may be either part of a more general philosophy of cultural relativism, or a specific evaluation of the culture of poverty. The cultural relativist decries judgment of the culture of the poor by members of the middle class, who mainly see it as defective because of its departures from their own middle class cultural traditions. While agreeing that the poor may have a different culture, they insist on the "right" of the lower class to have such a culture, and the equivalent worth of the culture. Riessman perceives important strengths in the folkways (culture) of the poor, and believes that social institutions serving the poor should be adopted to that culture rather than the reverse. Some (e.g. Paul Goodman) claim to find the culture of the poor admirable in some ways even to their middle-class intellectual

er|c

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tastes.* The view Is shared to some extent by what one might call "na- tionalist" movements that have many members who are poor, especially Negro nationalist groups like SNCC or MFDP. The Black Muslims, on the other hand, have values which appear severely middle class despite their ideological appeal to the lower class Negro.

The issue of cultural style is repeatedly raised by observers of the interaction In public schools between middle class teachers and lower class children; Havighurst, Deutsch, and others have viewed some of the problems of schools in lower class areas as arising from the different expecta- tions, values, experiences and communication styles of the two groups.

(c) Lower-class culture as a cue to discrimination. Another view, different from the first two but not i ncompatable, interprets the poor achievement of lower class persons as the result not so much of their own inadequacies, but as discrimination against them by a middle class that disapproves of other aspects of their culture. It seems undeniable that some elements of such a process exist, although just how important it is in comparison with the other effects may be debatable. In social situations, it appears that class membership is sometimes a more important cue to discrimination than such perennial discriminators as race. The issue has also been raised regarding the (presumably more inadvertent) effects of class bias in measures of intelligence, school achievement, and personnel selection. Correcting such biases might be of some use, regardless of one's view about whether the poor are "entitled" to a culture of their own or not, or of what its comparative cultural worth may be.

"Goodman, and also Edgar Friedenberg, refer with some admiration to the freer and more honest expression of such themes as sexuality and ag- gression among lower class youth. However, the claim of a less inhibited or less neurotic sexuality often is not substantiated by those who have specifically studied the sex roles and relations of the poor (e.g. Rain- water).

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(d) Poverty as 3 stable, evolving culture* ** *** The origin of the "culture

of poverty" is another item of disagreement. It may be seen as the product

of a long historical evolution of the lower class in Europe and also the

former slave population, or it may be seen as a more transitory response to

or defense against the specific economic circumstances in which poor people

*

find themselves. The famous Moynihan report revived the view that many of the distinctive cultural traits of the lower class Negro population (which act as barriers to their economic and social advancement) are the products of the particular North American form of the institution of slavery, which produced the cultural deformation thought to characterize the Negro masses. Others have seen African elements in the U.S. and Caribbean Negro cultures. Or the culture may be thought to arise much more generally in the experience of lower-class rural persons undergoing rapid urbanization.

Many of the patterns that Moynihan attributed to the specific features of American Negro slavery seem to occur frequently and reliably in the de- pressed segments of other populations of quite different ethnic background and history — for instance, among various American Indian groups, or the hinterland Acadians of the Maritime Provinces studied by the Leighton group, or the Mexicans studied by Oscar Lewis.

(e) Poverty culture as a transitory defense. This view conceives of most of the traits of the poor that constitute their culture as the parallel responses of individuals to discouraging or even hopeless economic circumstances

^U.S. Department of Labor. The Negro Family. Washington: GPO. 1Q66.

**Charles C. Hughes, et. ^. , People of Cove and Wood lot. New York;

Basic Books, I960.

***0scar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez; Autobiography of a Mexican Family. New York: Random House, 1961.

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The marked parallel between some cultural features of American Indians on reservations, Negroes both in rural and urban areas, and whites in depressed areas are thus seen as responses to parallel economic circumstances, rather than as parts of a single (or several parallel) autonomous traditions. The "culture of poverty" is recreated in each individual as the consequence of his encounters with inadequate resources and with the social roles and 'social environment imposed by low income and the difficulties attendant on it. If the cultural style is a response to economic privation, we pre- sume that it will disappear as that privation is eliminated. It might still be that adults who have lived since childhood in such an environment would be slow to respond to changed circumstances, but certainly one would suppose (taking this view) that the next generation would show little sign of the culture if its principal cause had been removed. The transition from the poor to the new lower-middle class — or to the nouveau riche — has often been noted, but mostly in cases In which those who were upwardly mobile really rose by their own efforts rather than by external largesse — or at least were able to maintain that delusion even If their success was largely adventitious.

These different views about whether there Is a "culture of poverty," of what it consists, how it arose, how it Is perpetuated, and what part it plays In the problem of poverty are not mutually exclusive, and the same individual may share elements of several. Nor are they directly translated into alternative views of antipoverty policy. But they will be evident In the following formulation of questions regarding policy.

Dispute about the Worth or origin of a "culture of poverty" may mean little to an educational administrator unless the disputes have some bearing on educa- tional measures. In order to design educational (or other) measures which

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operate directly through or on the culture of poverty or which take effective account of It, the following questions may be Important:

1 . How many of those poor today actually exhibit the **culture of poverty

syndromes, and what are the essential features of this "culture"?

2. How stable Is the culture of poverty? Is Its continuation simply a consequence of economic privation, so that it would be rapidly dissipated If the poor had jobs, money, etc., or should it be expected to persist even

after correction of the economic bases of poverty?

3. What means exist by which the culture of poverty traits might be modified? Should such modification be aimed at traits of direct economic significance (productivity, achievement, planning family size) or at secondary traits which serve to identify the poor and make them subjects of discrimination?

4. Would it be useful to improve inter-class attitudes and communi- cation? Would it be useful to attempt to influence the attitudes of the middle class towards the "culture of poverty" (rather than or in addition to directly operating on the poverty culture), or to prevent discrimination against persons because of class traits?

5. Would a change in this culture be sufficient to shift the poor out of their poverty? What means might be employed to produce this shift? At what rate would people leave poverty?

6. Is a change in the culture of poverty necessary if people are to escape poverty? Does failure to alter the "culture of poverty" impair the effectiveness of other types of antipoverty measures?

2. Describing the Culture of Poverty and Its Carriers

The answer will depend upon definitions and criteria. In order to arrive

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at quantitative estimates, it will be necessary to explore the qualitative nature of this culture in greater detail, and distinguish a number of different categories. Let us begin by using the rather simple dichotomy common to the previous generation of social scientists:

a.

Middle and

it

Lower Classes

U.S. Middle Class

U.S. Lower Class

Economic and

Social Status

i. Relative economic securi ty.

i. Harassed by insecurity.

ii. Recognition in wider community.

ii. Only local recognition.

iii. Schools and community

iii. Not true, lower class

organizations have goals in

children are discriminated

accordance with wished of average middle class family.

against.

b. i. Specific Goals Relating to Property.

1) Stress on permanency of property and piling up capital goods.

2) Emphasis on thrift and hard work.

