V

i

	L I B 11	A. K Y	'
Theological Seminar PRINCETON, N. J.	Y , '
: sin// ■ i Boo/,-	sea	D i V i s h. • Ho

The Pretended T)tfficuJties in Na^ tural or ReveaVd Religion no Excufe for Infidelity.

SIXTEEN

S E R M O.N S

Preach'd in the Church of

St. Mary -^le- Bom, London ;

In the Years 1721 and 1712 :

A T T H E

Lecture Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Efci;

By Brampton Gurdon, A. M.

Chaplain to the Right Honourable

Thomas Earl of Macclesfield^

Lord High Chancellour ofGnEATBRixAN.

LONDON:

Printed for RobertKnaplocKj^;?;^^ Biihop's- Head;, m St. Paul's Churchyard. 1725,

• V.' " '

nloDnrJ "\cs ^ii^^iS S^^^\

:>^

l^dlB^ biWTOVt^

TO THE

Right HoNOURA*BLtE

RICHARD,

Earl of Burlington ;

The Right Reverend Fathers in God, Charles LordBiJhop o/Winchefter^ Edmund Lord Bi/hop of Lincoln, Samuel Lord Bi/hop of Carlilc,

AND

White Lord Bijhop of 7ctQvhovouglu

TRUSTEES

Appointed by the moft Reverend Father in GOD, Thomas late Lord Arch- bifhop o^Cdnterbury^ the laft Surviving Truftee named by the Honourable •

Robert Boyle, Efq\

Thefe SERMONS are mof^

humbly Dedicated. \

BTWE-'^WOO

vV; «a!»«rra^ 3t>v

♦^ ^

• v.iV- .Ui^J-i

THE

CONTENTS.

3 E R M O N I.

' H E hnfortance of the Dtffute between its

and the Infidel. Pag, I,

Soine Ad'vantages attending the Belief

of Religious Principles. p. g.

Ackno'ivledged hy Epicurus.- p. 7.

And hy all other Atheifts in their account of the

frf: Introdu6iion of Religion. p. 10.

Religion lays no Rejhaints upon us^ but

for our ad'vantage. p. If.,

Jhe Atheifts Arguments againfl it affe^ only

Superfiltion, p. 1-7,

It fets a Mar^s mind eafy with regard,

to a future State. p. 2r.

The Atheift has no reafon to make

Frofelytes, p. 27.

A 4

Sermo^'-

The Contents.

Sermon s ir,m^IV,V,

No Safety in a Fahb not grounded upon fomc

kind of Evidence. p. 5 f.

Nor a Ma7i always fafe in acting accord"

ing to his Opinions. p. 57.

Mens Opinions ^ofte^tirries the <rejult of

,tbclr Vajfions.^ P- 39*

An Averfon to Superjiltion one Moti've to

Infidelity. p. 45.

Another Moti've^ the defire of being un~

controuled. p. 45".

Such ^Motives no fecurity agai7tfi the appre-

^ '-henfion of Tunijliment. p. 49.

2l^ H^^it of a.. Car ef id. Examination another

\, .,C^»fi of Infidelity. ■ P- 5'4-

Tke , 'V'-jpculty. of conQ^iving fame Terfeciions in

Gou.tio Reafoiifer. d^lie'vlng them. p.6j.

-, 2>lothing b:^l^.a Contradicilon ctin jitfiifiz

. .fitch dishlief p. 64.

- iinwateriality iw piles no Contradlclion. p. 6^.

C^^ "fht^ ^hiioj«pkerl^ ficnial of the. Creative

VI "J ^^"^'^^'y ^0' fi^'^^'^^ ^^ ^'^^' Atiieift.

PP|. h cannot be proved to he impnijiblc. p. 78, ^ifmoil-ackno'wlec^cs many^ tilings, to he true ahho' he does not underfiand them. p. 7'9.

The

The Contents.

The Being of Natural ani Moral Good and Evtl conjifient with the Being of a good JPrinci-' pie. p. 8r.

Tie Scheme which Spinofa Suhjlltutes In the place of the Religious one. p. 87:

His Scheme encreafes infiead of lejjenlng Difficulties. p. 90,

Forced to alter the recel'ved Notions of Matter. p. 91.

To deny that there is any fuch Thing in Nature as a mutable Being. p. 100. To affert that Thought and Extenfion are the fame Thing, jp. ror.

His NeceJJ'ary Being the SuhjeSl of Con^ traditions. p_ 107.

The other Atheiftick Scheme of a Plu- rality of NeceJJary Beings impoj/lifle,

p. HI.

No 'Account to he gi'ven of Good and E-vil

by Spinofa^J Scheme. p. 118.

The Union of GoD vlth Man in the Perfon

of Christ will not help out his Scheme.

p. 125,

No other Atheiftick Scheme will account for

Good and Evil. p. 116^ &c.

V. S E R M O N S VI, VII, VIII, IX.

Spinofa could give no Jccoufjt how Matter I'cafrU u he moved, p. ij2.

Not

The Contents.

- Nor Toland p-oiK that it could rmx/e Itfelf. p. lyy.

7^ contrary evident from its Idea, p. I y 8_, &C. And from fome appearances In Naturt^

p. 169.

The Oifj'e^iom againfi God's being the M.o%)er

of Matter, p. 186.

Particular Self-Movers confifient with aji

Unl'verfal Mover. p. 19,2.

The Exlfience of fuch particular Self-Movers

■ pofihle. p. 195-.

Tie ^Motive to Infidelity on this Head un~

. r jujilfiahle. p. 200.

"^2^(? accounting for Thought hy SpinofaV

Scheme. p. 21.5,

T^e ether Account -which makes It to h^ Figure

md Motion cannot be true. p. 2i8_,&c.

Delcartes might give occafion to this lafi O-

pinion. p. 224.

Farther dlfprovd from the Simple Nature

of Thought. ' p. 228,

The Charge of .Difficulties retmned. upon the

"Terfoxallty proved to be Imfofflble on any ;; Foot of Atheifm. p. 244^ &c.

Thi Union of Material 'with Immaterial can- ' not be provd tmpojfible. p. 2^0.

The~ main Indacement to Atheifm taken ' fi^viiy■' P- 2jr.

SERMON

TJ^ Coiitents,

Sermon X.

jmMr Proof of the AtfieiftV Unreafinabk-

vefs in complaining of Difficulties, p. 268.

He cm helieve undireked Jl^otions Jhall pro-^

dffce d Regular Work, p.. 270^'

_^ That a Compofition of Being Jliall be a

c :, i>^ecejfary Being. P-^JT-

That all the J)iv&rfity which appears in the

,llea'vens is necejjary. p. 277 &c.

' X^f/^« and Contrivance provd from the

Earth'' s Annual Motion. p. 284.

From the Vro^ijkn made for Animals ttp"

on our Earth. p, 287.

Our Ignorance of the Ufcs of fo?m Things no

Reafon for denying the Ufes of other Things

"ivhich -we do know, p^ 2^0.

Sermon XI.

ne Atheift'^ Denial of Moral Diff^ef^ces uhm reafonable. ... ^,, p. ^^j^

. Bis Denial will not prove then, are none.

p. 506.

A wrong as well as a right Tafie in judg- ing of thofe Differences. p. 509, TheThilofophers acknowledg'd fuch Differences.

p. 310*

Even

The Contents.

Even f/Sf Epicureans. p. 5i2.

They were -taken for granted hy Legijla-

tors. p. 314-

Wicked Men bear their Tefilwony in behalf of

them. P- 319-

What Reafoft for believing they appear fuch to

God Of to us. p. 325.

Sermon XII. v

"T^tf Infiderj Plea for not en^tdring into the

Merits of any Revelation. p. 3^1.

Jhe Poffibflity ^f Miracles proved, p. 558.

Thay we a good Proof of a Divine Mi(Ji67j,

■V .'-'5 ■ -- > ■ p. 341.

"^ht 'living Lift to a Dead Body no Ejf'ect of

^ny lament Powers in Nature. p, 542.

^■|f h could- be an Pffe^ cf any fuch Powers ^

'•■- it -would not account for oisr Saviour'j

Miracles, .1 ' .-^ '■ •-> "^ p. 346.

Jt cannot be^ done by any Agcfits inferior to

■^■' Qni).: - - p. J49.

7^ Converfon of the Magicians Rod into

' .^Sei-pentSy .fiot real. a i;Vr p. gj-i.

• "iNaPrttof that ApoUonius raised a dead Per-

'■'^- fon io Lifu -.. . ::■ ; .-., .. p. 55'4.

O^r Lord's Difclples able to judge whether

n^\4fUvr^'ifSi7ig\dead he ^ came ta lafe again.

c ... Tbe\T

The Contents.

Their fometimes not knowing him^ m Vroof /< of his not being the fame J^erfon*.

■ -^iVj^ ;vfcAy -i^vit ??uV. p)»x'3^r

Sermons XIII, XIV.

Another OhjeUlon againfi Revelation confder'^d.

p. 570.

Faith CiY yjuthority jJ]e^'n to he a proper Ground

of Terfuafion. p. 'i^'']6-

Ihat in Fa5i the Chrifiian Religion puts an End

to many Controverfies of A^oment. p. 279,

To many wicked VraBices. p. 585"^ 299.

The Differences among Chriftians_, 2Z);//

TUit invalidate this Vroof. p. 289.

The Way of Authority better fitted for the In-

firu5iion of the lower Sort of People, p. 292.

I'he Benefit of Preachifig as performed in cur

:^.ifhurches. p. 404.

The Philojophers did not teach Religion in their.

Schools, p. ^06,

The Heathen Paefs taught no Morality.

The Number of Churches 'vaflly greater and better dlfpofed than the Schools for Philofophy.

p. 409. Julian the Apofiate fenfble of thefe Advantages,

p. 4"- IVhy no Revelation has yet been JJniverfal^

p. 412. 7hat

^The Contents.

Thnt God was not ohliged to maie any Re^

'^Velation. -^ ;^ p. 415-.

l%at He has promlfed the Chriftian Jhall be

Uni'verfal. p, 418.

l>Jot preached at firfi to all , hecaufg all ?iot

(qualified for receiving it, p. aio.

Whf not in America. p, 424.

• Why not to the Chincfc. p. 425*.

' W<? Word in the Chinefe Language -wili

expre/s the Word God. p. 426.

\/idvice to the Deilt to examine hefm'e he makes a Jefi of our Religion. p. 428.

Sermons XV, XVI.

^0 Keafifi fir fufieWng the Jpojlles Teftimo- ny concerning Gofpel Miracles, p. 45-7.

That no worldly Purpofes could be fer^ved by giving fnch a Teftimony. p. 459J &c.

}sor no Trobahility 9f their being able at that Time to impofe upon the IVorld, p. 45:0,

The Falfe Miracles of the Vlth and folio-wing Centuries no Reafon for fufpecilng Gofpei Miracles, p. 45'4.

T^^Xhriftian Religion preached at the Time mentioned in our Gofpels. p. 461.

IVJjat Evidence for the Conveyance of the Chri« ftian Religion from the Apofles to our Times. p. 469,

Tljat

The Contents.

"fhat feme of them "writ Gofpels as ivell

^^-^ as ^reached, P* 470.

V^his confirmed hy ?i6^ Teftimony of He-

The Ebionites made ufe of St. J^atthew j

'^^fi^^- p. 47^

Tfhjy the Gofpel they ufed was thought to

■^''\'be an Apocryphal Gofpel, p. 475-.

T^e many D^ffevfncs^s from the Greek Cofy

accounted for^ p. 477,

?''''"Mark a7td\.\xkQ^t Cofpcls fuppe/d td ha^ue

recei'ved jhe A^proi^ation ^ <?«,; Afofile,

p. 481'.

No fuch Troof for the Epifiks of Barnabas

and Clemens. p. 48;.

Out Greek Copies could not he alter d fe

much as the Ebionites Hebrew Copy..

p. 484, lie Gofpel of Barnabas a Spurious Piece, ^

p. 487.' None hut our Four Gofpels had an undonhi^. cd Authority. p. 491,

How it might happen^ that falfe Gofpels^

might pafs for a Time, p. 492.

Jhe True Reading of the Four Golpels to be

found in feme Copy at this Day. p. 49 S,

Hereticks could not c^qrrupt all the Copies of

the New Teftament, , p. 499,

7J;e Conclufion, -^"^ •^•' ^ ^^^^

ERRATA,

^&&uu^(^i^»i!^&^u^^*dS^w>^^^Suu

ERRATA.

pAGE 94. line 15 infcrt not. p. 183. 1. 15. dele and, p. a6a. 1. 19- «/for ij*. p. 461. 1. 9. dele ftfne.

^1f:^^^f^^W?l"i^¥'fWW¥*l'*#

S£RM«

( I )

SERMON I.

I Timothy IV. 8.

- — Godlinefs is profitable unto all Things, having the Vromife oj the Life that now is^ and of that which is to come.

H E Subjefl: which I pro- pofe to difcoLirfe upon is of the laft Importance and Concern for all of us to be fatisfy'd in ; for 'tis no lefs than this,

I. Whether Men at firft either

grew out of the Earth fpontaneouil/

as Trees ; or that there has been

B Ahvajs

Sermon i.

always a SuccefTion of Men and Wo-- ftien upon Earth, propagated after the fame manner, as they are at pre- sent ; or whether a Wife and Intelli- gent Being fent us into this World.

2. Whether we are to go, as the Materialifi contends for, to the Place quo non nati jncera ; or whether, as the religious Man beheves , there is to be another State of Beins; for us after this Ihort Thread of Life is wound oE

I F any Prejudices were allowable, they would certainly be in this Con- troverfy between Us and the Atheifls^ where all the Advantages to Mankind are on the Side of Religion; and no- thing but Darknefs and Defpair in the .Atheiji\ Scheme of Things. The Pro- iitablenefs of Godlinefs, or of living under a Senfe of religious Principles^ and the Unprofitablenefs of Infidehty, may be made very plain to us, tho' we fliould fiippoie that we may be mi- ftaken in believing them true. And jR)r thefe Reafons :

I. Because

Sermon I.

1. Because nothing but fuch a Be- lief can cany a Man thro' the Diffi- culties and Miferies that human Life is fubjed to.

2. Because the Belief of religious Principles retrains a Man from no En- joyments but fuch as would be hurtful to him and make him uneafy.

^ Because living under a Senft of Religious Principles will make a Man's Mind eafy with regard to any Apprehenfions of a Future State*

I. That nothing but the Belief of •Religious Principles, 'viz. of G o d and a Providence can carry a Man through rile Difficulties and Miferies that Hu- man Life is fubjea to. If a Man makes the leaft Reflexion upon the State and Condition of his Life, he will prefently fee that he has not fuf= ficient Power of himJelf to procure his own Happinefs. That there are many Things which are able to hurt him, and he ndtliQi' knows how to fecure iiimfelf againll them, or to acquit him=. Cd^ of them, when they have attacked him» There are many Evils he muil own B 2 .him"

Sermon l

liimfelf obnoxious to, becaufe he fees ochers opprefs'd by them. If there was no G o D or Providence to have Re* courfe to in this difagreeable Profped of Things thofe whom we all of us al- low to be Animals inferior to ourfelves would have greatly the Advantage of him, for as they have no Forefight of Future Evils, fo they could have no Forethought about them, nor torment themfelves with any Fears of what may be hereafter ; whilft our conti- nual Anxiety and Solicitude about Fu- ture Evils would make the Life of Man appear to be a Scene of Things perfeftly difmal and without any kind of Hope, if nvithout a God in the World, The Author of the CharaQ:erifticks has fairly own'd that there cannot be a Compleat Virtue without Piety or the Belief of a God and Providence, that thofe Virtues which fliould fup- port us in Adverfity, fuch as Fortitude, Patience and Contentment under our Condition, would probably lofc their Etfeds upon us, if" we had nothing to trufl: to but Chance or a blind JSIe-

cefTity •

S £ R M O N I. 5

eeflity ; that they would be convert- ed into a natural Kind of Spleen and Abhorrence of every Thing in the World, and imbitter our Tempers to that Degree as to ruin the very Prin- ciple of all Virtue , fo as inftead of Fortitude and Patience , the Atheifis Scheme in his Opinion would produce Impatience and Rage, " Nothing, ^' Jays he^ ^ indeed can be more me- -' lancholy than the Thought of living ^' in a diifraQied Univerfe from whence •*' many Ills may be fufpeded , and '' where there is nothing that can ra ife " any PafTion befides that of Contempt, " Hatred or Dillike. Such an Opinion " as this may by Degrees imbitter the ** Temper and help to impair and ruin " the very Principles of Virtue , " Speaking of the Belief of a God and Future State, he fays -!-, " by Virtue " of this Belief Man may retain his *^ Virtue and Integrity even under the " hardeii Thoughts of Human Na- B 5 " true '\

* Enquiry concerning Virtue, p. 70. f lb hi yol. 2, p. 71,

Sermon I.