3) Respect for property and ownership.

ii. Specific Goals Relating to 'Good

1) Strict sex taboos.

2) Emotional control, especially of aggression.

3) Good fellow in a respec- table job and not too different.

1) Keeping family fed, clothed and housed vital.

2) immediate spending of money and goods.

3) Little respect.

Standing"

1) Prowess in sex encouraged.

2) Prowess in aggressive techniques gives prestige.

3) Good fellow in gang.

Clyde Kluckhohn, and Florence Kluckhohn, "American Culture: Generalized Orientations" in Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture. New York, Harper, 1947, pp. 106-129. The middle class-)ower class distinction is that preserved in Robin Williams American Society. 2nd ed. and other standard sources.

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U.S. Middle Class 4) Cleanliness.

5) Respect for law and order.

6) Good manners of conventional kind.

7) Affiliation with proper companies and organizations.

8) "Good works" stressed, but may increase class sense.

ill. Individual autonomy stressed .

iv. Good education, es- pecially as it relates to success, stressed.

V. Good marriage, ideally no divorce.

vi . Relation to Family Solidarity

1) Isolated conjugal unit.

2) Undesirable relative di sregarded

3) Spheres of dominance

separate: father in finance,

mother directs social life of father and children and self.

4) Child-centered, hope of future status through children.

vii. Relation to Recreation

1) Participation in indivi- dualistic and organized sports desirable.

2) Frequent travel for vacations.

U.S. Lower Class

4) Not stressed, perhaps because the mother usually works and has little time for cleanliness.

5) Opportunistic attitude toward law and order.

6) Less attention.

7) Not so affiliated.

8) Not stressed.

iii. Not stressed or unstressed.

iv. Vague idea education helps success, but "too educated" a misfit.

V. Marriage and divorce not very important.

1) Extended family, conjugal unit may not be too important.

2) All relatives recognized.

3) Father often marginal, maternal dominance by working mother.

4) Not chi Id-ceniiered, children not closely watched.

1) Little attention paid.

2) No.

I)

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U.S. Middle Class

U.S. Lower Class

3) Commercial entertainment 3) Gambling and commercial

important. entertainment important

from early age.

Patterns of Training Children

a. i. Encouraged to save, have i. Stress on getting a job

a bank account, accumulate early, early financial responsi-

things, to have organized bility.

hobbies .

b. Training for good standing

i. Early taboo on sexual matters, i. Relatively few sexual taboos, little chance to learn, but now some formal learning.

ii. Emphasis on washing hands, ii. Little emphasis on these

clean clothes, regular bowel matters,

movements, order and neatness.

ill. Emotional Control

1) Control of aggression: do not hit if you are bigger, do not hit unless other attacks.

2) Control temper.

3) Achievement important, but not overt expression of pride.

4) Conformance to the rules of the game. The child is taught to pay attention to the approval of others.

5) Careful training in table manners, proper forms of letters, etc.

6) Taboo on undesirable play- mates, not to speak to strangers; accepted patterns of enter- taining friends, children's organizations.

O

1) Children encourage each other to fight.

2) Overt aggression expressed in fami ly.

3) Achievement not as important (at least in middle class terms).

4) Neither emphasized by parents.

5) No.

6) Child on his own, collects his own companions.

o

10

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U.S. Middle Class

7) Respect for policemen and other authority figures taught.

c. i. Ownership is stressed; child

is taught to say: "This is mine,

that is yours."

d. i. Interest in school grades i nculcated.

e. i. Child respects parents as main authority, not grandparents; discrimination among relatives out of concern for family status.

f. Patterns Relating to Recreation

i. Specific supervised training, organized with rules.

ii. Parents take children on trips .

iii. Supervision of commercial recreation where the "good" and "bad" definitely distin- guished, e.g., the beer parlor i s condemned .

g. Reward and Punishment.

i. Threat of withdrawal of 1 ove .

ii. Threat of deprivation of a pleasure or thing.

iii. Offer of pleasure, thing, or praise as a reward.

iv. Long term reward and punishment.

U.S. Lower Class

7) "Do it and try not to get caught," fear rather than respect of authorities.

i. Not stressed.

i. Parents take no daily interest in the education of the children. Little attention is paid to home study and long-term educational goals .

i. General recognition of ex- tended relatives, may live with them for long periods, children care for each other.

i. Children spend money on recreation as they please, when they have it.

i i . They do not.

iii. Not supervi sed .

i. Physical punishment, frequently inconsistent.

ii. Not very meaningful.

iii. Frequent lack of ability of parents to give or lack of faith of children that it will be given.

iv. Short term.

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U.S. Middle Class U.S. Lower Class

V. Child may in later life v. Usually not an enduring

depend on mother's approval stimulus to social action,

for social action.

But as the Kluckhohns realized then and would even more today, the situation is considerably more complex. Let us define the following subcultures relevant to our interest, all of which may contain "poor" persons by the definitions of Orshansky.

A. New Middle Class

B. Old Middle Class

C. Working Class

D. Lower Class

JU

1 . 1 nci pient Risers

2. Rejecters

E. Enclaved Working and Lower Class Groups.

The middle class culture described in the foregoing table is, of course, thfi Old Middle Class. It is religious, has high sexual standards, emphasizes thrift and hard work. The New Middle Class culture, however, emphasizes consumption, enjoyment, the breaking down of constraints. It attempts to base society on the standards which in past centuries were more appropriate

to the frivolous upper classes.

*Fai1ure to make these distinctions, already foreshadowed by the Kluckhohns. led to some productive criticism of the simple dichotmy by S M Miner. Frank Riesman and Arthur A. Seagull. "Poverty and Self- Indulgence: A Critique of the Non-Deferred Gratification Pattern, in

Louis Ferman. Joyce Kornbluh and Aian Haber. Poverty in America. University

of Michigan. i965. PP* 285-302.

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The Working Class culture provides dominant guide lines for perhaps the largest single group of Americans. The standards of this group are midway between the incipient risers of the lower classes and the old middle class. Members emphasize a wide circle of family connections or neighborhood friends, and the life lived within this framework is the important life.

Work is sought through family connections. Jobs are judged by the pay, and education by the payoff. But these are not strivers. Within the family the position of the father is often quite strong.

The Lower Class culture of rejecters is the one described in the table. By "rejection" I mean the rejection of old middle class or working class standards and values. By contrast, when the women and the older siblings accept old middle class, or at least working class, values and standards, then sexual permissiveness, the inability to delay gratification and certain other patterns of thought often associated with lower class culture will not be present. However, the frequent weakness of the man's position is common to both types of lower class family. The male society is that of the streets or taverns, the female society is either that of the prostitutes and alcoholics for rejecter families, or that of women oriented toward a more respectable past, or toward escape, at least for the children, in the incipient riser group.

Subcultures A-D must be defined on a sliding scale of behavior, attitudes and sophistication which goes beyond the standards of the family

'The distinction of lower and working class is that used by Herbert Cans, (in Ferman, Kornbluh and Haber, pp. 302-311), although I have expanded the concept of working class to include many non-striving consumption oriented people with less exacting standards of cleanliness, aesthetics and behavior than the middle class.

" 'For example, as described in Walter B. Miller, "Focal Concerns of Lower Class Culture," in Ferman, Kornbluh and Haber, 0£. ci t. , especially p. 262.

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and Includes a large component of sheer economic possibility. One can be marginally poor as the result of special circumstances and not be lower class; one can be above the poverty level and be lower class; but both condi- tions are hard to maintain (In our later discussion we exclude the "wealthy" lower class and the poor working and middle classes from our focus). The reference tradition for all groups Is still to a great extent the old mlddl e class tradition. But a stable migrant labor family of husband, wife and two children with habits of thrift, and Interest In the education of their children appropriate to the old middle class, for some purposes might still be categorized as lower class Incipient risers In spite of the many middle class features of their life.' First, they would not be accepted as middle class by any middle class group, and secondly their children grow up In lower class surroundings, filled with behavior models which are not at all the middle class patterns their parents hope for them.

Finally, there are groups of people which include those classed as poor for which the foregoing categories are less meaningful. Generally having value systems close to the working class culture these people are the inheritors of relatively intact American Indian traditions, or old world conservative religious traditions, such as the Hutterite. I have classified such groups as enclaved working and lower class groups, where "class" is used to refer to economic standing more than to other cultural attri butes .

Cultural differences among classes lead to prejudices which keep

"‘There are of course many middle class aspirants in lower class contexts. For family planning behavior compare Lee Rainwater, And the Poor Get Chi Idren, I960, p, 31» and R. Freedman, P. Whelpton, and A. Campbell,

Family Planning, Sterility and Population Control. 1959, pp. 129-132.

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down the poor. But many of these prejudices relate to real experiences with the poor, experiences the poor often admit.* in speaking of the Indians of British Columbia, a recent study points out that there is in fact little discrimination against Indians by employers which is not based on experience: they do indeed tend to be tardy, often absent, careless with property, and quit readily. Thus, many of the poor, the bearers of the culture of poverty, of lower class culture, are not very productive, and their culture adds to their low formal education to keep their productivity down. If one believes — as the lower classes often seem to do — that the differences between the levels of success of individuals in life are due primarily to luck, or that success is due to sharp dealing more than to intelligent effort, or that the choice is between freedom from any constraint and dependency under strong authority, then attitudes toward work will suffer. It seems reasonable to suppose that apparent irresponsibility comes from attitudes and beliefs such as these. If an individual's parents and/or associates place a very low value on education, and leave school early, then the chances are that the individual will also quit school before he should.

Identity and Numbers. But who belongs to the lower class pattern, particularly to the rejecter group? Many of the traits here ascribed

^f., e.g. the discussion of the economic position of the Sioux by Wesley R. Hurt, Jr., "The Urbanization of the Yankton Indians," Human Organization. Winter 1961-62, p. 227.

**H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M. Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment. University of California,

1958, PP« 73-74* Merlam warned of this result for American Indians In 1928.

See Louis Meriam (Tech. Dir.), The Problem of Indian Administration, Institute for Government Research, Johns Hopkins, 1928.

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to lower class culture are often described as particularly characteristic

"ft

of reservation Indians, of lower class American Negroes or of poor Mexicans.

While the origins of the traditions of the poor lower class in America are certainly diverse and have been explained in diverse ways--for example, the origin of Negro matriarchy in the slavery system or West African culture — the fact is that a child being brought up in a big city Negro Slum, an Okie shanty town, or the former Klamath Indian reservation in Oregon is apt to be surrounded by a matriarchal situation in fact, if not theory; often to be cared for by grandparents or other relatives; and the boy will find few male models which it is socially desirable for him to copy.

How many of the present poor are, then^ blocked from greater productivity in their past or present life by the culture of poverty in which they grew

up? Orshansky estimated that in 1963 there were 7.2 million poor fami lies.

Of these, 5 million families were headed by a male, and 2.2 million families were headed by a female. Out of the 5 million male family heads, 35% worked full time, all year. Another 25% couldn't work because of illness and old age. That means that 60% of the male-headed families evidently could not be made up predominantly of lower class persons, at least by this restricted criterion.

If we assume that of those with part-tiime employment or some record of unemploy- ment in 1963, a fourth were honestly trying to be responsible males, that leaves only 30% of male-headed families which meet this criterion for membership in the "hard core" lower class.

Neither should we imagine that all of the families headed by females are lower class. Here we have less data: perhaps we can reasonably assume

that one-fourth are not.

Cf. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town. Robert Bennett and Gottfried Lang in American Indians and Their Economic Development. (Fred Voget (ed.) Human Organization. Winter 1961-1962.) Evon Vogt. Modern Homesteaders. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955. Oscar Lewis, Five Fami 1 ies.

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These considerations suggest that of the 7*2 million poor families* perhaps not more than 3 million are “lower class-rejecters." This estimate needs revision to allow for those we would judge to share a hard-core "culture of poverty" but who were missed in our first single-test approximation. Let us therefore arbitrarily add 500,000 families who exhibit a poverty culture by virtue of economics and surroundings, if not by familial behavior.

While this 3.5 million families are fewer than half the poor fami lies, they will nevertheless include the majority of the 29.7 million poor individuals in families***

Of the 5.0 million unrelated poor, half are 65 or over. From the employment record it would not appear that more than 50% of the unrelated poor are part of the poverty culture in terms of motivations and attitudes.

This gives us an estimate of only 15-20 million individuals in the "hard core lower class." These represent about 3.5 million families, plus another 2.5 million unrelated individuals.

Demography of the Culture of Poverty. Where are and who are these poor? Many will be found in Puerto Rican and Negro slums, or among the A million Span ish-Ameri can poor in the Southwest, or the .2 million American Indian poor, or the .38 million migrant workers and their families.

Members of the lower class are often those without formal education;

their culture rejects its values and goals, and the circumstances that prevent

*Table 18 of Orshansky.

**Table 5 of Orshansky.

***A slightly fuller explanation of these figures may be found in R.D. Gastil, "Toward a New Basis for the Evaluation of Anti -Poverty Pro- grams," Report II, in HI-IOO6-RR, op. cit.

I

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schooling are also those that produce poverty— as well as the direct effects of education or earning power. Two-thirds of the poor live in families whose head left school before the eighth grade.

A large number of the individuals who are poor today are children. This arises because of the higher frequency of large families among the poor. An especially large number of children are concentrated in these hard-core lower class segments.

If we assume that a great many of the children in all of these groups are growing up in the "culture of poverty," and that this differential also existed in the past, it seems likely that the cultural pattern will persist unless important new external forces alter the conditions that perpetuate this culture.

3* How Stable is the Culture of Poverty?