" ture ", but in the other Scheme, " upon difaftrous Occafions and under " the Circumllances of a hard and cala- '' mitous Fortune 'tis fcarce poffible " to prevent a natural Kind of Ab- " horrence and Spleen ''^. And in ano- ther Place, " That 'tis not poiTible *' to retain the fame Firmnefs or Con- " flancy of Mind , which Pvehgion " would naturally give a Man f ". Thus we fee, if this Author's Obfer- vations (who has no fmall Credit with Our Free-thinkers) have any Weight in them, what mull: be the Behaviour of a Man in Adverfity, and what mufi: be commonly expected from one that afts upon the Atheidick Scheme : In- ftead of Coniiancy and Firmnefs of Mind under Afflidions, we muft ex- peel to find the A.he/Jl raging and cur- ling his Stars, ading more like a Mad- man than a wife and fober Perfbn , we miuii: exped that he fliould lofe his Temper , grow foure and melan- choiv, and confequently uneafie to him-

' Page 73. t Page 75.

Sermon I. 7

felf, and every one that has any Thing to do with him. And is not this a Charming Profpe8: of Things , and enough to induce a Man to part with his Rehgious Principles, that in^ ftead of behaving under Afflictions with Decency and Dignity, if we will turn Atheifis we may hope to lofe our Tempers, grow impatient, contract a Sort of Diflike and Abhorrence of e- very Body and every Thing : But if we delire to keep our Tempers in all States of Life, and to do nothing that we fliall have Reafon to be ailiamed .of, we muft hve and a8: with a View to the Principles of Religion ; it being impoflible with any other Principles to keep up a good Compofure of the Af- fedions, or any Uniformity ia our Minds as the above mentionM Author obferves.

Epicurus himfelf could not for- bear faying, that he thought it better to believe the Fable of the Heathen Gods than to fubmit to that blind Ne= cefTity which our Modern Atheifts feem to be fo fond of Qn. his Letter to M^?

B 4 iJ2C§^ .

8 Sermon I.

mcxus given us by Diogenes hxentas m his Life) becaufe, he fays, there is Hopes that the Gods may be prevail- ed upon by Worfhip and Prayer, but the other, viz, NecelTxty is deaf and inexorable to all Applications ^. And tho' he did not much mend the Matter by his introducing the Clinamen or Ob- lique Motion of his Atoms, in order to fecLire the Liberty of our Minds, yet the Force of Truth extorted this Con- feflion fi-om him, that the Fatality which Leucipp!^ and 'Democritm had in- troduced, and which is ftill maintained by our Athafis did reduce Mankind to a moft hopelefs and miferable [Con- dition ; that it would be even better to embrace Superftition for fuch was the Heathen Mythology, than to be tied down to the Laws of an unre- lenting NeceflTity.

The

Ortj", n <j^ ^v(7ix,uv (meaning the Stolcks) ei^uctgiA- AvciyKiiy.

Sermon I.

The Athetfi when he is called up- on to give an Account of the general Confent of Mankind in the Behef of a G o D and Providence is forced to affign fuch Reafons for it as plainly fhew him very fenfible of the Profita- blenefs of Godhnefs or Religious Prin- ciples, as firft ^, When he accounts for the Introdudion of Religion, by Mens Fears and Solicitude about Future E- vents ; he muft own it to be his Opini- on that it would be for the Benefit of Mankind that fome Being fliould exift who ' could order and difpofe of all E- vents, to whom Men might addrefs themfelves for Rehef, and in whom they might take Refuge, as being able to proted them againft every Acci- dent. Whereas the Fear and Concern about Future Events which themfelves fuppofe to be natural to us, would en- creafe upon us, grow worfe and worfe, if we were once perfuaded that Fu- ture 'Events were under no Diredion but fubjecl to the Caprices of Fortune or what would be as bad for us, the un- alterable

* Primus in orbe Decs, fecic timor.

lo Serjmon I.

alterable Laws of a blind and un- thinking NecelTity, becauie in fuch a Cafe there is nothing to apply to, no- thing to truft in : For as thefe Athei- flical Deities bring about every Tiling without knowing all the while what they are doing, it can be to no Pur- pofe to make any Application to them or hope for any Relief from them. In order to amend this ill State of Things the At he i ft tells us Mankind found out this Expedient of making themfelves believe that there muit be fome other Agent beiides this material World , which they were fure could not help them ', and tho' they could not fee him doing any Thing that yet he did all, direded the Motions of the Heavens, manag'd all Events here upon Earth, and was able and ready ro relieve his Creatures when they called upon him for Help. What Proof v^-e have for a G o D fhall be afterwards fnewn, by which it will appear to (land upon the bed: of Evidence, -and th-retbre that Fear was not the onely Caufe of introducing Religion among Alen. It

is

Sermon I. Il

IS enough for my prefent Purpofe that we have the J^'heifi acknowledging the Advantages of Rehgious Principles for ilipporting Men againft the Fears of Future Evils , and confequently the Being of a God and Providence is what of all Things ought to be de- fired and wifli'd for by us all.

Another Account they arc woiit to give of the General Confent of Mankind in the Belief of a God is that Legiflators and Politicians perfuad- ed Men there was a G o d as fuch a Perfuafion was thought to be the beft Means of keeping Societies in order and in Obedience to the Laws. This too is a plain Acknowledgment from them of the Profitablenefs of Religi- ous Principles, fince the wifefl Men fuch as the Founders of States were, faw no Way of fecuring the Peace of Societies but by making the Princi- ples of Religion a Part of the Civil Conrtitution ; and Mr. Hol?h tells us how thofe Religious Principles prefer- ved the Peace of Societies in as much as the People v/hen they were under

any

12 Sermon I.

any Misfortunes or Calamities , and were therefore moft inclined to Mu- tiny , would not blame their Gover- nors f but rather attribute their Misfortunes to iheir Want of Refpett to G o D , to their OmiiTion of fome Religious Inftitution or fome Miftake in performing it. I think a higher Commendation of Religious Principles cannot poflibly be given than the ma- king them neceffary to the Peace of Societies. And the Hobbtji above all others muft acknowledge the Necef- fity of imbodying for our mutual Security , becaufe according to his Scheme y every Man is an Enemy to every other Man in a State of Nature. Every Man has a Natural Right to whatever he can get by any Methods what foe ver ; there be- ing according to him no fuch Thing

as

\ Per has fimilefq; Iqftitutiones ad finem fuum, nempe Pacem Civitatis, hoc raltem obtinueiunt, ut populus Calamitatcs fuas Errori allcui vel ne- gleftui In] agendls facris - — attribueris minus con* tja Reftores iuos incitaretur, Liviatban, p. Co.

Sermon I. 13

as Right and Wrong, Jutl and Unjuft, before Men enter into Society , nor confeqiiently any Thing but their own Intereft to hinder them from being a Plague and Vexation to each other. Having now feen fome of the Advan- tages of Rehgious Principles for our Support in the uneafy Parts of Life, it may be fit to fee what thofe Advan- tages are which the Atheift propofes by his Scheme as an Equivalent for what by his own ConfefTion he muft deprive • himfelf and others of by his Disbelief of a God and Providence, and by endeavouring to draw others into the fame Degree of Infidelity. Plutarch tells us his Defign is to free himfelf from Fear, that he might ftand in Awe of no Body, and be at full Li- berty to do what he pieas'd f. This leads to the Second Advantage of God- linefs, i'iz-»

That the true and Genuine No* tion of a G o D has nothing frightful

id

t T«A©- n ,u>) I'ouii^eif 9«K?j /LO> ^«^rt»^.-

14 Sermon I.

in it, that it reftrains a Man in no Enjoyments but what would be hurt- ful to him and make him uneafy, and therefore that a Man can be no Lofer by being a Behever, if it fhould prove at laft that there is to be no after State. Tliat Plui;aych\ Obfervation was a juft one, or that the At he i ft s Unwillingnefs to admit a God arifcs from a fright- ful Notion that he entertains of him, is evident from the Epcuream continu- ally reprefenting Rehgion as a grievous ' and heavy Burden. Thus Ve'deius in TuUy de NaturaDeorui-K^ lib. i. pag. 48. fays , That thofe who had introduced a Governor of the World, had made Mankind perfedt Slaves ^. So Lucretius in. the Beginning of his firfl Book , reprefents Mankind as finking under the heavy Load of Religion, grovel- ling upon the Ground, not able to look up or lift up its Head for tear of the terrible Afpecl of a God appearing

from

* Itaque impofuiftis in Cerviclbus noftrls fem- pirernuai domiaum, quern Ulos 5v iiowtes timere- mus.

Sermon I. 15

from above, and that this was the mi- ferable Cafe of Man till Epicurus ap^ peared ^. And the fame Writer fpeaks of Epicrma^s curing Men of tlie Fear of a G o d as the mod fignai Piece of Service that was ever done for Mankind -K But there is nothing can be more fahe than this Reprefen- tion of G o D and Rehgion. 'Tis true indeed our Holy Writings fpeak of Re- ligion under the Phrate of the Fear of God. But then this is not the Fear of an Arbitrary Being who has no regard to the Good and Welfare of others* 'Tis not the Fear of an Omnipotent Tyrant, that acts by Humour and PalTion , but the Fear of a wife and good Being, that always governs himfelf by the unalterable Rules of good Senfe, fuch a Fear as fliould re- train Men from playing the Fool and hurting themfelves, from violating the Laws of Reafon, and confounding the

Moral

* Primum Graius homo mortales tendcre contra tfi: Oculos aufus.

t Nos exsequat Victoria Cxlo.

t6 Sermon L

Moral Diflerences of Things. And fuch a Fear no confiderate Man ought to be concern'd at, for a Fear of this Kind is greatly for the Advantage of Mankind, as it tends to the keeping the World in Peace and good Order, and hindring thenn from injuring one another ; 'tis the Fear of a juft B e- I N G who threatens Punifliment for doing fuch Things as would turn to Our real Detriment ; 'tis the Fear of a kind Father, who knowing better than ourfelves what is good for us and what would be mifchievous to us, leads us to our Happinefs and keeps us from hurting ourfelves by the Fear of of- fending him. This is the true and genuine Fear of a God; what Ad- vantage then would it be to any Per- fon if he were deliver'd from fuch a Fear. Every Man that thinks at all would rejoice that there fliould be fuch an Objed of his Fear as might keep his PafFions and Appetites from doing him Harm, he would fee that fuch a Fear was fo far from being Sla- very , that 'tis confident with the

trucft

Sermon i. 17

truell Liberty, and the beft Prefervative of itj and that withutt^ it, it would fcarce be pofTible to fecure the Free- dom of our Thoughts and Aftions, Whenever this Fear is attended with Jealoufies and Sufpicions of the Deity, as an imperious and arbitrary Being, that, father dehghts Himfelf in the Mi- feries than the Happinefs of his Crea- tures, it then ceafes to be a rehgi* ous , and cornmences a vicious Fear, or what we are wont to call Supet- ftition.

'T I s againfl this lafi Soit of Fear, that the Arguments of Lucretius^ and of all Sorts of Jtheifis are direfted. For they, laying it down as a certain Truth, That there is no fuch Thing m Nature as Moral Differences, no Right or Wrong, Jufi: or Unjuil:, fepa- rate from Pleafure and Pain , Conveni- ence and Inconvenience, k would then indeed follow. That if there was a God , He could have no Moral Qiia- lities, nor be obhg'd to ad in Virtue of them. If there was a Being diftinct from the World, and enduM with a

C Power

i8 Sermon I.

Power of doing every Thing ; yet there could not be a juft Being, if there be no fuch Thing as Juftice (abftra£led from the Laws of Civil Government.) If there exifled an infinite Intelligence, yet fuch Intelligent Being could make no Difi:in61:ion between Right and Wrong, if there really be no fuch Thing as Right and Wrong in the Nature of Things ; and then what fhould we be the better for fuch a Being -^ Or fa- ther, fhould we not probably fare bet- ter, if we were without fuch a Go- vernor as ads by mere Will and Plea- fure? That thefe Notions are juftly cliarg'd upon the ancient and modern Atheifisy may appear by a Quotation from each of them : Cotta, in Tully de Natura Deorun?^ pag. 98. Davie s''s Edit,, tells us, one Opinion of the Epicuream was, That there was no fuch Thing as Benevolence or an Obligation to do A£1:s of Kindnefs ; but that whatever appears of this Kind, arifes merely from Weakncfs ^5 and therefore, ii there

was

^ Cum ill imbecllllcate gratliicatloncni §; bcneyo- Untriam ponicls.

S E R M O N I. I p

was any fuch Thing as a God, there could be no fuch Thing as Love or Benevolence in him ; becaufe as He would be all-powerful, He could want no one's Afliftance, ftand in Need of no Body, and therefore care for no Body. And thus again, Mr. Hobbs m his Levia^ thm^ and his Book De Cive, p. 260, 262. founds all the Right that God has of Go- verning us, upon his Almighty Power ; and all the Obligation that we have to obey him, upon this. That we cannot help it, his Power being irrefiftible ^* Thus we fee the Atbeijls Drefling up God in a frightful Shape, that they might have the better Colour for De- nying his Exiftence. But I have alrea- dy fhewn, that this is a falfe Repre- fentation of Him ; that when He is re- prefented as He ought to be, and fuch as He really is ; that He is the moft amiable Being in the World j fuch a C 2 Being

* Deo omnipotenti jus dominandi ab ipfa poten- tii derivator': manifeftum eft Obligationem ad prje- ftandam ipfi Obedlentiam incumbere hominlbus propter imbecUlitatem.

20 S E H M O N^ I.

Being as every confiderate Man would heartily wiili for, and would even part with all the World, rather than give up the Belief of Him ; as the Want of fuch a Being would rob him of a moft comfortable Profpeft in a Time of Dif- ficulty and Diftrefs, and in a Time of Profperity take off that Reftraint from his Appetites and PafTions, which is ab- foluteiy neceffary to keep them from hurting him.

Hitherto I have fhewn the Profi- tablenefs of Religious Principles, and {cor/fzqtiently) the Difadvantages of thofe of the Atheifls on the Suppofition, that they could fully perfuadc themfelves. of the Truth of their Scheme: But, if af- ter all the Pains they take to difown a: God, they cannot fet their Minds eafy from the Fears of Him, then the Pro^ fitablenefs of living under a Senfe of Religious Principles, and the Difadvan- tages of Athiij?;-?., will receive a new D^igree of Evidence : Which was the third Advantage of Rehgious Principles that I proposed to difcourfe upon, viz. That the Belief of them will fet the

Religious

S E R M O N I. 21

Religious Man's Mind at Eafe with Re^ gard to any Apprehenfions of an after State.