It has been estimated that there were 35,000,000 poor people in I963,

of whom 15,000,000 were children in poor families. Thus, while 18.5% of all

people in the U.S. were poor in Orshansky's definition, 22% of American children lived in poor families. Some of these families were only accidentally poor

in 1963; in other years they do better. Some of these families were in a

middle or working class cultural environment, in spite of the poverty of the family. But one imagines also that some lower class families had

a good year in I963, and thus were temporarily "above" their expected condition in economic terms and have not been counted. Although this latter effect must partially offset the previous qualifications, our calculations in the preceding section suggest that about 3.5 million families should be classified as lower class and characterized by what is rather loosely called a culture of poverty. These families contain fifteen million persons.

^These estimates are from Ferman, Kornbluh and Haber, op. clt., pp. 85«

105-106.

ERIC

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In order to examine the dynamics of the lower class, let us first find out how many children are Involved, and the estimate of their prospects of remaining In that class. If the figures above are correct, we may estimate the residual number of children If we first subtract 5.5 million family heads (4 million adults in husband-wife families and 1.5 million women In female led families) from the I5 million. In addition, one might estimate that another 500,000 adults In these families should be subtracted (e.g. children 18 or over, or aged relatives who are part of families, or other unmarried adults In the family). This means that there may have been 9 million children growing up In lower class cultural contexts in I963.

The question now becomes: how many of these 9 million children should we

expect to grow up to repeat the pattern of low productivity in the next genera- tion? How many could ordinarily be expected to rise out of the lower class and out of the poverty culture? Since only Indirect evidence Is available, we shall attempt some rough estimates by a series of appro imate calculations that they may at best serve to give some impression of the order of magnitude of rates of change between classes

The classic study by Morgan £t aj_ * ** compares the education of the heads of families that are poor today with the education that their fathers received. This comparison Is presented In the following table.

*James N. Morgan, Martin H. David, Wilbur J. Cohen, Harvey E. Brazer , Income and Welfare in the United States. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,

Inc., 1962.

**Uslng their rather high definition of the dividing line between poor and non-poor.

Education of Family Heads

and Their Fathers

Grade School

Some

Beyond

or Less

High School

High School

Present

heads of

poor fami 1 i es

64%

17%

19%

Present

heads of

nonpoor families

22%

22%

56%

Fathers

of heads

of fami 1 ies now poor

66%

34%

Fathers

of heads

of families not now poor

63%

37%

it

appears

that the differential

in education of

the grandfathers

of poor

families is nowhere near as marked as It is for the heads of poor families. Presumably some well educated persons of the last generation had children who nevertheless became the heads of poor families, while many poor fathers in the last generation had children who became heads of families that were not poor today.

Morgan et al compared the educational attainment of the poor with that of the rest of the population as follows:

Education Attained by Children Finished with School'^'^

0-8 grades 9-11 grades 12 or more

Chi 1 dren of ,

Poor Families 3^%

Children of Not -Poor Families

7% 21% 72%

''Adapted from the table appearing on p. 207 of Morgan eX. JCiS.*

'^'Adapted from the table appearing on p. 211, .j.bLd .

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These data understate the likely final attainment of children from these families since the children still in school are not counted. Making some allowance for that fact, and rounding off, let us provisionally assume that the educational attainment of children of poor families in this decade approximates 30% finishing no more than 8 grades, 20% having some high school but not finishing, and 50% completing high school. What are the expectations of this group of remaining in poverty?

Morgan's data indicated that about 20% of poor families were headed by high school graduates. If we apply that same figure as a basis for estimat- ing the number of poor children who graduate from high school but do not thereby escape poverty, then 80% of the 50% of the poor who graduate would be out of poverty. If so, then 40% of the children of the poor should es- cape poverty.

Let us now return to the estimates of the size of the lower-class group and attempt to guess the possible size of the education effect upon the lower- class poor. Assume that 6 million of the children in poor families are not in lower class families.* If we assume that for these 6 million, 70% will achieve a high school education or better,** then there would be 3«6 mil- lion non-lower class poor receiving high school or better training. Re- turning to our estimate that among the poor group taken as a whole 50% will graduate from high school, that would be a total of 7*5 million poor children receiving this level of education. Subtracting the 4.2 million

'H'hus, in the Orshansky data the poor had 15,000,000 children, while above we assume that 15,000,000 in lower class families would have 9,000,000 children, leaving 6,000,000 over for the non-lower class poor.

'^'Compared with an uncorrected average for non-poor children of 72% in the foregoing table.

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graduates who are not lower class, 33 million high school graduates remain who are both lower class and poor. If this results in exit from poverty for 75-80% of them, it implies that some 3 million lower class poor will escape from the poverty classification, and thus pass beyond many of the low productivity barriers of their class and culture. This is one-third of the lower class, poor children.

This would indicate that there is likely to be a good deal of lower class mobility, that the "culture of poverty" is to a large extent a culture of class transients, much like the culture of skid row. However, we know from the experience of many investigators that there is also a self- perpetuating, lower class bio-cultural stratum. Let us hypothesize how big this group might be by using the AFDC data on second generation welfare recipients and the data on the vertical mobility of the poor. Many lower class rural families may not have needed or received welfare in previous generations because their culture and subsistence living were congruent. However, this same culture cannot provide enough basis for productivity when Its bearers are transferred to city life. We might guess that 60%-70% of AFDC recipient family heads come from lower class fami 1 ies--for whom we have guessed that about a third of the children will rise out of this class. It seems fair to assume that most of these latter will come from what we have called "incipient riser" homes, those in which at least one member preserves the values or styles of the class above. These homes will represent for at least one of the parents only a one generation lapse

*M. Elaine Burgess and Daniel 0. Price, An American Dependency Challenge. Chicago: American Public Welfare Association, 1963*

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into the lower class milieu and pattern of life. This suggests that there is a transient lower class, which includes perhaps 30-40% of the nine million children in the lower classes. If the children of this group achieve high school or better education at a higher rate than the non-lower class poor (60%) instead of at that of the total lower class poor (40-45%), then this 30-40% of the lower class children will account for about 1.6 million of those who "escape" from the lower class in the next generation. That is, about 2.0 million of about 3*2 million "transients" will graduate from high school, and 1.6 million (80% of 2.0 million) of the 3 million will escape from the poverty culture and from poverty. Perhaps, then, another 1.4 million will also escape from the much larger "static" group through educa- tion.

If these estimates are reasonable, about 33% of the children of the lower class tend to achieve a status in some higher class. Roughly this 33% is made up of 17-5% who rise from the one-generation transient group, and 15.5% who rise from the larger "static" (more than one generation) lower class.

Downward mobility is assumed to occur for about a half of the "transient group, so that those entering the static lower class from transient status in the previous generation would account for about 10% of the lower class.

That leaves about 50% of the poor who start in the "static" lower class group and remain there in the next generation. These presumed rates of flow are i 1 1 ust rated below:

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This model assumes that upward mobility is much more common among the one- generation transients than among the static lower class. Presumably much of this difference arises because the transient families frequently contain a parent or sibling who aspires to the standards of the higher class. In the case of the static group, upward mobility seems more likely to arise as the result of factors such as exceptional intelligence, an outstanding adult model from another culture, or association with members of the other cultures in such

Calculations here are based on crude guesses from analogical material. They are meant to indicate someti.’ng of the numerical nature of the problem, and to suggest some of the numbers w'^at we should know with more precision.

In particular, I do not wish to imply that if birth rates were equal for all classes and the same numbers were recrui ed into the transient lower class each generation, then the lower classes would be growing at 2% a generation.

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contexts as school or the army. Access to such outside sources of inspira- tion for upward mobility is probably considerably less for members of the static lower class.

Data from other sources indicate wide general agreement that the rate of upward mobility from the lower class is between 25 and 35% each generation, not only in the U.S. but in most of Western Europe and also in Japan, and that these rates have changed little if at all in the industrialized countries over the last 50 to 7O years for which there are some data.* Data which include farm workers for those countries show lower mobility, and presumably mobility is much lower in the traditional and agricultural societies of the underdeveloped world.

What are the limits of social mobility? Rates of flow such as these can- not be interpreted unless there is some model of "expected" or normal flow. Are the rates we have assumed for class mobility under present circumstances high or low? It may be of interest to consider briefly the flow rates that would occur in a society with perfect mobility and perfect equalization of opportu- nity.'^' Under these circumstances, let us define the lower class as those at the lower 20% of the income distribution. Let us start by assuming that na- tive ability (which may emerge under genuinely equal opportunity) is distribu- ted at random among all classes of society. Then at the start we should ex-

pect that 80% of our lower class in fact merit higher positions, while 20% of our not-lower class merit being in the lowest class. If there is perfect

mobility, the 16% m isclass i f ied too low and 16% misclassified too high will be

“See the reviews by Seymour M. Lipset and Natalie Rogoff, "Class and Op- portunity in the U.S.: Some Myths and What the Statistics Show," Commeatarv. 1954, pp. 562-568; Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobi 1 itv in Industrial Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959; Bernard Be re Ison and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, pp. 468“4?6.

'^‘Such an exercise is carried out in the form of a science-fiction novel written from the viewpoint of the Year 2033 in Michael Young, op. cit. The 20% lower class group is taken from R.D. Gastil, "Toward a New Basis for the Evaluation of Anti-Poverty Programs," in HI-IOO6-RR, op. cit.

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transposed. Putting it the other way, it is unreasonable to suppose that even under perfect conditions more than 80% of the bottom 20% should be up- wardly mobile. (We are ignoring now the additional culture features of that class and concentrating on its economic productivity and ability, or assum- ing that the culture is related to the fact of having the lowest rank order in the economic society.)

What the effect of a class ordering is upon the next generation depends upon (l) the rate of intermarriage across class lines, which is probably low and will remain low, and (2) the complexity of the genetic patterns that af- fect ability and hence the speed with which social selection by merit-advance- ment will result in stable inherited patterns of merit. This might be stated as the probability that a low-ability couple will have a low-ability child, or, more generally, the correlation between the abilities of parents and children under conditions of perfect mobility and opportunity. The genetic basis of such selection is not understood, but is almost certainly complex. It seems highly likely for that reason alone that even under perfect equality of opportunity substantial misclassif ication of the next generation would still result, re- quiring further mobility, and the effect would not rapidly produce a stable segregation of classes by ability. Moreover, "ability" is not a unitary trait since society recognizes and values a very diverse list of abilities and traits, any of which might be a basis for achievement. Michael Young en- visions that the consequence of effective equality of opportunity would re- quire rapid upward mobility at first, but would rapidly trail off as effec- tive natural segregation ensued. However, his scenario depends upon the ex- istence of a unitary and simply inherited trait of "intelligence," almost certainly contrary to the actual mechanisms of the inheritance of traits viewed as socially useful.

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To what extent has such a form of natural selection actually been operating in the last few generations or centuries? In populations that have experienced some degree of merit mobility for a long time, even a small rate might have produced some significant partition of the gene pool. This would be much less likely in the case of groups whose status has been clearly prescribed on the basis of criteria other than merit. In that case, other things being equal, once opportunity was equalized, artificially segregated minorities (castes) should have better genetic potential for advancement than those in less formal low-status groups. Whether indeed there are differences in the genetic endow- ment of races or stocks that would have some bearing on the distribution of status under equal opportunity is unclear. In its pure form the social experiment of providing effective equal opportunity and watching for the outcome has never been tried, and very little good evidence of such an effect (or its absence) has ever been mustered.*

These speculations could Le used as a basis of speculation as to the limits which an i Jeal social policy would be working against in trying to increase the mobility of a lowest 20%. For example, let us assume that there has been some genetic differentiation in the past so that 60% of the children of Negroes in the lowest 20% should move out of this class in any one generation and 30% of white children. If so, then our mobility estimates above suggest that there may be little improvement possible in the rates of white mobility, while Negro mobility could at least double. This might have important implications for educational pol icy--assuming, of course, that the assumption of an equal distribution of income potential characteristics characterizes white and black.

'‘We are here speculating on the possible conseuqences of genuinely equal opportunity for the consequent demography of social classes or levels of productivity, and not on social policy regarding equal opportunity for minori ties .

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NOTE TO SECTION A

*

SHOULD CULTURES OF POVERTY BE PRESERVED?

The discussions of poverty measures in Part III may justly be ac- cused of attempting to reduce the number of those who in the next gener- ation will be found to exhibit certain characteristics associated with cultures of poverty. This means, in particular, that there will be a de- cline in the number of those who are taught by life to put a high value on impulse, who do not take seriously the responsibility of a man for his own life, his family, his community or nation, or who show little respect for laws or for persons of age and status. It may also mean a decline in the number of people who live in female-centered families, who share their wealth readily with their neighbors, and of those with little money v;ho place a very low value on work and productivity, I do not necessarily wish to reduce the frequency of the latter group of characteristics, but I do wish to reduce that of the former. And in doing so I realize that in the American context the second group is apt to decline as well. Let me suggest why, and why I feel justified in trying to reduce such charac- teristics as male irresponsibility for the family,

A great deal of writing on cultural relativity has been careless, and the impression the lay reader has derived from this writing often erroneous, ‘‘ In fact, the rules that cultures lay down for human behavior are very simi- lar, particularly on roughly equal levels of societal complexity. The de- gree to which behavior conforms to these rules varies greatly. But when a people is vigorous and self-confident the rules are followed to a significant

*For example, the classic work by Ruth Benedict (Patterns of Culture) appears in retrospect to have been a deliberate twisting of the sources avai lable to her.

degree. When under stresses, such as that of the heavy impact of another and apparently more successful culture, rules may become hollow slogans, seldom adhered to in practice. The degree to which rules are adhered to behav ioral ly , and even strongly insisted upon verbally, also varies by "class" within any society. In general a group analogous to our middle class,* and usually representing the majority of any people, inculcates a fair degree of adherence to the basic rules of its society. Often there are people who have power enough to flout the rules of their society, at least in private, forming a kind of criminal or wastrel upper strata. More universally, those who do not follow the rules, or are not expected to, because of poverty, social or ethnic origin, or previous "misbehavior," form a lower class. This lower class may or may not preach the same rules as the middle class, but it certainly does not follow them so closely. In addition, there may be variant and deviant codes of behavior for small sub- groups. These are firmly acceptable only if they are consecrated to a sym- bolic or material purpose of the community (e.g., monks or Janissaries).