The Hiftories of all Times, and all Countries inform us, That there con- ftantly has been a Belief of fome future State, in which Men v/ere to be ac- countable for their Behaviour in. this. ' I am not now to confider, Whether this Apprehenfion in Mankind be agreea- ble to the Truth of Things, or any good Proof of them : I am at this Time pnly to confider, What EHeds fuch an Apprehenfion may have upon Mens Minds. And I think it muft be granted me. That whilft Men have fuch Ap- prehenfions, they cannot be indiflerent or unconcerned what is to become of them in this after State, no more than a Man can be indifferent with Regard to his Happinefs or Mifery in this prefent one. And therefore, unlefs the Jthtifl can give us a fure and certain Method by which we may get entirely rid of fuch Fears, he muft acknowledge his Scheme to be neither calculated for fhe GoocJ of himfelf nor any Body elfc.

22 Sermon I.

For I have already fhewn the Advan- tages of a true and genuine Fear of God, for the better Conduct of our Lives ; and if the Atheijl is willing to give up thofe Advantages, fo as he might free himfelf from the Fears of an after Reckoning, we might expe8: %hd,t he was fure of gaining this Point ; • Bnt the Hiftories of all Ages fliew us, that the Convidions of Mens Confci- ences are not to be filenced by fuch weak and trifling Reafonings as the Jthetfis Scheme is built upon : The Ap- prehenfions of a future State have ta- ken too deep Root in Mens Minds to be overturn d by any Speculations of Men; and I will venture to fay, That the Athei[t himfelf, with all the Confidence he pretends to have in the Truth of his Scheme, cannot infure himfelf for Life againit the Fears of a future State, and for this plain Realbn, That he cannot prove it to be impof- fible, that fuch a Being as God (in the Religious Notion of the Word) fliould exill : For if he cannot have an abfolute Certainty of that, neither cai^

Sermon I. 2g

lie have any of the other. The Cafe be- ing this, there can be no Difficulty in fhewing, That the Principles of Religi- on are better calculated for the Eafe of Mens Minds, with Regard to a fii- ture 6tate, than thofe of the Atheift, For the Man that lives under Religious Principles, has a comfortable Profped : If his Apprehenfions be juft, he knows that he is made for ever, that his Happinefs will be beyond the utmoft of his Con- ceptions, and the Continuance of it to all Eternity. And if his Thoughts of the Matter fhould prove nothing but a Mi- ftake ; yet his Belief has made him pafs plf Life with more Satisfaftion than J- theifm can afford a Man, and it can be at laft no worfe with him than the other.

L B T us now take a View of the Unbeliever, with Regard to the Apprehenfions of a future State : As I have already obferv'd, That he cannot demonftrate the ImpofTibihty of a Lire after the Conclufion of this prefent one, the Suppofirion of its being bArely pof- fibly to be true, mull give him now and then an uneafy Thought, for Fear C 4 that

24- S E R M O N I.

that PofTibility lliould arife ; and when- ever fuch a troublefome Thought di- fturhs him, I know of no other Way he can take to make himfelf cafy, but by perfuading himfelf, either ift, That no Man is under any Obhgation of Re- verencing or Honouring God, tho' there fhould be One ; or elfe, if he dares not truft to that, That he is un- der no Obhgation, becaufe not behev- ing there is a God, he cannot pay any Reverence to Him. As to the lirft of thefe Excufes, I beheve the Atheift will jfind it hard enough to make himfelf ■ believe, that no Man is under an Obli- •gation of honouring Him, if there real- ly be One ; for if there be fuch a Be- ing, the Relation that we fland in to • Him, and the Obhgations we have re- ceived from Him, will make it fit for us to exprefs our Thankfulnefs and Ac- knowledgments to Him.

I Am fenfible UnbeHevcrs do not allow what we call moral Differences; but then this is upon Suppofition that their Material Scheme is the true one, and that there is no God, or no Su- preme

Sermon 1. 2$

preme Being endued with Moral Per- feftions. But if there fhould be fuch a Being, the Jtheiji may be, lor any thing he knows, anfwerable to this Be- ing for denying his Exiftence, and in Confequence of that, for paying no Re- ;verence nor Acknowledgments to Him for the Favours received from Him, For if there are any moral Differences in the Nature of Things, and they are judg'd of by the Supreme Underftand- ing fuch as by other underftanding Be- ings, making only an Abatement for the Difference between a finite and in- finite Underftanding ; that is, Suppofe . we know what Juftice is in God, we muft believe that it is unjuft to deny Reverence to the Supreme Being, as well as it would be Injuftice to refufb our Acknowledgments to any Friend or Benefactor for any Kindnefl'es we had received from him. And it can't be thought but that the Supreme (as well as other Beings) muft make a Dif- ference between thofe that honour Him, and thofe that deny his Being and Au-. ^hority oyer them. For if God has

tonftitutecj

2(5 S E R M O N I.

conftituted any moral Differences la Things, He has thereby fufficiently de- clared that it is his Intention to adi fui- tably to thofe Differences. The Thing is fo evident, that the Learned and Un- learned have agreed in honouring the the Deity, TuUj has long ago told it as a certain and undoubted Truth, That if there is a Supreme and Eter- nal B e i n g , He is to be had in the greateft Reverence and Admiration by Mankind ^. And even Epicurus f him- felf wrote a Book of Piety tov^^ards the Gods. If he wrote this Book for no . other Reafon than to fcreen himfelf froni the Publick Odium, yet it fhews thus much, That it was the general Belief of People at that Time, that the Deity tught to be honoured. And that thisf Belief was well-grounded, will after- wards appear, when I come to prove a real Difference in the Nature of Things between Virtue and Vice. Fide Serm. XI.

I

* Tully de Natura Deorum.. Lib. t De Divinatione. Lib. z.

S E R M O N I. 27

I Cannot forbear making one Re- mark from what has been faid, which is this : That fuppofing there are any Perfons of fo perverfe an Underftand- ing, as cannot perfuade themfelves of a God and Providence, that they fhould not give themfelves much Trouble in drawing Men off from fuch a Belief j becaufe, by their own Confeflion, Man- kind was brought into this Belief for their own Good, that they might re- lieve themfelves from the Uneafineffes which human Nature is fubje<3; to. If they make any Pretenfions to Good- nature, or have any Love for their Spe- cies, they fhould be contented to believe themfelves in the right, without uling any Endeavors to draw other Perfons in- to a Scheme which is fo difmal anrl with= out all Comfort, as theirs is ; they can lie under no Obligations of Confcience, becaufe they make fhew of Denying all moral DiiTerences ; and therefore if they were not a Set of four and ill-na- tured People, they would be contented to be miferableby themfelves, and leave the reft of Mankind in the quiet Pof-

feffioa

28 S E R M O N I.

feilion of fo agreeable a Deiijfion as tliat of a God and future State, I can fee but one Tiling they can urge for themfelves, which is, That tho' a right Notion of Rehgion would be real- ly beneficial to Mankind, yet Superfli- tion is more deftru8:ive of the publicly .as well as private Quiet of every Man ^^han Jtheifm itfelf : And for the Truth .of this, they refer you to Vlutarch m his Treatife, ^a^d j'nenJ'My.oviaf, and to the vi- fible EfleQs of it, wherever it has pre- vailed. They add further, That the Hiftories of every Age have convinced them, that Mankind is a Creature that Is more apt to be influenced by a fu- perflitious, than by a religious Fear. And therefore, the Odds in Iiuman Na- ture being on the Side of Superftition that 'tis not fafe truiting it with any Religion. The Anfwer to this is very eafy, That if the Fears of SuperlHtion, . are the only Reafon of his rejedling re- ligious Principles, then indead of letting himfelf againft all Religion, let him en- deavour to fet the World right in their Notions of Religion, and we will hear- tily

Sermon i.

tily joyn with him in fo laudable an Undertaking. And , as I hope the Danger of Mens falling into Superftition may be much lelTen'd by our joynt Endeavours ; fo I am fure, the above- mentioned Advantages of true Religion will fufliciently juftify us in the At- tempt.

2p

S E R M.

3t

SERMON 11.

1 ThESSALONIANS v. 21.

Vrove all Things : hold fafi that which is good.

HE Reafonablenefs of Ob- ferving this Rule of our Apoftle, is grounded upon this undoubted Matter of Fact, That there has been always a Mixture of Trutli and Falfe- hood in the World : That there have always been Perfons who have endea- vour'd to propagate falfe, as well as true Doctrines, and therefore no Safety in holding faft any Opinions, before we have carefully prov'd and examined them.

If

/

32 S E R xM 0 N It.

If our Apoftle might have a par- ticular View to the trying of Revela- tions or divine Infpirations ; yet this Advice of his will equally extend to every SubjeQ; that is propofed to our Confideration ; and if we are guided by it, we fhall never give our Ailent to any Propofition, till we have fully and fairly examin'd it \ For if, as in the pre- fent Cafe, which the Apoftle feems par- ticularly to referr to, we fuppofe a Man led into Error by fome mere Pretender to Infpiration, if it would not, I fay, be a good Excufe before God, that he be- lieved fuch a Perfon infpired, ahd pra- 6:ifed amils in the Virtue of fuch a Be- lief, becaufe he ought to have examin'd his Credentials, and proved his Spirit, whether it was of God, or not ; neither would it be a good Juftification of a Man, if he fliould plead. That he aded fuitably to his own Opinions; unlefs 'twas alfo true, that he had carefully examined them before he efpoufed them ; becaufe every Man will be as much con- cerned to avoid Miftakes concernino- the Truths of Natural, as well as

thofe

Sermon 11. 33

thofe of Revealed Religion. And he that afTents to either upon any other Motive than that of Evidence, alcho'' he fhould embrace the Truth, as this is purely accidental, may be anf^verable to God for not making a due Ufe of his Faculties : for St. Paul's Rule is. To prove ail Thi^^gs : and then to hold fnfi that which is good.

We who are guided by St. Vaul and the reft of the infpired Teachers, do require, and pfefs Upon all PerionS a thorough Examination of the Argu- ments on which Religion is built : Y/e defire nothing more than a fair Trial, and are willing to abide by the Suc- cefs of it. And therefore the Author of the Difcourfe of Free-Thinkifigy is a Slanderer of his Brethren , vv^hen he would infinuate, as if the Jlehgious Man was averfe to a free and impar- tial Examination of Rehgious Truths. We defire Men would examine with the utmoft Stridnefs; we only defire them to lay afide all Partiality, and every Prejudice ; we are only againft Licentioufnefs in Thinking, as we are D perfuaded

34 S E R M O N II.

perfuaded, That a Man may as well abufe his Freedom in Thinking , as he may his Liberty in Acting ; as I fliali have Occafion to fhew in Confider- ing another Evafion the Jtheifl has to avoid the Apprehenfions of a future State, vijc. That a Man cannot deferve Blame or Punifliment, fo long as he ads confiflently with his own Opinion, or that himfelf cannot deferve Blame or Punifhment for not Honouring God, becaufe he does not beheve there is one.

F o R if this Excufe be a good one, one of thefe two Things muft be true, either i/, That a Man cannot deferve Blame for ading according to his Opi- nions, how groundlefs foever they be. Or, 2dly, Becaufe he had made a due Examination and Trial of this Quefti- on, and could find no Evidence for a God.

A s to the firfl of thefe : Let us fee what Grounds the Atheifl can have to hope for Impunity, merely becaufe he ads according to his Opinion, when he refufes Refped to a Supreme Being.

I

Sermon 11.

I Must confcfs, I cannot fee much in the Argument ufed by jbme great Men againft incurring this Blame and Punifhment, 'viz,, they advife the Atheifi^ That he fhould ftrive to have Faith and beheve to the utmoft ; becaufe, i^ after all there be nothing in the Matter , there will be no Harm in being thus deceived ; but if there be any thing, it will be fatal for him not to have believed to the fall i And my Reafon is this : Becaufe the Perfon \ve advife to believe, is fuppofed at beft to be doubtful, whether there is a G 0 D ai)d Providence ; And how^ then can the Man believe them, who at the fame time is not perfuaded of their Truth ; but rather believes there is no fuch Thing ? For if a Man fbould affect to believe, what he does not be- lieve, there is little Reafon for thinking that fuch a Procedure would be agree- able to God; becaufe this would be acting againft the Light of his own Mind, which no one that believes a God, will fuppofe to be a probable Way of recommending any one to his Favour- D 2 I

3S

§6 S E R M O T'T It.

I Should rather advife the Afheiji to examine carefully, What were tJie real Motives that prevailed upon him to quit the Religion he had been edu- cated in, and to take up with Infide- lity ? Whether a fmcere Love of the Truth, or rather fome fecret Paflion had influenced him ? If he would deal fairly with himfelf in this Self-examina- tion, I am perfuaded he would find, that the Alteration of his Opinion is not fo much owing to any rational Convidion of his Mind, as to fome vi- cious Inclinations, which had made Ar- guments appear weighty. to him, which would pafs with other People for mean and trifling ; as I fliall afterwards fhew when I come to corifider the Argn- ments by which he pretends to fupport liis Material Scheme.

I N the mean time I am to fhew, That there are many Motives befides rational Evidence, which have deter- mined Men to the Opinions that they efpoufe, and confequently, that this Eva- fion of the Atheifl, i/iz. That a Man cannot deferve Blame or Punifliment

for

Sermon it. 37

for acting agreeably to his Opinions, cannot be relied upon by any prudent or confiderate Man, And then the J- theiji can never fecure himfelf againft the Apprehenfions of future Punifhment upon this Foot of Reafoning.

When I am fliewing, that a Man may be anfwerable for his Opinions, and for what he does in Virtue of them ; I woulcj aot be thought to alTert, That 'tis in any Man's Power to be- lieve what he has a mind to beheve; for his Belief and his Opinion mull de- pend upon the Evidence, fuch as it ap- pears to the Man ; and yet thus much is certain, That a Man may defervc Blame for his Opinions, i^ he has not duly qualified himfelf for Evidence when 'tis offered to him. As,

I /?, I F when he is enquiring after Truth, he fuiTers himfelf to be byafs'd by any predominant PafTion or Appe- tiie; for thefe are known to make Men deaf to the plained Evidence of Reafon. Or,

2^/j, If thro' Lazinefs he declines a

full or thorough Examination of any

Jj I Queftioi^

;8 S E R M O N II.

Qiieftion in which he is much con* cerned. That thefe may be, and often are, the true Caufes of many Per- fons Infidelity, will appear probable, by confidering fome of the Motives wliich too often govern Men, with Re- gard to the Perfuafions or Opinions that are held by them : The Prejudices which I fliall at prefent confider, as having a great Influence upon us, and which may lead Men into an Inclination for the Principles of Infidelity, are thefe ;

1. An Affectation of Singularity; which is v/ont to take much with fuch Perfons as defire to be diftinguifhed by being thought to fee farther than their Neighbours.

2. An Averfioji to the Errors that have crept into true Religion, .has in^ fenfibly led many Perfons into a total Disbelief of all Rehgion.

^. A Desire of being independent, and uncontroulable by any one : When this meets with Perfons of an impe^ rious Temper, 'tis a lirong Temptation to Infidelity.

Whenevhr

S £ R M O N 11. 39

Whenever any of tliefe prevail, they muft be allowed to be falfe Grounds pf Perfiiafion, and for which a Man will be juftly accountable, if there be a Su- preme Being to whom an Account is jto be given for the Ufe, or Abufe of our underftanding Faculties.

i/. An Affedation of Singularity is wont to have a powerful Influence up- pn a Man's Opinions, efpecially when it meets with a proud Temper.

A Man muft have pafs'd his Life without much RefleQ:ion upon human Nature, that has not obferved, That Men are more commonly influenced, as to the Opinions they hold, by fome predominant PafTion, than by any Con- y'lEtion from the Principles of Reafon. The ftriking out into a difl'erent Way of Thinking fl'om the red of Mankind, flatters the Vanity of a proud Man with this pleafing Imagination , That he fliall be thought to fee farther than any Body elfe. For he that contradids any received Notions, expects the World fhould beheve, that he does fo, becaufc he reafons with greater Freedom and Im- P 4 partiality

Sermon ii.

partiality than other People ; and the more p^^enerally received the Opinions are which he oppofes, the greater Credit he hopes to gain by it \ and therefore, Reh'gion having been the general Per- fuafion of Mankind, is for that Reafon the fittell: Mark for the proud Man to point his Arguments againll: : for the Fewer he has on his Side, the more he hopes to fliine, as he knows a Man is apt to be Ipil: in a Croud, and that if he would be taken Notice of, he muft fland fingle, or have but Few in his Company.

The Author of the Difcourfe about free-thinkii^g , has acknorvledged this fecret Temptation to Infidelity, when he would put it off as the common Opinion of Mankind, that the Aiheiji has more Senfe than other Peo- ple. For^ fays he, // ar/y good Chrijiian happens to Reafon better thra ordmnrj^ they (meaning the Chriftians) charge him with Athtifm. He takes this fly Way of commending the Atheifts for good Rea- foners, in fuggefting that thofe very Perfons who believed a God and future

State^

Se RMON II. 4^

State, could not forbear ownmg Atheifm to be the Effe6: of good Reafoning, and the Atheijls better Reafoners than other People. How weak and groundlefs fo- ever this Notion may be of Mens be- ing better Reafoners in proportion as they beheved lefs of a G o d and Pro- vidence ; yet thus much may be obferv- ed from it to my prefent Purpofe, That fome Perfons may have been, and ftill are tempted to appear on the Side of Infidelity, from the vain Hopes of be- ing thought more difcerning and faga- cious than the reft of the World.

Monsieur Bayle^ whofe Writings will free him from any Sufpicion of be- ing overpartial in the Caufe of Religion, does honeftly ackflowledge, That the Infidelity of many People is owing more to fome Degree of Vanity, and a Defire of diftinguiiliing themftlves, than to any Force of Evidence : and nothing can be truer than what he has faid up^ on this Qccafion in his Hifiorical Dicfia' n^ry^ " It is plain enough, jays he ^ *' that thofe who make a Shew in j- Company of pppofing the moft

" common

42 S E R jM O N II.

^' common Truths of Religion, fpealf " what they do not really think ; their " Vanity has a greater Share in their " Debates than any Convidion of their " own Minds ; they pleafe themfelves *' with the Thoughts that the Boldnefs *' and Singularity of the Opinions which " they defend, will gain them the Repur *' tation of great Genius's, and of Men *' of a fuperior Way of Thinking to *^ the reft of Mortals. Thus they are " tempted againft their Confciences to " fet forth the Difficulties which the " DoQrines of Providence and tliofe of " the Gofpel are fubjeft to ; fo that by " Degrees they get a Habit of fpeaking " impiouily : And if their Vanity be ^' attended with tlfe Love of Scnfua- " Iky, they go on fafter ia their Im- " piety ". Thus far Mr. Bajle ipeaks in relation to an ingenious Fref?ch Li- bertine, and to all of that Sort ia the Title Des Barnaux. The Jthei/l has perhaps heard too, That the E- ficurean Atheifl was wont to impute the Belief of a God to Mens Igno- rance of the Povvers of Matter iri

Motion :

S E R M O N II. 43

Motion; and therefore hopes by the Denial of Him, to acquire a great Re- putation for Knowledge.

Another common Fountain from whence Infidelity is wont to arife, is, An Averfion to Superftition. Some Men do no fooner difcover the Errors that are crept into true Religion, than they conceive fuch an Averfion to thefe Er-^ rors, as that they begin to fufped all the reft to be a Miftake, and from be- ing Enemies to Superftition, become Enemies to all Religion in general. This I take to be the moft ufual Way by which Men arrive at a State of Infide- lity ; but this is an unjuftifiable Proce- ding in any one that pretends to be a Lover of Truth; becaufe it fuppofes that where there are Errors, there can be no Truth, There are Errors in all Communities of Men profefTing Reli- gion, therefore there can be no Truth at all in Religion itfelf ; Men have made great Miftakes in the Pidures they have drawn for the Deity, therefore there can be no Deity at all ; becaufe they are fure there cannot be a God with '"' "' human

44 S E R JVf O N II.

human WeaknefTes, therefore there can- npt be one with divine Perfections: They might with as much Juftice ar- gue, That becaufe there is a Wrong, there can be no fuch Tiling as a Right.

But they are not only unjuftifiable, when they have no better Reafon for leaving us, but alfo (which I believe will concern the Atheift more, becaufe it reflects upon his Underflanding) they fhew great Weaknefs when they are byafs'd to Infidehty by their Averfion to Superflition, as this fhcws a great Defeat in Point of Judgment. Fqr when Men flee from one Extream to the other, when they take Refuge m Atheifm out of an Hatred to Superfl:ition, the Reafon muft be becaufe they know not how to difl:ingui(h what is true from what is falfe. They And they have not Skill enough to take ofl' the Difguife froiji Religion, to feparate the Appearance from the Reahty; and therefore finding they mufl: take all or none \ the Hatred they have conceived againft the Errors they have already de- tected;.

S E R M O N 11. 4$

tested, prompts them to quit Religion entirely, as the only Way for fuch poor Reafoners to be fecure againft Errors in Rehgious Matters. This is the true Reafon and Foundation of that Obfer- vation fo often made, That where there is moft Superftition, as in luly, Atheijis are moft frequent; becaufe the Gene- rality of People are apt to conceive fo ftrong a Prejudice againft any Caufe, how juft foever, when they difcover any Fraud ufed in the Support of it, that they immediately conclude the whole to be a Cheat. Their Averfion for the Fraud, makes them overlook all tlie Arguments that can be given them for the Support of the Truth ; as i? it was an IrtipoiTibility in the Nature of the Thing, for evil Men to defend the Truth by a FalQiood. But this has fo often happened in the World, that no Man can be accounted a fair Ex- aminer that rejects Religion merely upon this Account.

3^/7, A Desire of being uncontrouFd and unaccountable as to their Thoughts and Behaviour, tempts fome Perlbns to

the

/^6 S E R M O N II.

the Denial of God's Exiftence. Men of haughty and imperious Tempers would be Monarchs to themfelves, they care not to believe themfelves obliged to any Body, and therefore are fond of the Material Scheme, as it fets them at fiiU Liberty from all Obligations; for no one can think himfelf obliged to any Being merely for doing for him what it can't help doing. Atoms by luckily jumbling together for my Good, or the neceffary and unalterable Laws of Matter in Motion producing all that we fee, tho' I received never fo much Benefit from them, could lay me un- der no Obligation of Gratitude to them ; I fhould ftill be under the fulleft Li- berty of Thinking and Ading as I liked beft ; (if any fuch thing as Li- berty were confident with either of thofe Schemes) But if a Man fliould ac- knowledge an Intelligent Being for his Creator and the Author of all the Comforts he meets with in Life, he cannot forbear thinking fometimes that fonie fuch Submiflion may be due to

Him

Sermon II. 47

Him, as may reftrain his Fulnefs of Freedom in Thinking and Ading.

And this St. Evremonty who was never thought to be troubled with Be- lieving too much in Rehgious Matters, acknowledges might be a Temptation to Ferfons of an imperious Temper ; if he was truly tlie Author of a Trea- tife afcribed to him ^, where it is faid, " That there are others who in an " extravagant Prefumption of their ov/n " Abilities, fcorn to . depend on their *' Maker; vainly imagining, that the " Obedience that is paid to this Infi- *' nite Majesty, muft necelTarily take " away the Freedom of their Thoughts " or Opinions. " We have already feen by the ConfelTion of Lucretius f, that the Defire of being in a State of Independence, and of having none to controul them, was a great Induce- ment to many Perfons to enter them- felves in the School of Eficurus ; and v/e cannot doubt but the fame Caufe is

ftill

ff Vid. Curious Mucellanie?. t Sevmon I.

48

Sermon il

flill working the fame Effecl: in the Children of Difobedience : Efpecially as to thofe who are Libertines in Action as well as Thought, who defire to gra- tify every irregular Appetite, and to extinguifli the Clamours of theii- Con- fciences, 'tis their Interefl: to throw off the Belief of a G o d and turn Atbeip : as long as they have any Reafon left, they muft for Peace and Quietnefs Sake en- deavour to perfwade themfelves, that there is no Superior Underftanding to take notice of and animadvert upon them for ading againft the Senfe of their own Minds. Atheifm is the only Refuge they have to take to; for fo long as Men will a£b againft their ownUnderftandings, they muft wiili that there were no Underftanding Being to obfcrve what they are doing : but thefe are the Fools, which the Pfalmijt tells us have [aid in their Hearts^ that there is no God,

The Ufe that I would make of this, fhould be to advife the Atheijl^ That fince there are confeifedly vicious Motives that have led Men into their Opinions,

that

S E R M O NT II.

that he would examine, whether none • of thok I have already mentioned had determin'd him to exchange the Reh^ gion he was brought up in for Jthe^fm. For i[ he has left it without fufficient Reafon, his pleading that he ads ac- cording to his Opinion, will not ex- cufe him from Blame and Punif[> ment.

I A M eafy to believe, that the M. ■del will difregard the Advife I have given him of examining what were the Motives that principally occafioned his . Infidelity, and may think, that his Mif- take, if it fhould prove fuch, can do lym no Harm. I fliall therefore chufe to put him m mind of what Monfieur BAjite fays of fuch as have been drawn into Infidelity thro' any vicious Mo- tives, particularly thofe he infiances of Pride or Senfuality in his Hiftorkal Dicii^ onary^ Title Des Barrea^x : '' That qviI ^' Cufiom, fays he,, which fome Perfons " had taken up in Converfation of oppo- " fing the great Truths of Religion, oc- *| cafion'd either by Vanity, or a Defire '' of being thought more knowing than ^ ** others.

49

^O S E R M O N II.

" thers, or to juftify themfelves in their " Senfuality, may for fome time filence ^^ the inward ConviQ:ionsof their Minds, " and make them to have entirely for- ^' got what they had learnt in their " Youth concerning a God, a Hea- " ven and a Hell: but they cannot " wholly extinguifh the Belief of them, '^ it being only like a Fire concealed ** under the Afhes, which will quickly " fliew its Adivity, efpecially when *' tliere is any ProfpeQ: of Danger ; *' then, fays he^ we find them Trem- " bhng, and more in Fear than any *' body elfe ; they become then even *' fuperiiitious : '* And he gives this Reafon for it ; " That the Remembrance " of their having fliewn more Con- ** tempt for Holy Things than others, *' increafes their Uneafinefs. " If this Obfervation of Monfieur Baylis be juft and agreeable to Truth, the Advice I have given the Jt'^eijl of examining the Motives that induced him to renounce Religion, may not be altogether amifs. Becauic whatever he may think while he is in Health, and out of Danger, he

cannot

S E R M o jsr II. 5 r

cannot fecure himfelf againft the Ap- prehenfions of Punifhment, i? he has wantonly taken up the Caufe of Infi- delity.

But fome one may fay, That this Way of arguing againfi: Atheijis^ is en- tring into the Hearts of Men, and charg- ing them with what may be as eafily denied as affirmed ; that it is an un- fair Procedure with them, becaufe 'tis taking for granted, that a Man mail: be influenced by fome Prejudices whenever he embraces Atheifm ; that this might be with equal Juftice retorted upon the Believer, that he too is prejudiced, and willing againft Evidence to believe a G o D, becaufe he wifhes there was one, and thinks it would be better for him that there fhould be one; and therefore that the Argument drawn from Prejudices ihould be omitted by both Sides.

The Anfwer is, That I ought to fhew, if I could, that other Motives befides Evidence, might influence Men in their Opinions; that fuch Motives were \\- cious and punifhable if there fhould be E 2 a God :

^2 Sermon n.

a God : And this, in order to engage the Atheifi to examine carefully upon what Motives he took up his Opini- ons : If the Reh'gious Man is under a ftrong Prejudice to believe a God, and he fliould be miftaken, his Miftake can- not be dangerous or hurtful to him. I ought alfo not to have omitted thefe- Prejudices as probable Motives to In- fidelity, becaufe many of thofe who feem to difown all Religion, have been (as we have alrady feen from the Con- feffion of unfufpecled Writers ) in- fluenced by fome or other of them.

If there are any others who have from any thing like a ferious Confide- ration wrought themfelves into a Be* iief. That this Frame of Things might have either cafually fallen into the Or- der we find it in, or necefTarily have exifted fuch as it is from all Eternity, they are not concerned with what has been faid under the Head of Prejudices, and fliall be diftinftly confidered by themfelves, when I come to confider another Evafion of the Atheifi s^ 'viz. That after tlie bell: Enquiry, he

could

Se R M O N II. 52

could find no Evidence for a G 0 d, and therefore could deferve neither BJame nor Punifliment for being confident with himfelf, in. not paying any Re- fped to One whom he did not acknow- ledge for God.

Having confidered certain Preju- dices which might be fuppofed to have determined many of thofe who have efpoufed the Caufe of Jtheif^^ it can- not be amifs to put them in mind, That their Anceftors in Iniidehty fupported their Pj'inciples by Reafons which our Modern Jtheifls mull acknowledge to be falfe, and therefore were certainly to blame in concluding againft a God up- on fuch Reafonings, as a further and more careful Examination into Nature would have difcovered to be faife. Tiiis fhould difcourage the modern Jcbeift from being over-confident in his Scheme, left further Difcoveries in Knowledge Ihould make his Caufe lefs defenfibie, and himfelf culpable for determining haftily againft a God, before a full and thorough Examination of the feveral Particulars on which he is wont to K ? groun<i

54 S E R M O NT II.

ground his Infidelity. Which brings me to confider another Defed in try* ing any Qiieftion, viz,

2dly. That we defer ve Blame, i^ tliro"* Lazinefs we decline a thorough Examination before we take up our O'g'mioTis.

Ir cannot be doubted that there are in the world Half-Thinkers as well as Free-Thinkers ; fuch as lead themfelves into Miilakes, either becaufe they want Abihties or Inclination to make a cjofe Inquiry into Things. The great Lord Baco^ places Atheifm to the account of Short-Thinking, to a fmattering in Phi- lofophy. I know our modern Unbe- lievers would think themfelves greatly injured li we charged them with any V/ant of Ability, and fo would their PredecefTors ; for we find Lucretius per- petually Talking with fuch an Air of AlTurance, as if he had adually wreft- ed the Thunderbolt out of Jupiter\ Hands ; and yet he appears to have been a carelefs Examiner into Nature, when he accounted for the Produ- clion of x^nimals from infenfible Mat- ter

S E R M O N II. 55

ter, by Worms arifmg from corrupted Carcafles ; which was the only Ac- count he could give of Animal Pro- dudions, z'iz, of Life and Senfation ^ ; And yet our prefent Atheip muft ac- knowledge, That he pronounced in this Cafe as a poor Philofopher, and be- fore he had made a fair Examination : For I think Equivocal Generations are now generally given up. This there^ fore muft pafs with our Unbelievers for a Proof, That their Anceftors were ia this RefpeQ: Short-Thinkers, and took up their Opinions upon infufficient Mo- tives.

There is another Inftance may be given, in which the Atheifts have taken up their Opinions before their having made a due Examination ; which is this : That nothing could aO: upon Matter but by Contad ; from thence they inferred, there could be no real E 4 Being

Quippe videre licet vivos exiflere vermes, ftercore de tetro putrorem cum fibi nafta eft, ^c.

55

Sermon ii.

Being but Matter, or, which would be the fame thing , that if there was any thing immaterial in Nature, it could have nothing to do with the Material World ; becaufe Matter could be acled upon in no other Way but by Contacl, and then nothing but Matter could aQ; upon Matter ; and con- fequently, an Immaterial Being, which could not a£l in the Way of Contact, could have no E&iency or Aftion up- on Matter : But a farther Examinatir on into the Laws by which Nature is govern'd, has convinced the World, that Bodies themfelves can a8: upon cne another at the greateft Diftance from each other, and in another Way than that of Contact ; and then it muft be allowed, that the Argument built upon it was form'd before a due Ex- amination had been made into the Nature of Things.