The "middle classes" of history, and even of primitive societies, have, then, a broad degree of similarity in their social codes. Within this broad band there are, of course, many significant variations. But such "middle class" cultures have everywhere emphasized adherence to the group's norms as a value in itself, and respect for those persons who symbolize group

*Generally subdivided into middle and working classes in modern so- ciology. A working class person values work and family, but does not value

education and career as highly as the middle class. The following discussion emphasizes the features which are common to both.

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values. They have always emphasized respect of children for parents, and by extension, of the young for the aged (at least until they retire); man's duties and responsibilities to his family, his community, and to any larger order that the particular culture recognizes. The hero is one who sacrifices his whole life for these values— and heroism is universally praised. For a man the "family" may in this case be that in which he was born, the families of his sisters and brothers and their children, or that of his wife and her children, or all of these. Men always are given clear responsibilities for bringing up as successfully as possible some particu- lar group of the young. The responsibility of women is equally stressed, but few question it.*

Much of the apparent irresponsibility and freedom of impulse observed in other cultures is actually found on closer examination to be closely patterned, or limited to specific occasions or periods. Middle classes everywhere emphasize that following the rules regularly is necessary both for a happier life for the individual in the long run and for the smooth functioning of the group.

Although overemphasized, there are important differences among cul- tures in social and economic values. Emphasis may be placed quite dif- ferently on personal property values, on in-group sharing, and on indi- vidualism. Most peoples have tended to see the economic pie as fixed in size, and therefore it is feared that the exceptional person will use his abilities to diminish the shares of others; to be exceptional is dangerous and success may seem criminal. Individualistic societies have been rarer, but their growth more rapid, so that by 1900 they came

*Exceptions may be found in the literature, but these are generally ascribable to cultural breakdown-- e. g. the Marquesan Islanders.

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to rule most of the world. In this framework indlv'dual economic initia- tive was more rewarded— and one reward was to allow the individual to deny his property to his neighbor. Since there was no longer felt to be a fixed economic pie, e^ch individual could legitimately prove his worth by working harder to provide for his immediate family or for coming gen- erations. Thus work, even beyond the requirements of a year's supply of minimum essentials, came to be highly valued, and finally became a value in itself in Western civilization. Again, similar values on work can be found in most cultures, at least in embryonic form, but there is probably a difference in degree.

Most cultures have had roughly similar values for important and still valid reasons. Societies continually disrupted by the expression of human impulse found it harder to survive the pressure of enemies or of starvation. In more recent t imes, ne ighbors have noticed that more ordered life often resulted in a newer washing machine. In societies in which parents took little responsibility for the children, the children grew up relatively unproductive — if they grew up at all. Neighboring groups grew more rapidly in population and skills. Finally, the women of the former society pre- ferred to marry into neighboring groups rather than their own, with its unproductive, if occasionally charming, men. Moreover, where parents took less responsibility for their children and for the reputation of their family, both they and their children became a disruptive influence in so- ciety, thereby destroying its cohesiveness and unity in the face of threats.

The development of lower class cultures of poverty have, of course, also been adaptive for the individuals concerned, if not for their societies.

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Primarily, if an individual is not going to be given a roughly equal slice of the goods of a society, and if there is a way to survive in terms of one's own standards without following middle class rules, why should an individual submit to the middle class code? Often the member of the lower class would do a little better in the long run by following these codes, but he does not have much to lose by not following them. And his many fellows at his level have often built up over generations lovf/er class codes of behavior, almost anti-codes, if you will, which must be followed to achieve the comfort of their esteem.

But since this latter is the culture of failure and the middle class the culture of success, lower class society becomes essentially parasitic upon the middle or upper class. Even if the lower class person receives a poor share materially, that share is more than he would get if the middle class society were torn away. Lower class people would have to recreate a middle class culture to survive for long in this world.

Most poverty programs have as their goal an increase in the advantages which a person from a poor background may see in following middle class codes and expectations. And fortunately or not» these codes will be within the narrower limits of the American version of middle class culture. I personally think that many different types of middle class societies are acceptable bases for social life. Thus, the lower class person could be- come "middle class" in this general sense by organizing his life around the support of his sister's children. But I doubt if this will become a dominant pattern in the American context. The gratifications of respon- sibility, e.g., respect and deference — will probably not be granted by the sister and probably in too many cases not by her husband. The lower

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class American must be swept up in responsibility for his wife's chil- dren--or not at all. (Her children would not have to be biologically his.) He could adhere to a universal middle class standard and produce only the minimum wants of his family, but American society is not going to let him. It is going to place the definition of his wants at a higher and higher level, and he is going to have to place a value on work and goods uncommon perhaps for a 15th-century "middle class" man in a ZuHi pueblo. If he is going to be asked to be more productive, to work for higher and higher material standards, then a man striving for middle class status is not going to be willing to share the results of his work with those about him. If his children can go to college if he works a little harder, he is going to be loathe to spread his hard-earned margin among his relatives. The cooperative community of impulse workers will be broken up.

We are, then, trying to make more acquisitive, industrious, less spontaneous, but more serious and responsible middle class individuals out of the lower classes. In the process, many people will lose charac- teristics that our intelligentsia may value in them. But I know of no other way within the limits of justice to eliminate poverty as currently defined, or to further equalize opportunity among rich and poor. Basic- ally, I do not feel that there is a culture of poverty that the govern- ment has a responsibility to preserve as it attempts in other ways to lift the level of the poor.

er|c

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B. MEANS OF INCREASING MOVEMENT OUT OF THE CULTURE OF POVERTY 1 . Introduction

Equality in educational opportunity is much greater today than in income, and equality in final educational achievement is also considerably more than in money terms. By comparison, the distribution of incomes in the United States is not much different than in India, but the educational differences among classes are much more ext reine i n I nd i a . 2__wo^J^^d^^^ucj2^e^t^^tjTa^^^^^^oj2^^jT^e^jTex^^^J^^f^t^y^^^^ears

the lowest 20%, insofar as they are justly at the bottom, are not going to need much more education in a technical sense than they will receive on the basis of current extrapolations of trends. There will continue to be many service and laboring occupations for which the average employee may be, in fact, academically overeducated. The appropriate training here is usually on the job. Yet the value of education in terms of creating a better subjective life, in terms of taste, knowledge of political affairs and so on, may be considerable, and as such is a right of the poor and their children. Again, this is the group least likely to know what it wants, or even to desire what it should have for themselves and their children, so paternalism will con- tinue to exist in this area. (|n a society organized on principles of jus- tice much stricter than our own, the lowest 20% would naturally be expected to exhibit personalities transitional between "childhood" and "adulthood," as usu- al ly conceived.)