Avery Learned Man and a great Thinker in our Time, who had af- ferted, " That we might as well con- " ceive that God might have added " a Thinking (Quality to Matter, as

'* make

Sermon. II. 57

'^ make a material Subftance capable of " Ading or being aded upon by an ''* Immaterial one ; becaufe there could " be no relation of Contact between ^^ fuch heterogeneous Subftances ; " was afterwards convinced, that there was another Way than that of Contad by which Bodies might be afted upon; as may be {qqh in his Pojihumous Let- ters.

The Ufe that I would make of this, is, That in a Matter of fo great Concern as that of a God and Pro- vidence, the Unbehever would fufter himfelf to be perfuaded to re-examine his Conclufions, and fee whether he has not been deceived in any of his Premifes. he fees his Predecellbrs ia Infidelity by a clofer Infpedion into Nature, ftripp'd of fome Part of that Armour in which they trufted moft : And how can he be fure , that far- ther Enquiries into Nature may not ftill weaken his Caufe ? And if thro' Lazinefs he fliould dechne fuch En- quiries , and his Opinions fhould at kft prove falfe, his Negled will be

Criminal,

58 Sermon II.

Criminal, and himfelf anfwerable for not taking due Information , before he took his Opinions for Better , for Worfe,

S E R M.

SERMON III

I Thessalonians v. 21*

Trove all Things : hold fajl that "which is good.

5?

HAVE already in difcour- fing upon thefe Words fhewn how we muft pre- pare ourfelves for a fair Examination of any Que- ftion ; that we muft, previoufly to our Inquiries, diveft ourfelves of every Prejudice and Paflion, fuffer no Incli- nations, nor any Defires, but thofc of finding the Truth, to influence our Judgments : That we muft be con^

tented

(5o Sermon hi.

tented in Qiieftions of great Moment, to undergo the Fatigue of a full and care- ful Examination, and not thro' Lazinefs decline a thorough Search into the Ar- guments on both Sides, or draw our Conclufions before we have well con- fidered our Premifes.

I HAVE fhewn that the Want of obferving thefe Rules, doth often lead Men into Errors ; and that the greateft and worft of all Errors, 'viz. Infidelity, would decreafe in its Numbers, and lofe a great Part of its Profelytes^ whenever the World ihall refolve to take up their Opinions from no other Principle but a fincere Love of the Truth. That the Jtheifl ought to lay his Hand upon his Heart, and declare if he can, That nothing but a Love for the Truth had determin'd him to exchange Religion for Atheifm ; and that it concerns him to be fincere in fuch a Declaration ; becaufe every o- ther Reafon for making the Exchange, would render him a Criminal for the Abufe of thofe Faculties of his Mind

which

Sermon hi. 6i

which would have dire£led- him bet- ter*

I AM now to confider ihe other Excufe the Athcift is wont to make, That he has made the befl: Enquiry he can, without being able to difcover any Evidence for a G o d.

But before I confider what thofe have to fay for tliemfelves, who pre- tend to have taken up Atheifm after a ferious Confideration of Things, I mull infift upon this, .as a Prelimina- ry to the Debate, That the Atheifi ought not to bring againft us any fuch Objeftions, whofe whole Strength arifes merely from our Incapacity of conceiving the Nature and Operations of G 0 D ; and for this plain Reafon, Becaufe 'tis agreed betwixt us, that we are finite or limited Beings ; and muft therefore have limited Underftandings : But that the neceffarily exifting Being, w^hoever He is, muft be an Infinite and Eternal One, filling all Time and all Place. For there is no denying that Something muft have been from Eter- nity j becaufe if it were not fo, Some- thing

62 Sermon hi.

thing mufl: have arifen abfolutely from Nothing, or exifted without having any Caufe or Reafon of its Exift- ence : Which is plainly impofTible. And yet 'tis certain, we can form no No- tion of an eternal Duration already paft ; an Argument therefore drawn from our Inability to conceive the Na- ture of a Being that has actually ex- ifted from Eternity, or to comprehend its Manner of Operation, ought to have no Weight,with «^, nor be urg'd by the Jiheift, becaufe his Material God would be equally affeded by it. If then he would juftify himfelf, the only rational Inducements that can pof- fibly be aflign'd for exchanging Re- ligion for Atheifm y muft be one or other of thefe :

Either for the avoiding fome par- ticular Difficulties, which he thinks may be proved to amount to Impof- fibilities in our Notion of a God, and which too his Material Scheme is not attended with :

O R elfe, becaufe in general there are far leis Difficulties to be gotten over

m

Sermon m. 63

in accounting for Appearances by the material Scheme, than there would be, fhould we once admit a God and Providence. Thefe are the only juftifia- bk Inducements that can be affigned for quitting Religion and embracing Atheifm, And if the firfl: of thefe fhould appear to be fuch as cannot be de- fended, and the other to be falfe ia Fad ; then it muft be granted, that the Atheif has not taken up his Ma- terial Hypothefis after a fair Examina- tion ; and will be therefore highly cul- pable for not aOiing with that In- genuity which becomes a Lover of Truth.

A s to the firft of thefe Inducements, I will fhew, That it can never juftify him in rejecting Religion.

i/?, Because he can never prove that the particular Difficulties he complains of, do amount to an Im.- poffibility or a Contradiction.

2flJ/j, Because his Material Scheme which he takes up with for avoiding thofe Difficulties, is attended with infi- nitely greater ones than thofe which he

finds

6j^ S e r xM o n Hi.

finds fault with in our Notion of a Gop'i

And then, as to the other Induce- ment, 'viz. That in general, there are fewer Difficulties in accounting for Things by a Material Principle ; I will ihew, that fome of the moft confidera- ble Ph£»omena in Nature, cannot be ac- counted for by fuch a Principle only.

The firft Inducement for embra- cing Atheifm^ is not defenfible, becaufe the Atheift can never prove, That the particular Difficulties he complains of in our Notion of a G o d, do amount to an Impoffibihty or a Contradi6;ion. The chief Difficulties which the Jtheifl is wont to charge upon our Idea of a God, are thefe:

17?, That we afcribe Immateriality to Him.

idly^ That we allow Him a Pow- er of making Something out of No- thing : Both which are thought by him to be impoffible , whenever they are fuppofed to be the Nature or the Ope- rations of any Thing whatfoever. And

^dly^ Because we make Goodnefs a Part of his Charader j which they

think

Sermon III. 65

think to be fufficiently contradicted by the many Natural and Moral Evils that appear in his Workmanfliip.

ly?, I A M to confider the Difficulties which are raifed againft a God from his Immateriality. If the Jtheift would prove an immaterial or incorporeal Sub- ftance to be impoflible or a Contra- di£lion ; in order to prove it fuch, he muft undertake the Proof of this Pro- pofition, " Whatever is immaterial, is " Nothing." And therefore an imma- terial Subftance, a mere Non Entity, And he muft prove this, one of thefe two Ways ; either^ That what we have no Idea of, can have no Exiftence in the Nature of Things; that we have no Idea of an immaterial Subftance, there- fore there can be no fuch Thing. Or elfe he muft affirm, That the only fub- ftantial Thing in the World is Matter or Body ; and therefore an incorporeal Subftance would be the fame thino- as an incorporeal Body : Which muft be a Contradiclion in Terms.

The Anfwer we give to the firft of

thefe Obieclions, is, That we cannot

F allo^

66 Sermon III.

allow them to fpeak Truth, if they af= firm, That we have no Conception of •an immaterial Subftance. 2^'/j, That if it were a Truth, it could not be a good Proof of the Impoflibility of its Ex- iftence.

A s to the firft of thefe Objeftions, we are perfuaded,That we as certainly know fome of the Properties of immaterial , as we do thofe of material Subftance , that Perception, Underftanding, and a Power of beginning Motion , are as certainly the Properties of an immate- rial Subftance, as Solidity, and a Ca- pacity of receiving and communicating Motion are Properties of Matter or Bo- dy. I know the Atkift would make all thefe Properties of immaterial Sub- ftance, to be only Qualities refulting ft-om Matter. But as I ftiall after- wards have Occafion to fliew, Tiiat this Suppolition of the Athsiji is Groundlefs and Unphilofophical, I will for the prefent take it for granted, what fhall afterwards be proved, viz,. That thefe are Properties of immaterial Subfence ; and iis a Confequence of that, that we

are

S E R M O M III. 67

are able to form fome Notion of an Immaterial Subftance ^. And as for the Subftance itfelf of an Immaterial Being, it would be 'm vain and to no ' Purpofe to argue, that we knew no- thing of it, or could form no Idea about it; becaufe the fame Objeftion would equally affeQ: Material or Cor- poreal Subftance, of which we know as little as we do of the other.

But fuppofing it never fo certain, That we could form no Idea of an Immaterial Being ; this would not prove the Impoflibihty of its Exiftence ; un- lefs it was as certain, That the Facul- ties of a limited Nature, fuch as ours confeiTedly is, could reach to the ut- moft Extent of every Truth, and no PofTibility of Being could efcape the Searches of our Underftanding. Where- as all the Knowledge we can pretend to have of the Exiftence of Things without us, muft be derived to us thro' fome or other of the Senfes ; for thefe

F 2 are

^ Vide Serm. VI, VH^ VIII, IX.

6S S E R xM O N HI.

are the only Carriers of all the Intel- ligence that the Mind receives con- cerning External Exiftences. And then which Way will the Jtheiji take to convince any Body, that our Five Senfes are all the poiTible Ways of receiving Information concerning the Nature and Operations of External Objects. If we fhould confult our Reafon in this Mat- ter, that would probably tell us. That this particular Number of Informers was rather calculated for our prefent State (in which we find ourfelves be- fet on all Sides with Corporeal Objects, fome of which are good for us, and others would hurt us) than to give us an exad Infight into the Nature of Things. And that probably there may be many more Chanels of Knowledge than thofe we are furnifhed with, and fuch as would have given us farther Views into Things than we are capable of in our prefent Condition. And there- fore we fliould with juft the fame Rea- fon and Juftice pronounce againft the PofTibility of any Thing which is not the Objed of one of our Five Senfes,

as

Sermon lir. 6p

as a Man that is born blind might de- clare againft the Poflibihty of Light or Colours, becaufe • he has no Idea of them ; or as we all fhould have done, had our whole Species come into the "World with only Four of them, or with- out the Senfe of Seeing.

It is certain we can form no Idea of an Eternal Duration already paft ; and yet the Atheijl^ as well as we, is forced to acknowledge the Exiftence of Something from all Eternity. And his Want of an Idea of Eternity, is not fuJiicient, even in his own Opinion, to exeufe him from believing it true. Let but Immaterial Subftance have the fame fair Play, and we are in no Pain from this Objection againft a God. For the very fame Reafon which obliges the Atheifi to admit Something Eternal, tho' he has no Idea of Eternity ; will equally hold in the Cafe of Immaterial Subftance, if there are, as I fhall after- wards prove ^ certain Appearances in F I the

Vide Sermon VII, VIH, IX, X.

70 Sermon hi.

the World which cannot be accounted for by the mere Mechanical Laws of Matter in Motion. For then he will have the fame Motive for taking in forne Being that is not a Material one, as he has for that of an Adual Eter- nity. For he takes Refuge in this, that he may avoid the Abfurdity of Acknowledging, that any Thing can come into Being abfolutely from No- thing, or without any Caufe of its Be- ing ; and if he cannot make it very probable, that certain Powers I lately mentioned, may arife purely from Mat- ter ; he muft then either acknowledge thofe Powers to have exifted without any Caufe or Reafon of their Exiftence, or elfe with us he muft admit Immate- rial Subflance.

The other Argument againft Im- material Subflance, viz. That there is nothing fubftantial in the World but Matter ; is a fhameful begging of the Queftion in Difpute, and taking for granted, what they know we con- ftantly deny. For how would the Jtheijl prove this? Why thus Spinofa

does

Sermon ill- 7 v

does it, he gives us a Definition of Subftance, that " 'Tis Something In- ^' dependent of every other Thing, and '^ exifting by a Neceflity of Nature. " From thence lie inferrs. That fince there can be but One Self-exillent or Independent Being, and Exten- fion or Matter is confelled to be a fubflantial Being, therefore there can be no other Subftance in the World befides Matter ; and confequently, no fuch Thing as Immaterial Subftance. But all this Proof amounts to no more than if he had only told us, there is Nothing but Matter, therefore no Im- material Being. For he knows very well that we denied Matter to be the Self-exiftent Being; and therefore that if his Definition of Subftance was a good one, that we fhould deny it be- longed to Matter, or in this Senfe of the Word, that Matter itfelf could be a Subftantlal Being, or indeed any Thing except the One Self-exiftent Be- ing : And then how will his Definition prove to us the impoffibility of Imma. terial Subftance ? Thus far then we can F 4 §0

7? Sermon m.

go in Defence of a God, That his Immateriality cannot be proved to be impofTible, or to imply a Contra* diction.

2dlj, Another Difficulty the JtkfJI: is wont to raife againft our No- tion of a G o D, is, The Power that we afcribe to Him of making Some- thing from Nothing. Here the Jtheijl is wont to triumph, as if we had found out a Power that could not pofTibly have any other Exiftence than in our own Imaginations : Here they perfuade ' themfelves, that they are fupported by Authority as well as Reafon. The Jtheifl does feldom take Refbge in Au- thority, but in this particular Cafe he condefcends to part with his beloved Singularity, and is contented for once to be found in a Croud, and to take Shelter m Numbers. But he might as well have kept out of them for any Advantage they will be to his Caufe For he fuppofes the Meaning of this Jxtom, Nothing can he made out of No^ thing, to. be defigned by all thofe who made ufe of it, not only againft the

Produftioa

Se rmon 111. 73

Produfiton and Annihilation of any Spe- cies of Things ; but alfo that there can be no other ProduQ:ions but what are from pre-exiftent Matter; that every Thing muft have a Material as well as an Efficient Caufe of its Being. But here his Numbers forfake him, and he is reduced to thofe of his own SqS:, For altho' it was generally believed before the Appearance of Chriftianity, That Matter was eternal and unmade, yet we are fure that all thofe, at leaft, who acknowledged our Souls to be in- corporeal, did not derive them from pre- exiftent Matter : For thus Plato fays ^, ^^ That if the Soul be ancienter than " the Body, then muft the Things of " the Soul alfo be ancienter than thofe " of the Body ; and therefore Cogita- *^ tion, and the feveral Species of it ^f muft be in the Order of Nature, not " only before local Motion, but alfo *^ before the Longitude, Latitude and ^t Profundity of Bodies. " From whence

'tis

* Plato de Legib. Ub. X. pag. 8^5,

74 Sermon hi.

'tis evident, Plato could not poffibly fuppofe the fiijR: Produdion of Souls to be derived from pre-exiftent Matter : Wliich is diredly contrary to the Act count which the Atheifi gives of Things : For he muft fay, That the Things of the Soul, viz. Thought, &c, are pofte- rior in the Order of Nature to the Formation of Things, being an EfFe6t of Matter properly moved. And there- fore fuppofing the Antients to have been unanimous in Denying the Produftion of any Subftances ef «» ov\av ; yet fince they did not derive all Beings from Matter, they will do the Atheiji's Caufe little Service ; for if the Atheift will not allow their Authority, when they fup- pofe that there muft be forne adive Subftance not derivable from Matter ; neither are we obliged to allow it, when they fuppofe the EiTences ol^ all Things to be eternal.

But the Atheifl may fay, that their Agreement in denying a Power of pro- ducing Subftances , will be of great Ser-^ vice to him, becaufe a juft Purfuit of that "Principle muft neceflkrily end m

the

Sermon 111. 7$

the Denial of a God, as the advan- cing of two Independent Principles, is a fetting up two Gods,, which is the the fame Thing with pulling down

one.

And therefore if they had feen the Impofllbility of two Self-exiftent Prin- ciples, they muft have joyn'd with the Atheift, in deriving all Things from that which every Body's Senfes affure them to be a fubllantial Being, viz. Body or Matter.

To this we anfwer, That alltheSeds of Philofophy, excepting that oi Epicurus, fpeak fo fully their Senfe as to the Ne- cefTity of fome aftive Being diftinft in its Original from Matter, in order to account for the Appearances- of Things, that we may with much better Rea- fon conclude, that if they had feen the Confequcnce of their Dodrine, they would rather have allowed of a Crea- tive, than have given up to the Metft an Mive Power diftinft from Matter, As the Stoick is generally fuppofed to be the greateft M^teridifi of all the Seds, next to that oiEpcurus^hQ will

be

l6 Sermon hi.

be the fitteft Perfon to be interrogated upon this Occafion ; and I think it cannot be difficult to .fhew, that if the Stokk argued confiftently, he muft have been more eafily perfuaded to admit a Pow- er of Creating Matter, than to part with his Adive Power or Principle ; for io long as he fuppofed Matter or his Materia friwa (which, according to him, was the Principle of all material Exigences) to be a lazy and inactive Being, it would be impoflible for him to give any Account of this Frame of Things, without an a6i:ive Power to work upon the Inertia of Matter, or rouze it out of its Stupidity ^.

And therefore 'tis reafonable to be- lieve , that- had he been reduced to this Dilemma y of either admitting a Power of Creation , or rejeding an

Adive

* Dicunt, ut fcis, Stolcl noftrl duo efle in rerum N^tura, ex quibus omnia fiant, Caufam & mate- riam : Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parara, cefTatura, ft nemo moveat. Caufa autem, id eft, Ratio, materiam format, & quocunque vult verfat,, fix ilia varia opera producic. Smcca Epift. 65.

Sermon HI. yj

A(Elive Principle , that he would have chofen the former, rather than have owned himfelf to be of a Sed of Philofophy that could give no Ac- count concerning the Formation of Things. For it cannot be faid, that the Stoical Active Principle might be a very volatile Matter, and what he called Matter, the grolTer Part of ky to diftinguilh it from the former ; be- caufe there is no other Difference be- tween the fineft and the grofleft Mat- ter, if Matter, as Matter, be inadive, than that the fineft requires a lefs Force to put it into Motion : and then this Adive Principle, inftead of giving Mo- tion to every Thing, muft be moved it- felf by Something ; and therefore could not be a Principle of Adion, or account for the Formation of Things.

But however that be, if we con- fider the Reafons by which he and the rell of the Philofophers were deter- mined in rejeding the Creative Power, they will appear to be fo weak and in- conclufwe, that their Authority in this particular Point ought to have httle

Weight

78

Sermon hi.

Weight with us; they either argued from Natural Generations, or Artificial Produdions. Becaufe we do not now fee Nature producing any Subftances, but only different Modes of Being, therefore the Author of Nature never could : Becaufe all Works of Art are only the Management of pre-exiftent Matter , and fitting it for particular Ufes, therefore God, as well as eve- ry other Artifl:, muft have a Subjed prepared to his Hands to work upon. But this Way of Reafoning will never prove what ought to be proved, viz. That it is impoffible in the Nature of the Thing, that there fhould be any fuch Power. For this Power of ma* king Something out of Nothing, or of creating a Subftance, is no more than the bringing Something into Being, which before had no manner of Ex- iftence ; but this is not to aiiirm, That a Thing may be, and not be at the fame Time; which is a Contradiction, and therefore the Object of no Power whatfoever ; but only that Something, which once had no Being at all, may

be

Sermon iil 19

be brought into Being. If we, who work only upon pre-exiftent Matter, cannot conceive how this fhould be done ; this can be no good Argument againft the PofTibiUty of its being done by an Infinite Power; for there will always be fomething in fuch an Ob- -ject as the Infinite Being, that will more than fill our finite Capacities.

And Sfinofa himfelf confeffes as much, when he tells us, ^ " That he " cannot underil:and the Manner how " many Things are brought about by ^' his Self-exiftent Being, fuch as the " Cohasfion of the Parts of Matter, " and the Connexion which particu- ** lar Beings have with each other.

And

* Seriem rerum fingularlum murabilium impof- fibile foret humance imbecillitati afTequi, cum prop- " ter earum omnem numerum fuperantem multitu- dinem, turn propter infinltas iclrcumflantias, in una & eadem re, quarum unaquseque poteft efle caufa ut res exiftat aut non exiftat. Traft. de Emend. Intellea. p. 38S.

Cognofcere quomoJo partes nature revera co haereant, 8c quomodo unaqusque pars cum fuo to- to convemat, id me ignorare dixi in antecedenti mea Epiftola, quia ad hoc cognofceudum rcquire- rerur totam naturam omnefque ejus partes co^- nofceie. p. 439.

8o Sermon ill.

^^ And yet he is fully perfuaded, that *^ there is a Chain and Connexion of " particular Beings; that there is fuch *' a Thing as the Cohaefion of the " Parts of the Body, and an Union of " all the Parts with the whole. " And therefore, in Purfuance of the fame Way of Reafoning, Altho"" we cannot tell how God could make all Things out of Nothing, our Ignorance will never prove the Thing to be impof- fible, no more than Spwofa^s Ignorance of the Caufe of Cohaefion in the Parts of Matter, will prove that there cari be no fuch Thing.

The Neceflity of admitting a Crea- tive Power, will appear ftill ftronger, when we come to fhew the Abfurdities which the Mutertdift for Want of fuch a Power is reduced to. But

^dljy Another ImpolTibility the Atheift is wont to charge upon our Notion of a G o D , is on account of our afcribing Goodnefs to Him, which they fay, is plainly contradicted by the many Marks and Tokens of Natural and Moral Evil which appear in that

Part

Sermon ill. 8i

Part of his Workmanfhip which we are beft acquainted with. Before the Atheift can prove that thefe could not poflibly proceed from a Good Being, it will be incumbent on him to (hew, That 'tis inconfiftent with the Nature of Goodnefs to make Beings with dif- ferent Degrees of Perfedion. If he cannot do that, then certainly every Degree of Imperfedion makes an A- batement of the Happinefs of the Crea- ture; and fuch an Abatement confti- tutes what we call Natural or Phy- fical Evil. Thus for Inftance, 'Tis an Imperfeftion m us Men that we want a perfeQ: Knowledge of our own Frame and Conftitution ; fuch a Know- ' ledge, I mean, as would enable us to find out (antecedently to the tedi- ous Way of Trial and Experience) what would be good for us, and what would be prejudicial or hurtful to us. To fupply the Want of this Know- ledge, God has affix'd the Idea of Pain to our Natures, which is de- figned to give us Warning of any Thing that might hurt us. Pain fs

G acknow-

82 Sermon hl

acknowledged to be a real Evil, and yet if we were not admonillied by it to avoid fuch Things as would be hurtful to us, what thro' Inadvertence and Ignorance of our own Frame, we fliould never know when it was Out of Order, nor endeavour to fet it aright, till it was too late. If there* fore it be not repugnant to the Idea of Goodnefs to create a Being with fuch a limited Knowledge; neither could it be inconfiftent with the fame Goodnefs to make him capable of re- ceiving painful Ideas, when fuch a Conflitution was fitted for the Ufe and Benefit of fuch a Creature.

And thus for Moral Evil, the Atheift can never fliew its Exifi^ ence to be a Contradiction to the Idea of Goodnefs, till he can fully fatisfy us, that there can be no fuch thing as a Creature endued with a 'Power over its own Actions ; becaufe if that is pofTible, which the Atheift cannot difprove, fuch a Creature may mofl: cer- tainly make an ill Ufe of that Power, and involve itfelf in. Moral Evil.

But

Sermon" m.

But I fhall decline faying any more upon this Head of Natural and Moral Evil, becaufe this Subjed has been aj. ready Handled by the Learned Perfon who lately Preached thefe Leftures- ^o whom the Reader is referred for farther Satisfadion.

83

G

serm.

SERMON IV.

I ThESSALONIANS v. 21-

Trove all Things : hold fafi that which is good.

H

AVING in the preceding Difcourfe fhewn that the Jtheift cannot prove a Con- tradition upon our Notion of a God ; and yet lure if there was a real Contradiction in it, he might help others to a Sight of it as well as himfelf; I proceed to confider the Difficulties attending his Scheme, by which he will appear to be a very partial Enquirer after Truth, as he G 3 might

S6 S E R M O N IV.

might have feen much greater Diffi- culties in his Material Scheme, than thofe which he makes Obje£l:ions againft the Religious one ; that under the Co- lour of avoiding the three Difficulties of an Immaterial , Omnipotent , and Good G o D, he is fore'd to take Re- fuge in fuch Explications of Things as are evidently falfe and impoffible ; and is therefore inexcufable in making thofe Difficulties a Pretence for rejeding Re- ligion.

Spinosa is the only Perfon among the modern Atheifls, that has pretend- ed to give us a regular Scheme of Atheifm j and therefore I cannot aO: un- fairly in making him the Rcprefenta- tive of their Party, and in. proving the Weaknefs and Abfurdities of the Athe- iftick Scheme, by fliewing the Faults of his : tho' I flaall not fo entirely con- fine myfelf to the Examination of his Scheme, as not to iliew occafionally^ that every other Scheme that leaves out the Religious Notion of a God, will be liable to great Abfurdities. And if we examine the Hypothefis which

Spnofa

Sermon iv- 87

spinoff has fubftltuted as a Remedy to the above-mentioned Difficulties, I am fully perfuaded his Remedy will appear to all indifferent Perfons to be much worfe than the Difeafe he complains of.

He fuppofes with us, " That Some- " thing muft have exifted from all " Eternity, without having any other " Caufe of its Exiilence than the abfo- " lute Neceflity of its own Nature : " Thus far we are agreed. He further fuppofes, '' That there is Nothing in " Nature, that is, no Subftance or rtal " Being, befides this One NeceiTarily " Exiitent Being ; and fince the Ex- *' iftence of Material Subftance is moft " evident, that this muft be the One *^ Self-exiftent Being, and all the va- " riety of Beings in the ^yorld, no- " thing but ditferent Modifications of " this One Material Subftance. He fup- *^ pofes this Subftance to be Infinite " or Immenfe, and to have an in^iiitQ " Number of Attributes, two of which " he fuppofes to be Thought and Ex- ^[ tenfion ; he then affirms in Confe- G 4 " quence

88 Sermon iv.

" quence of this , That all Bodies " are Modifications of this One Sub- ^^ ftance, confidered as extended ; as alt " Souls or Thinking Beings are the '' Modifications of this One Subftance ^' confidered under the Notion of " Thought. So that God, the Neceffari- " ly Exiftent Being, and endued with " infinite Perfeftions, is the Caufe of " all Things that exift, tho' at the fame " time He himfelf differs not really " from thofe Things that exift ; they " being all of them Confubilantial with " him, and not fo much as perfonally " differing from Him. He is at the ' " fame time Agent and Patient, Caufe

*' and Effed, and every Thing He pro- "' duces, is only praftifing upon Him- " y^(/ ; and generating a new Appear- " ance of Hmjelf. "

This is the extraordinary Scheme that Sf'mofa has thought fit to ered, in order to get himfelf clear of the Three above-mentioned Difficulties. From this Account of his Syftem 'tis evident, that tho' 6pmofa and we do differ as to the Subjed of the Self-exiflent Nature ;

yet,

Sermon IV. 89

yet, as to certain Characters or Pro- perties of it, we are both agreed ; fuch

i/, The Unity or Simplicity of the Self-exiftent Being. And 2^/7, Its Immutability. For whatever Diverfi- ty, whatever Changes there may feem to be in the Nature of Things, yet all this does feem to pafs with him for nothing ; fo long as 'tis but one and the fame Numerical Being appearing in different DrefTes : As a Man fuffers no real Change by alTuming different Cha- racters, or by perfonating any State or Condition of Life different from his own : Which he thinks fuiBcient to fe- cure both the Unity and Immutability of his Self-exiftent Being. Thus far then being agreed, we are to enquire, How far he has mended the Reli- gious Scheme by rejecting Immaterial Subftance; and whether his Material Scheme can poffibly anfwer the above- mentioned Characters.

The infuperable Difficulties which thinking Men found in reconciling thefc Attributes with material Extenfion, in-

clia'd

90 Sermon IV.

clin'd them to admit, altho' their Senfes could give them no Information con- cerning the Exiftcnce of any fuch Be- ing, that there might be in Nature fome more perfeQ: Manner of Exiftence than the Material one ; and this they called Immaterial jubilance, ^pwofa himfelf was well aware of the Diffi- culties that would difturb his Material Scheme, and therefore tound it necclla- ry to give us a new Notion of Matter, and different from what the World had hitherto fufpedled of it. Matter had always been thought capable of Di- vifion into numberlcfs Parts ; each of which Parts might exift feparately from the whole ; and confequently, if Matter was the Self-exiftent Being, according to the common Notion the World had of it, there muft have been as many Self- exiftent Beings as there are Parts into which Matter is divifible. But Spinoja was feniible that the Being which was NecelTarily Exiftent, could be but One ; he therefore lays it down as the Foundation of his Undertaking, " That " there is no more than One,Material

" Subftance

Sermon iv. ^

^' Subftance in the World ; that what " every Body before him had calfd di- *' {\'m8: Subftances, were to be no long^ *^ er fuch. " And tho' the feveral Parts of Matter are every Day feen to be feparated from each other without lo- fing their Exiftence, as when the Parts of Wood are divided from each other into Smoke and Afhes and tho' the feparate Exiftence of Individuals, and of the feveral Concretions of Matter look never fo much like diftinO: Subftances ; yet they fhall all pafs with Spif?ofa for nothing more than different Modes of one and the fame Being.

But if we know any thing at all, we know this to be falfe and impoili- ble : if we have any diftinft Ideas, and if fuch diftind Ideas will at all prove a real Diftindion or Difference ia Things exifting without us, we are as certain as we can be of any Thing, that there muft be more than one Material Sub- ftance ; as many as there are or can be of feparate, material Exiftences, and thofe as many as the Divifions which Matter is capable of receiving. And

therefore

p2 S E R M O N IV.

therefore Spifjofa by fubftituting Mat- ter in the Room of Immaterial Sub- ftance, has avoided a Difficulty, and taken up with an Impoflibility. For let there be never fo much Difficulty in conceiving Immaterial Subftance, yet when we find ourfelves reduced to this Dilemma, of either admitting it for true, or elfe acknowledging Matter to be a Simple Being, the Choice which Side to take, cannot be long in making : For all that any one can fay againft Im- material Subftance, is only this ; That his Senfes give him no Account of any fuch Exiftences 5 but as for Matter or the Material World, he fees nothing plain- er than that this is a Compound Being, each of whofe Parts may exift feparate- ly ; and therefore can never be made confiftent with that Unity and Simpli- city which are neceflary Confequences of that Onenefs of Subftance which Spi^ nofa. afcribes to the NecelTarily Exifting Being. The only Subterfuge Spinoff has, and a mere Subterfuge it is, is this; That he takes it for granted, there is no fuch Thing as a Vacuum ;

and

S p R M O N IV. 93

^nd therefore that there can be no real Separation of one Part of Matter from another.

I N the firfl: place, This is taking for granted, and Building his whole Scheme upon what Sir Ifaac Newton, a much better Philofopher than himfelf, has fince his Time given the World ftrong Reafons for believing to be falfe, viz:., That there are no Spaces void of Matter. But fuppofing there is no fuch Thing as a Vacuum ; yet thofe who maintain'd the Infinity of Matter, or that all Space was filled with Matter, did acknow- ledge, that the Parts of Matter were really divifible and feparablc from each other ; and confequently did not think void Spaces necejGfary in making a Se- paration of one particular Part of Mat- ter from another, however necelTary they might be to make a total Sepa- ration from all Matter in general : For \irho will not fay, that two Perfons are as really feparated from one another, tho' the Space or Diftance that fepa- rates them fhould be filled with other Perfons, as if it were taken up by any

Thing

94 S E R xM O N IV.

Thing elfe? and therefore one Part of Matter may be really divided from' an- other, altho' the Space between thoie two Parts of Matter fhould be filled up by other Matter.