One imagines that federal aid to state and local school districts should be a first priority item here. For since the poor districts do not offer so much, they do not compete successfully in the market for teachers. A general rise in teachers' wages (but not "qualifications") should allow a weeding

*Cf. Laurie Rockett, "World Poverty to the Year 2000," 02.. cit. . and studies on the spread of education in India versus the U.S.

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process to occur among teachers which would do more than any other program to improve education in poorer areas.

Education in a much broader sense is also a way to approach the prob- lems of low productivity associated with undesirable attitudes and behavior.

One of the most important types of education is through increasing exposure to the middle class world. Theoretically, this could be achieved through eco- nomic class integration, through scattering the poor. In many cases, however, a people can maintain their level of society in spite of spatial dispersion. The Diegueno Indians of San Diego County, California, have been scattered for a hundred years on tiny reservations in the county, some with as few as one family. Many attend integrated schools. They have lost nearly all of their native culture, yet the majority have a common variant of the culture of poverty of lower class pattern as we have described it, A certain number of people of this group, or of any lower class group, do, however, take on the model of the alien middle class culture, perhaps a middle class teacher or fellow student, and carve out a new and more productive life.

One of the best ways to achieve the goals of "character-training," if we may call it by that name, may be to have a person take and keep a steady Job, This may be attained, as perhaps in World War il, by increasing the monetary opportunities and incentives of the poor to the point where either the differential between relief and wages is dramatically large* or merely by availability of reasonable jobs. But at the expected welfare standards and wage levels, it is hard to see how present differentials can be increased. It will be difficult even to maintain them, if some current proposals for straight income maintenance are enacted.

*A documented example of rapid change under these conditions is given by Norman Chance, "Culture Change and Integration: An Eskimo Example,"

American Anthropologist. December I960, pp, 1028-1041. Experience with Es- kimos elsewhere in the Arctic indicated their situation resembles that of the American Indians, given standard poverty conditions,

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In some societies the goal of steady work is attained by the pressure of want. In our society we must turn to the use of law to compel improved behavior, since we no longer countenance a really draconian use of want for an individual — certainly not for a family. Let us take as a behavior pattern to be changed, the frequently cited disinterest of the father in support of the child and suggest the possible influence upon this trait of increased application of non-support laws.* Some fathers would perhaps be more willing to support their children if making a living were easier. But our objective here is to make the poor father more interested in supporting the child, and therefore to provide the father with more incentive to work productively. Exhortation and direct advice have often failed. Legal pen- alties might be more effective. If more non-support actions could be car- ried through to conclusion, then the wrongfulness of non-support might begin to make a greater impression on more people.’’^' We notice in the education of children that an action which at one period of development could only be

^Family stability and the presence of the father are not obvious goods in themselves. In many families, the presence of the father is probably not desirable. Indeed, recent studies have shown that for all families, and particularly Negro families, the lack of a father's presence contributes little to the low educational performance or the delinquency of children that is not accounted for by other factors such as neighborhood, income or education of parents. (B. M. Fleischer, "The Effect of Income on Delinquency," og^. ci t . , p. 132; James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1966, pp. 301-302.) However, if we are interested in the productivity of the father, and the chance of the father raising the family out of poverty, then we should be interested in the father's interest in and support of the children. That is, I judge that the father's sense of responsibility for his children will help his productivity, even if it does not help his children directly. But if as a result the family has more money, then he will help the chances of his children. For the same studies show that the wealthier the family, the greater the chances of the children.

**l do not think this would be "cost-effective" in the short run reduction of welfare budgets. It might be very expensive. There is, however, a tremen- dous demand for this kind of help among the poor, as witnessed by recent experience with free legal services. (The New York Times^ September 2, 1966, on legal aid to the poor in Wisconsin.)

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imposed upon children by force is in later years seen as right and proper in a moral sense. Similarly, children growing up in a household in which the father is forced to work, or forced to support the wife, may have little respect for the father, but considerable for the law and its right- fulness. At any rate a boy in his early teens may have a less casual atti- tude toward becoming a father. Just what changes in present laws and pro- cedures might be necessary is not clear. In many cases, additional time and effort spent on enforcing present welfare regulations and non-support laws may be sufficient. This might mean a national system for tracing down absent fathers.

Another example is the ease with which some people apparently get around the regulations of unemployment compensation arrangements and gen- eral relief, by making less effort to find and hold jobs than the law in- tends. Caudill has pointed out how a demoralizing climate of illegality and subterfuge in favor of the poor has built up around the administration of a complex web of welfare programs in the Cumberlands.'‘ Much the same climate may begin to exist in the world of welfare of the large city. Again by increasing the rigidity of enforcement, the wrongfulness of the behavior of the lawbreaker would be strengthened in the mind of the poor individual and the community of the poor.

At the same time as the law is made stronger, it may be made fairer. This means both that discrimination against the poor and the special groups of the poor must be reduced, and that the generality of law enforcement must be maintained in ail communities. Often poor areas are so shot through with

*Cf. Harry Caudill, og^. cit . . pp. 273 ff.

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crime and illegality that any enforcement of a minor law seems an arbitrary intervention in the natural scheme of things. The great middle class, whether of Nova Scotia, New York, or Alabama, assumes that the law will be broken by the poor, and that as long as the acts of the poor are against one another, this is really not very important. In some areas this may lead to the institutionalization of light sentences for the crimes of the poor.* But the result is that the general respect for law and the middle class standards these represent is lowered. Thus, if we are really inter- ested in changing the behavior of the poor, an increase rather than de- crease in arrests among the poor may be a desirable addition to a well- rounded educative program.

Thus, as we look at education in the following sections we will be looking at everything from changing the context of formal education to vocational training, to new environments for the poor. The most success- - ful education for cultural transfer will probably end up affecting all of these areas of concern.

2. The Possible Cost of Financing Mass Movement Out of the Poverty Subculture Through Training

To the administrator the question "How stable is the culture of poverty?" may mean how rapidly the constellation of traits that now appear to make up the "culture of poverty" would be altered under other circumstances. The minority who have "made good" from a poverty culture appear to have been able to abandon the culture very rapidly. But this is not a good indicator of the

likely response of those who would not have made it on their own; the self- made group is also a self-selected sample. It is difficult to find instances

*Cf. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, Doub'ieday,

1937 (1949), P. 279.

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in which persons clearly in poverty cultures have undergone advancement from forces quite outside themselves, or have experienced random economic trans- formations or wealth unrelated to their own efforts. Some collective examples are provided by instances of fortuitous development of backward areas (e.g. the discovery of mineral resources in a depressed area, the creation of military bases in remote spots, etc.). It is our impression that the view is well founded that "poverty culture" dissipates rapidly under the impact of sustained prosperity and stable new cultural roles (especially as employees). But there are importai '^inter-cases when the wealth was erratic or unstable (lottery winnings, windi-M claims, settlements of land rights to Indian tribes). What means exist by wh i ch--cul tural change--and in the desired di rect ion--coul d be accelerated for those who share the "culture of poverty"?

The lower class (who are also the majority of the poor) are indeed

characterized to an important extent by habits, values, and attitudes that diminish their own economic potential, contribute to some extent to their

difficulties, and are also the object of disapproval or the basis of discrimi* natory rejection by the majority society. To say this is not to deny that there are also strengths and values among some of these traits of the lower- class poor. Note too that the same traits may appear as either assets or liabilities, depending upon context.* At the same time, neither of these views

amounts to a belief in a distinct culture in the anthropological sense. The

poor share a great many of the goals of the middle class, but often feel hopeless or frustrated in achieving middle class goals. Much of their

behavioral pattern consists of the consequences of, or adaptations to, that

*The much discussed matriarcfial pattern of the Negro p^r may be seen either as a serious weakness, hampering the development of male initiative, or as a competent and adequate response among Negro women to a problem (desertion by the husband) which also faces white women and with which white women appear to cope less effectively when faced with the same problem.

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feeling of exclusion and relative deprivation. Thus the problem of the "culture of poverty" is not simply the conventional problem of cultural change or culture conflict. In the long run, individuals who move out of the economic circumstances and the social milieu of the poor will have little difficulty in being assimilated into a middle class culture which is already largely familiar to them. What remains as the interesting prob- lems of the behavioral traits of the poor are the following:

1. The persistence of behavior patterns that make it harder for the lower class to be effectively employed in a middle class culture, or to be effective entrepreneurs, prevents the change in milieu that would (if brought about) do much to assimilate (former) lower class individuals to middle class society.

(a) Can these behavior patterns be changed, so that a sequence

of linked changes of economic productivity and social status can then

move forward?

(b) Can changes of milieu, employability, or Income be brought about

without the necessity of an "admission ticket" of prior behavioral change?

2. In any society in which income is related to effective economic output,

there will inevitably be a bottom twenty per cent. The fact of being in this bottom group is the source of an important part of the social pathology of the poor, and hence is likely to persist because of the likely persistence and comparative stability of differences in earning power. If this effect Is taken seriously, there is an important sense in which the poor are "always with us": moreover, the effect may be quite as serious in equal itarian or

equal opportunity societies as in more rigidly stratified ones.

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There are currently many proposals and programs In being for speeding up the transition of persons out of the lower classes. The settlement house movement, special classes in education in English, citizenship and hygiene helped to speed movement from lower class levels for many immigrant groups. Today, headstart programs, camps, job training and military training all assist the schools and churches in the process. For children from static lower class families, it appears that few experience enough of a boost really to take them from one culture to another. But even if four out of five are not helped, the record of achievement might still make these programs worthwhile, provided the yield warrants the cost.

Among the variety of approaches to training, retraining, and education that have been suggested, modification of the "culture of poverty" is either a direct goal or else an expected by-product of preparing the individual or his family for a new social role and a new social context. Often these involve

job training and relocation. In this regard, it may be useful to examine the rather long but not altogether encouraging history of the efforts of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Culture-change and the Indian Bureau. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most Indians slipped from identification with their own cultural patterns to patterns rather similar to the lower class model. The cultures of many Indian groups were, in fact, not too different from those we have outlined for the white lower class cultures (especially if we distinguish behavioral norms from ideals). The basis of the reform of Indian policy was a sort of "war on Indian poverty," a proposal that was spelled out in the detailed

-t-

Merian report of 1928. This study's primary proposal was to get away from the

^Louis Meriam, (iTech. Dir. ) The Problem of Indian Administration. Institute for Government Research, John Hopkins, 1928.

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pauperization of the Indians with its emphasis on “per diems, “ and to empha- size a broad upgrading of educational programs of all sorts, particularly through the improvement of personnel.* ** *** These recommendations were appar- ently implemented,’’^’^ and to a far greater extent than is generally recog- nized today. Yet the problem of the Indian's transition from a pauper state— and thus to a large extent from lower class culture — was by no means solved by this emphasis, nor by the Indian development projects which helped only a few.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs attempted to meet the challenge of Indian poverty by moving from a policy of welfare assistance to one of active assistance

with emphasis on education. This program offered the Indian three avenues of advancement:

(1) New cooperative or communal economic organization, able to provide a good living for those willing and able to cooperate, established on some reservations.

(2) Assistance to individuals to become independent agriculturists on their own land.

(3) Assistance to Indians who moved off of their reservations to take urban jobs.

This last was to be accomplished by residential vocational schools and by providing adults with general and specific education and counseling, and then helping them to get off-reservat ion jobs.

’^Ibid. . pp. 3-51.

**Cf. Hawthorn, Belshaw and Jamieson, cit . . p. 486.

***Newton Edwards and Harold Getty, in Fred Voget (ed.) "American Indians and their Economic Development," Human Organization. Winter 1961-1962, discuss earlier Indian training programs. AVT is described in Training Facts. U.S, Department of Labor, December, 1964.

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A renewed program of training for urban occupations was launched in 1961, under the Adult Vocational Training program of BIA. It pays not only for up to two years of training, but also provides the costs of transportation and maintenance ' for the trainee — and his sometimes numerous dependents. Support is also available if the trainee and his family must relocate again in order to take the new job for which his training presumably has qualified him.* *

In general, the attempt to provide employment on the reservation and thus raise vistas by direct employment assistance and training has been suc- cessful in an important number of instances, but has not reached the point of generally transforming either the culture or the employment status of most Indians.

The governments' job training and placement program for adults has apparently been the most successful of its Indian project. Between 1952 and 1963, nearly 30,000 workers received employment assistance. Only 60% of these became permanently employed; and "permanence" was established for that 60% on the average only with the third job they attempted One suspects that the people who find their way into the program have been the more aggressive reservation Indians rather than average, but still the gains seem considerable.

We might take as a model for a program to change culture the BIA's adult job training program with relocation, counseling and follow-up. This appears to have been more successful per dollar than any other program, including general education, in improving the general economic position (and thus class

*Cf. Louis Meriam, 0£. ci t. . pp. 712 ff., and Hawthorn, Belshaw and Jamieson, 0£. ci t . See also the Ute and Sioux cases in F. Voget (ed.) 09.. ci t.

*iWaterial on employment from a statement by BIA, USD I, submitted to the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, September 10, 1963.

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culture) of Indians over the last thirty years. The present AVT program is said to cost $4200 for a family head and $1900 for an individual.^

The approach concentrates on short- to medium-duration courses for adults, with job placement, relocation if necessary, family support if necessary. Job placement above poverty levels and Job follow-up until permanency is achieved. This latter is perhaps the most essential feature. In a few cases counseling, relocation and placement may be sufficient. The concentration is on young adults, although some teenagers and middle aged men are included.

Applying the BIA approach to all the Poor. If a similar program were to

be applied to all the poor, unrelated individuals as well as family heads, this

might be the cheapest way