Indeed, Spmofa himfelf feems to miftruft the Strength of this Argument, and therefore thinks it beft to provide himfelf a Retreat in cafe he were beat- en out of it, by faying. That he does not know whether he attributes any thing to God, that is unworthy of him, i£ he fhould grant that He was di- vifible *. And all the Reafon he gives why Divifibility fhould be an Imper- fe6lion in God, is, " Becaufe if He is *' divifible. He is divided by Himfelf^ " and not by any External Caufe. " But this Anfwer leaves the Difficulty in all its Strength : For let the Divifibility be caufed by what it will, ftill the Dif- ficulty remains, how a partable and

feparabte

♦ Se nefcire cur dlvina Natura indigna efTet, (I akatur Dlvifibilis. in tbi latter End of the ScholiOT <m Prop. 15. Part i.

Sermon iv.

feparable Nature, can be a Simple or Uncompounded Being. Till the Materidift can fatisfy us in that Point, we muft beg Leave to affirm, That he is no fair Examiner; that he could not be deterniined by the greater Evi- dence, when he left Religion to free himfelf from the Belief of Immaterial Subftance, becaufe at the fame time he faw himfelf under a NecelTity of fwal- lowing an Article of Belief of much harder Digeftion ; I mean, that Divifi- bility is irreconcileable with Unity.

idly^ Another remarkable Diffi- culty the Atheifl brings upon himfelf, \s^ To make a fufficient Provifion for the Immutability of his Self-exiftent Being, while he makes Matter to be the Sub- ject of it. We are fully perfuaded that we know the Difference between a Be- ing that always continues the fame, and a Being that is perpetually changing the Manner of its Exiftence ; that a Being who is what it is by a Neceffity of Nature, cannot be fubjed to Change or Corruption : we are alfo well alTured that Material Beings are fo far from

being

pd S E R M O N IV.

being without Variation or Shadow of TuYning^ that they are fubjedt to all manner of Alterations, that they are fucce (lively putting on new Modes of Being, acquiring fome Forms that they had not before, and lofing others that they had.

How much foever Our modern Atheif may think fit to laugh at the Eficurems^ yet I think, in this Refped, they have taken better Care of their Gods than he lias done. The Eftcuream faw that their Material Gods could never be perma- nent Beings, if they were in the Way of their Atoms; that their Frame would be in continual Danger of be- ing difordered, if not deftroyed by their continual Incur fions : and therefore they wifely removed them out of their num- berlefs Worlds, where the Atoms were continually joftling each other, and placed theni in Security in their Intra- mundan Spaces: But our modern A- theiji has taken no fuch Care of his God , for he has left him in all the Hurry and Confufion of Things,continu- ally altering and changing his State and

Condition,

S E R xM O N IV, ^J

Condition, fometimes for the better, fometimes for the worfe; he is the Sub- jed of all the Generations, and all the Corruptions that are feen in the World. For, as what others would call parti^ cular Beings or Subftances, are with S^imfa, only Modes of the fame One Subftance God; fo it muft be God that is the Subjed of all the Changes; and yet Cotta in Ttd) de Natura Deorumy ipeaks of it as an undoubted Axiom in Philof'phjj Si ortus eji DeoruWy intcritus [it mceffe efl. p. 56.

Mutability has fo plain a Mark of Imperfedlion upon it, and is fo in- confiftent with necelFary Exiftence^ that it gives Spinoff no fmall Trouble to dear his NecefTary Being from any fuch Imputation ; and the only Way he could think of, was this : That tho' the Man- ner of Being was always changing, yet the Subftance or SubjeQ: of thofe Changes always continued the fame. But this Plea will never excufe his. Self- exiftent Being from Variablenefs and Change, whenever we appeal to any of the Ancients who have made ufe of H thefe

pS SerxMon IV.

thefe Words: For they all maintained, as much as Spimjk, the Immutability of the Subftance of Body ; they fuppofed that the Sublknce of Matter was never created or annihilated, but always conti- nued the fame ; and yet believed it a Being that was akkoU^q- & r^iirVoi, becaufe o'l its fo often altering the Manner of its Exiftence.

The Proteus of the Ancients, tho' the Emblem of the greateft Inconftan- cy, would be as immutable a God, with all the different Forms he threw himfelf into, as Sfinofa\ Self-exiftent Be- ing. For 'twas always the- felf-fame Being, tho' fometimes in one Shape, fometimes in. another. And therefore to deny the Mutability of any Being merely becaufe the Subftance remains the fame, is to give a new Significa- tion to the Word, and different from what was ever given before. For in every Mutable Being 'twas always un- dei'ftood, that the Subftance remained what it was, only the Mode of its Ex- iftence was altered ; otherwife there would be no Difference between the

Change

Sermon IV.

Change and the Annihilation of a Being ; and yec the Poets as well as Pliilofopliers, the fabulous Mitiimorphofes of Ovid^ as well as the real Chajiges and Corrup- tions, as explained by the PhilofoplierSj have always fuppofed a Difference be- tween thefe two Ideas. And therefore Si)inofa\ Argument will only prove the Iin mortality, not the Immutability of his Self-exiftent Being.

'T I s plain from Flutnrch^ That lie thought a Being might be immortal, and yet an imperfect and mutable Being .^ For thus he expreiles himfelf in his Treatife asrainft the Steicks. where he is ridiculing the Stoical Notion of Jr/plter^ into whom the Stdich fuppofed all o- ther Beings, Gods as well as Men, to be transformed at the Conflagration 5 " CLryftppus ^ fays he^ and l leant he s ^ " when they had filled the whole " World with what they called Gods„ " tjiey took no Care of fecuring any "" of them from Corruption but "JuPiter *' only, m whom all the reft of the " Gods were lod. And then he makes this Remark, " Tliat his d&^Xvoymgoi H 2 '' them.

loo Sermon IV.

^' them was no better a Proof of his " own Immutability than it was of ** theirs. For, fays he, it is no more " an Argument of Weaknefs and Mu- '^ tability in the Gods, that they are ^ ^* changed and corrupted, into ^upter^ " than it is in Jupiter into whom they ^ are changed ^. "

Besides, this Argument of the Spinolifts cannot be a good one, be- caufe it would prove too much : for it would prove not only that the Self exiflent Being was not a Mutable Being, but alfo that there could be no fuch Thing as a Mutable Being in the World. For if the Self-exiftent Being could be an Immutable one amidftall

the

* Plutarch. Tlzeit ^ koiv&^v Ivvoiuv -TS-fSf ti^j 'S.Tco'iKVi. Seft. looo.

il) 70 (JLijetCoiKKoV di iTfJV (pQei^iJttl, K^ 70 ToTf Ahhtlf

Sermon IV. loi

the Changes He went thro', only be- caufe his Subftance was not deftroy- ed but remained the fame ; then what fhould hinder Man from being an Immutable Being , altho' he fhould change his Opinions, Inclinations and Purpofes every Day, or, if you will, every Hour of the Day ? for amidft all thefe Changes, he is ftill the fame Perfon or perfonal Being. And there- fore by the Reafoning of the S^ino^ Iffls, he too would be a moil fteady Being, tho' his Thoughts and Purpofes were unfteady enough.

These Difficulties , or rather ImpofFibihties , muft aHecl: every Scheme that the Atheiji can ra ife up- on the Foot of a A'Jaterial God. And now I will leave it with every Thoughtful Perfon , whether the A* theifi could be moved by any rational Conviftion, when he took Refuge in the Material Hypothefis, to avoid the Difficulty of conceiving an Immate- rial Exigence ; ' and whether he has not a.Q;ed the fame foolifh Part, which H 3 Coiu

102 Sermon IV.

CoUx charged upon Epicurus in another Cafe ^. But,

2^/7, I AM now to confider how hq • has mended the Matter by rejefting a Power of making Something from Nothing. As he allows no fuch Power, he is under a Necellity of deriving all the Powers of Nature from the Sub- iftance of Matter, as from an Emamtive Caufe, producing them by adling upon iifelf; and thus Thought, Senfe, and Life, as well as Material Extenfion , muft all be drawn out of the ^^cwels of this fimpie Subftance of Matter.

As there are evidently Thinking, as well as Unthinking Beings in the World ; the Difficulty is, how to de- rive both of them from one fingle Prin- ciple. SpifwfA and we are agreed. That there is but One Principle 01' all Things : we account for it, by fuppofmg an Om- nipotent, Subftantial Intelhgence to have given Being to Matter, not as an Ema-

native

* GravJorein plagam recipiclMt, ut Icv'orcm repe'- ?.£vet, r>. 58. d« Nar. Deoiam. Da-j'.es''^ EJIr.

Sermon iv. 103

native Caufe, by producing it out of its own Subflance; for we do not fee how material Extenfion fhould flow from the Subftance of a Thoughtflil Being, any more than how Thought fhould arife from Matter ; but that God gave a Being to Matter from Nothings or when it had no manner of Exigence previoufly to the Exercife of this Pow^ er of his.

The Atheift^ that he may avoid afcribing this Power of producing Sub- ftances, or of making Something from Nothing, which he thinks to be the Ob- ject of no Pov/er whatever, is forced to have recourfe to Material Subifance as the only Source from whence mull a- rife both Thought and Extenfion, all the Variety of Corporeal Beings, all their Powers and Qualities, -and alfo all the Powers of Mind, fuch as thofe of Perception and Intelligence. A hard Task I his is for him to perform ; and yet hard as it is, he mull go thro^ with it, if he will not with us admit -o^ Power of Creation.

H4. ^yE,

loz}. Sermon iv.

^' We agree to what the Author of the Char act ertfiicks has faid concerning the Production of either of thefe Sub- ftances, (to wit, Extended and Think- ing) out of the other, when he fays ^, " That the poor Dregs of forry Mat- " ter, can no more be made out of ^' the fimple, pure Subftance of imma- " teriai Thought, than the high Spi- " rits of Thought or Reafon can be ^' extracted from the grofs Subftance ^' of heavy Matter. '' We joyn, I fay, with him in this Reafoning, and do therefore aifert the NecelEty of having Recourfe to a Creative Power • for fince neither Materia} Subftance can flow from Immaterial, nor Immaterial Think- ing Subftance from Material m the Way of Emanation ; there mupj either be two Independerit Principles from whence we may draw out thefe two dilferent Kinds of Being ; or eife on^ of them muft neceftarily be produced from Nothing. If the Aiheifi will affirm, That Thought

and

* Vol. II. p. z^C, "-97.

Sermon IV. i o$

and Extenfion may arife from the fame Subftance; the Abfurdities he will be reduced to, are thefe; he muft fay, That Senfe and Infenftbility are the At- tributes of the fame Simple Subftance of G o D ; and yet he nor no Man a- hve can tell how fuch incompatible At- tributes could be identified, fo as to conftitute one Simple Subftance ; that is, how the fanie fimple Subftance could be both fenfible and infenfible, thought- ful and thoughtlefs.

To avoid this Abfurdity, he muft then fay, That there is no real Diffe- rence between Thought and Extenfion ; he muft fall in with that abfurd No- tion of Mr. Hobbs, " That all Matter *^ is furnilhed with adual Senfation and " Thought ; altho' only Matter Orga- " nized and in Life, can make Evidence " of its Perceptions." And Spwofa feems to be under a Neceffity of acknow- ledging this ; becaufe he makes Thought and Extenfion to be Two Attributes of his One Subftance, and fays, " That f' there is no real Difference between f the Attributes and the Subftance. " " ■ ' ~ For

io6 Sermon iv.

For if there be no real Difference be- tween the Attributes and the Subftance, there can be none between the At- tributes themfclves , to wit, between Thought and Extenfion, according to that known Rule, That thofe Things which agree in a third, muft agree a- mong themfelves.

Thus we fee Sfinofx in avoiding the Difficulty of conceiving Something made out of Nothing, reduced to the Neceflity of making no real Difference between Thought and material Extenfion, tho' every Body elfe fees a manifeft Difference between them. Whatever Difficulty then there may be in conceiving it poffible that Something fliould be made from No- thing ; yet I hope there is a great deal of DiiTerence between our not conceii'ing the Vojiihilitj of a Thing, and the con^ celvhg it hn^ofjlhle to be : That Thought and Extenfion (hould be really the fame Thing, we fee, if we fee any thing, to be impoffible ; becaufe our Ideas of 'em are evidently the Ideas of different Things *,

and

* Vide Serm. VJII.

Sermon iv. 107

and we mufl: defpair of ever knowing that one Thing is not another, if fuch Marks of Diftinclion in our Ideas will not prove a Difference in the Things themfelves.

2^/)', There is another Abfurdity which Sp/mja is led into by rejefting the Creative Power, which is this : He mufl: make his Self-exiftent Being the Subjed of all the contradictory In-' clinations and Paflions which are met with in Mankind ; for if there be no Creative Power, there will be no other Way in accounting for the Exifl:- ence of Things, but by deriving them from the Subllance of the Self-exiftent Being: But all fuch Derivations can be nothing but fo many different Modes, as himfelf confeffes, of the Divine Sub- ftance ; and confequently, tli€ Souls of Men, all their Thoughts and Paflions, will be only different Modes of the Divine Being. And therefore it will be God, and not the Man (for he is only a Mode of the Divine Being) that thinks, affirms or denies, loves or • jiates , fo often as Man feems to do

either

ic8 Sermon IV.

either. For it is an undifputed Jjchm in Phllofophy, That whenever we affirm of any Thing , That it is an Agent or a Patient, we mean, that the Sub- ftance, and not the Accidents , does or fuffers this or that ; as when we fay, Iron is hard, or Wax foft ; we mean not to fay, that the Accident of Hardnefs is hard, or of Softnefs is foft, for this would be ridiculous ; but that the Subftance or EfTence which conftitutes thefe Bodies is hard or foft : fo when we fay that a Man thinks of any Thing, affirms or denies, loves or hates any Thing ; we do not mean, that the Thoughts themfelves (which are only Accidents or Modes of the Soul) but the Man himfelf or his Soul thinks , affirms or denies, loves or hates. From thence it muft follow, that the Souls' of Men, being according to Sfdnofx's Scheme, Modifications of the Divine Subllance, we mud not (if we v/ould fpeak pro- perly) lay; that the Man affirms or de- nies, loves or hates j but that Gop loves or hates, affirms or denies, as of- ten as Men do fo : And as on^ Ivlari at

th^

StiRMON IV. IOC)

the fame Time, and in the fame Re- fpefts, afiirms what another denies, and loves what another hates. According to this Account of Things, God muft at the fame Time, and in the fame Re- fpect affirm, and not affirm or deny, love, and not love or hate, which are palpable Contradictions ; and if we know any thing at all, cannot poffibly belong to any Being. Yet thefe, or as great Abfurdities will ftick fafl: to all the Deniers of Creative Power.

For they muft either affirm, with Spinofa, That all the feveral Beings in the "World are only Modes of the Ne- celTarily-exiftent Being, which muft end in the Abfurdity I have now men- tioned, of making all the contradi([iiory Volitions and Paffions of Men to be the Affections of one and the fame Being : Or if they affirm thefe Modes of Spinoff to be real and fubftantial Beings ; they muft admit what is equally abfurd, an infinite Number of Neceffarily-exiftent Beings, as many as there are real Be- ings in the World : Or elfe they muft with us, allow, how difficult foever it

may

no Sermon iv.

may be to conceive, that there muft be fomewhere or other a Power of ma- king Subftances or real Beings, which is the fame thing with what we call the Creative Power. For nothing can be plainer, than that all particular Be- ings (fuppofing them to be real or fub- ftantial Beings) muft exift by a Necef- fity of Nature, if there be no fuch Thing ia the World as a Power of making real Exiftences.

S p I N o s A was well aware of this Confequence, and therefore as he was neither willing to admit a Power of Creation, nor a Plurality of NecefTari- ly-exiftent Beings, he could fee no other Way of extricating himfelf out of this Difficulty, but by advancing this new Notion, " That what the World had " before him called real Beings, was no- " thing more than different Modes of " Being." And tho' Mr. Boyle feems to think the Chinefe Notion, which makes all particular Souls to be {q many Self-exiftent Beings, or 'UemocrU tus and Epfcurus\ infinite Number of Self-exiftent Atoms, to be a more ra- tional

Sermon IV. xii

tional Account of Things, than that which makes all particular Beings to be only Modes of Being ; yet thus far I think fuiSciently clear, That the Jtheifi a£ls a moft fooiifh Part when he takes Refuge in. either of thefe, to excufe him- felf from admitting a Power of Creation. For as to a Plurality of Self-exiftent Beings, nothing can be more abfurd than to make all the Diverfity of Be- ings, with different Degrees of Power, to be all NeceiTarily-exiilent. The Rea- fon which induced the Chinefe to fup- pofe a great Number of Self-exiftent Souls with dijftrent Powers, was, That they might the better account for their animating dijftrent; and tmequd Portions of Matter ; and the Reafon why the Epicure am fuppofed their Self-exiftent Atoms to be of different Figures, was, That they might give a more proba- ble Account of the different Combina- tions of Material Beings. But i^ tliis Inequality of Souls, and the Different Figures of Atoms, was really necefTa- ry in accounting for the Diverfity of Beings in the World, it will be ntQt.{-

fary.

112 Sermon IV.

iary to look farther, and enquire for the Caufe of this Difference in the Chinefe and Eficurean Principles: For if . the Inequahty in the feveral Portions of Matter, was a good Reafon for fup- pofing an Inequality in the Self-exiftent Principles, what Reafon can they give why we fhould not as well look out for the Caufe of the Inequality of their Principles, as well as they provide a Caufe of the different and unequal Combinations of Bodies ? They could, I fay, have no more Reafon for fup- pofing the Difference of their Princi* pies to have arifen from the Neceflity of their Natures, than that the diffe* rent Combinations of Matter, fhould have arifen from fuch a Neceffity ; which latter they do not fuppofe. And therefore, if they would argue con* fiftently with themfelves, they muff ac- knowledge fome external Caufe of the Difference that is fuppofed to be in their Principles; and this Caufe mufl be fome One Simple Being, not ma- ny Beings ; becaufe all Diverfity of Be- ing does plainly fuppofe a Reafon of

its

Sermon IV. 113

its being what it is, extrinfical to the Nature of the Being , to wit, that it muft have fome external Caufe, that makes it to be what it is, or different from any Thing elfe.

And thus I have fhewn that the Atheifi does not acb hke a fair Exa- miner, when lie rejects a G o d with a Power of Creation ; becaufe he either takes up with a Number of Self-exiilent Peings of unequal Forces, or ehe, with Spif7oJa, he makes the Self-exiftent Be- ing to be every Thing, in the flrid- eft and propered: Senfe of the Words; which are fuch Abfurdities, that we may without Breach of Charity, deny fuch Perfons to be impartial Searchers after Truth.

I S E R M,

11^

SERMON V.

I ThESSALONIANS v. 21.

Trove all Things : hold faji that which is good.

HAVE already fliewn that the Jthei/l cannot be a fair Examiner, wlien he quits Religion for the a- voiding fome Difficulties in the Religious Scheme • becaufe he muft fwallow much greater, if he will ac- count for the Appearances of Things, and abide by his Material one. As to two of the Difficulties which he is wont to complain of, "jiz. The Imma- I 2 teriality

II 6 Sermon V.

teriality of God, and his Power of Creation, or of making Something from Nothing, we have already feen, that if he will not admit thefe, he muil ad- mit fome Things that are much hard- er of Belief, and that therefore he can- not be juftified by any f4ir an^ can- did Reafoner in rejecfing Religion, for the Sake of thefe Difficulties.

I AM now to confider one other Difficulty, which he makes in Excufe for not believing a G o d, which is, That it would obhge him to believe that Evil may be reconciled with the fuppofal of a Good Being • and am to fhew, That all the Ways he can pof- fibly take to account for the real State of Good and Evil upon the Foot of Atbsifm^ are impoffible to be true ; and therefore that he is an unfair Examiner in rejecting Religion for the Sake oi this Difficulty. 1 will begin with that Account Spwofa is able to give' of tjiis Vh£nome-rion^ confidently with his Syfleni of the World , which is built upon a fmgle Principle, from whence he is tp drav/ both Good and Evil.

If

Sermon V. 117

If there was in the World nothing tut Natural and Moral Good, or no- thing but Natural and Moral Evily there would be no Difficulty in deriving either of them from one fingle Prin- ciple; but as there is an evident Mix- ture of both in the World, SpjKofa judged it to be impolTibie that fuch a Mix° ture fhould arile from a good Prineiple^ and therefore ere£ts a new Syftem with a Material God at the Head of ir, tliat lliould be neither Good nor Evil, but in its own Nature indifferent to both :■ Such a Being then acting necefTarily ac« cording to its Nature, which Nature is fuppofed to be perfedly indifferent as to Good and Evil, and a£l:ing by an infinite Force or Power, mult produce all the Poflibilities of Being. For Spi^ nofn, fays *, Ex Neceffitate D:vm£ Naturd wfinitA infinitis modis^ hoc ejiy omnU qua fub intelUBum infiifnttim aider e poffunt^ fe- qui debent. Arid therefore, fince Errors and Crimes, Grief and Pain, are as real Modifications of Being, as Truth and I 3 Virtue'^

"■ Piop. XTI,

1 1 8 Sermon V.

Virtue, Pleafure and Happinefs ; confe- quently one as well as the other muft have a Place in the Univerfe. For this Principle being in its own Nature in- different to either what we call Good or Evil, and producing all that is pof- fible to be produced, it muft of courfe pfoduce Evil as well as Good.

W E will now fee whether 'twas worth S^mofa's while to quit Religion in order to get rid of that difficult Queflion, If a Good God, '^'ohv t^ aclka. I would grant Spnofa^ that his Infinite Being fliould produce all the Polli- bilities of Being ; but then I can never grant, that ContradiQ:ions are PolTibi- lities of Being. And yet furely it looks as much like a Contradiction as can be, to draw out of the fame Simple, Un- compounded Subftance both Wifdom and Folly, Virtue and Vice, Happinefs and Mifery ; and yet if this Account could , be true, thefe muft all flow from the EfTence of the Self-exiftent Beingv

Homer has fhewn much better Senfe, when he accounted for the Goods

and

SfiRMON V. tip

and Evils of this Life by placing two Tuns near the Throne of Japiter, one filled with good Things, the other with Evils, and that Goods and Evils came from Heaven, as JufheripouYQd out of ei- ther of them ; if he poured out of both at the fame Time, then there was up- on Earth an Appearance of both Good and Evil, or a Mixture of both. He faw that if he had made both Happi- nefs and Mifery to be drawn out of the fame VeiTel, that it would have had too much of the Air of Incredible, even .for a Poem; that it would have been as bad as if he fhould have pretended to fetch both /i/^ Water and frefjj froni the fame Spring or Fountain, v/hich was in. St. Jamesh Time a proverbial Saying :,by which they ufed to exprefb an Im- pofTibility. Had Spinofa lived m thofe Days, and broached this DoQirine, his God might have been in Danger of .becoming a proverbial Expreilion for ..any Thing that was thought iiTtpofTi" ble.. For to fuppofe a Simple Being to be neither Good nor Bad, but a Mix- ture of both, is fuppoling what is al- I 4 togetbg!'

I 20 S E R M d N V.

togethei* unintelligible. The Spwojiji muft allow a real Difference between Phyfical Good and Pliyfical Evil, Plea- fure and Pain, Happinefs and Mifery : And yet if his Account of Things were true, thefe muft be fo like one another, and fo much of the fame Nature, as to come indifferently from the fame Un- compounded Subftance.

But this is not all, here is not only a DiiHculty of giving Birth to both Good and Evil from fuch a fmgle Principle, but alfo when that is done, of freeing fuch a Principle from the Contradidion of being at the fame Time happy and miferable, in Joy and in Grief, as often as Men or any other Beings are in thefe Circumftances, which is always the Cafe of fome or other of them. Tulfy ^ ridicules a No- tion of Pythagoras^ which made the Souls of Men to be Parts of the Di- vine Being; becaufe Go d muff in. fuch Cafe be often miferable ; but this was not to be reconcil'd with his fuppofed

Happinefs^

• Tull. De Natura Deorum.

Sermon v. 121

Happmefs. Na^ Fythagoras qui cenfuit Deum animum effe per Natr/ram rerum om^ mm intent um Isf commemtem^ ex quo nojlri anim'i carp:rentur^ non vidit diftrAciione hu- nt a nor um animorum difcerpl £jf dilacerari Deum : dr cum wiferi ejfent animi, quod plerifque contingeret^ turn Dei partem ejfe miferam. We fee that it was then thought a good Argument againfl: Py- thagor^ih Opinion, That if it were true^ the Deity muft be miferable, which could not be, becaufe God was a Hap- py Being, and they hctle thought that 'twas pofTible to be both happy and miferable at the fame Time ; and there- fore Pyth.\2^oras\ Notion was juftly re- jeded, and fo muft SpinoJa*s too for the fame Reafon ; for i[ Pjthagcras made the Souls of Men to be Parts of the Divine Being, Spinofa makes them to be Modes of the fame Being, or the fame Nature of God, differing only in the Manner of its Exiftence ; and therefore the Divine Being muft be at leaft equally affeiSled in the one as in the other Cafe.

The

1^2 SeR MO N V.

The Religious Man ftands (4lar of any fuch Abfurdities ; as he fuppofes thefe particular Exiftences wliicli are the Subjeds of Evil, to be made not out of the Divine Subftance, but from No- thing^ and to be created with different Degrees of Perfection, and confequent- iy, that the Evils they are obnoxious to, whether Phyfical or Moral, do not proceed from Him, but are, as I be- fore obferved, merely the Effects of their imperfed Natures. And we do not think that the Atheijl can prove it inconfiftent with Goodnefs to make li- mited or imperfeO: Natures. Thus far we are fure we can talk Senfe. Where- as Spmoja having no Creatures nor li- mited Natures to take Refuge in, muft neceflarily fuppofe all the Evils and Im° perfe«Etions of the World to be the At- tributes of his Infinite Being: And therefore cannot avoid the Abfurdities I have now charged upon him.

There is aUb one other Abfur- dity chargeable upon Sfwofah Syftem, viz. That . all the fooliili and wicked Thoughts of Men, as well as thofe that

ars

Sermon V. 123

are good and rational, muft be the Thoughts of his Self-exiftent Being; but fo long as we fee a real Difference between good Senfe and Foolifhnefs, Virtue and Vice, we can never fee how fuch incompatible Properties can flow from the fame Principle. For this would be to make a moft Simple Being to be not only a Compound Being, which is Contradiftion enough; but alfo com- pounded of fuch inconfiftent Ingredients as could never be united together in the fame Being, but would battle each other till one of them had fubdued and deitroyed the other.

But then, it may be faid, Why may not this be true, as well as what the Chriftian Religion fuppofes to be true^ w^ That" the fame Perfon may be the Subjed of both human and divine At- tributes? For human Wifdom, or the Wifdom which human Nature, for In- ftance, is capable of, when compared with divine Wifdom, is no better than Folly: And if this be true, then the Subjea of both Natures muft be at the fame Time divinely and humanly wife,

that

12^ S E R M 0 N V.

that IS, wife, and not wife ; but this can no more be conceived than the other ; and if thefe Things can be fup- pofed by the ReUgious Man to exift in God, why not by the Spinofift in his Self-* exiftent Being. Some Christians to avoid this Difficulty of uniting God and Man in the Perfon of our Saviour, either fuppofcd one of the Natures to be fwal- lowed up, loft or confounded in the other, 'viz, the Man in G o d ; or elfe, that after the Union there ftill conti- nued two diftind Subjefts of the two diiferent Natures ; but there is no Need of either of thefe Solutions to clear the Union of God with Man from the Ob- jections I have raifed againft Sfi}?ofa\ Self-exiftent Being. For when God took upon him human Nature, that human Nature was per eftly fubmitted to the Divine, and conftantly followed its Gui- dance, and the AQiions of the Perfon were always the laft Determinations, not of the PafTions and Appetites of the Man, but of the Divine Logos. No con- trary Volitions, no ConfliQ: between God and Man, but the Word direded,

and

Sermon V. 125

and the Man followed- And tho' cue Saviour, as a Man, is faid to have en- creafed in Wifdom as wd\ as Stature ; yet it is enough for my prefent Pur- pofe, that there was no Clafhing be- tween the Wifdom of the Divine and ' Human Nature : If the Wifdom of the latter was lefs extenfive, yet it was without any Mixture of Folly : Where- as I objecled again ft Spinofa*s Syftem, becaufe it introduced a Nature which was a perfed Scene of Contention and Inconfiftency, as it was evident from the many rational and foolijh Thoughts of Men ; which if we know what Con- tradidions are, muft be fuch, when- ever they are both made to be at the fame Time the Thoughts of one and the fame Being. And yet (as I have already ihewn) his Self-exiflent Being, fo long as he fuppofes him the only Subftance or real Being in the World, and all other Beings only the fame Be- ing in different Shapes and Dreffes, ac- cording to the Diverfity and Variety that we fee in Nature, muft be charge- able

12(5 Sermon v.

able with all the foolifli as well as ra- tional Thoughts of Men ^.

H A. V I N G now fliewxi that 5/>/>r/^'s Hypothefis is fo far from giving a bet- ter Account of that Mixture of Good and Evil which appears in the World, than the Religious Scheme, that it will by no means introduce any fuch Mix- ture into the World ; and therefore that every Spinofift is Culpable when he re- jects Religion for the Difficulty of re- conciling Good and Evil with a Good God :

I COME now to fhew, That no o- ther Atheiftick Scheme ought to be ta- ken up by any fair and impartial Exa- miner; becaufe every other Atheiftick Scheme, different from that of Spinofa, will fuppofe more than One Neceffa- rily-exiftent Principle; but a Plurahty pf Self-exiftent Beings cannot poffibly be true. And therefore how well foe- ver a Plurality of Principles would ac- count for this particular Difficulty, yet

it

Vide Serm IV,

Sermon V. 127

It ought not to be admitted for a So- lution of it ; becaufe every good Syftem ought to be built upon clear and evi- ' dent Principles of Reafon, as well as to be qualified for folving Appearances of ' Things : But every Scheme that fup- pofes a Plurality t>f Independent, Ne- cejGTarily-exiftent Beings, is fo far from being fupported by clear, evident Prin- ciples of Reafon, that 'tis diredly re- pugnant to the cleareft Ideas we have of the Order of Things. All the real Perfections that Men have ever had any Notion of, they have been wont to give to the Self-exiftent Being; they were fure that Something muft be boundlefs in its Exiftence, both with regard to Time and Place ; and as the Exigence of that Something was exclu- ded from no Place nor Time, that its Operation could not be hindered any rvhere nor any when. As thefe Powers and Privileges, I fay, were always thought to have a real Exiftence in Nature, they were as conftantly afcribed to the Self-exiftent Being ; for the Excel- lency of fuch a Nature muft be, accord- ins

128 Sermon v.

ing to our Conceptions, if any Thing be fo, entitled to all pofTible Perfedi- ons ; but then it mull: be very hard to conceive two fuch Beings with all thefe Powers and Privileges; as for In- ftance, We fhall be hard put to it to find Room for more than One of fuch a Kind of Beings, as would by Itfelf fill up and exift in every Part of the infinite Space, as it muft of Necedity, fince 'tis fuppofed to be Infinite or Iramenfe.

'Till the Jtheifi can tell us how to provide a Reception for a fecond Infi- nite, when all is already taken up by the other ; we muft beg Leave to af- firm, that he has a much greater Dif- ficulty upon his Hands, than the Reli- gious Man has, when he is called upon to account for Good and Evil upon the Foot of a Good God. For as the Atheiflh Self-cxiftent Beings, are fuppofed to be Material, they cannot be both in the fame Place ; and therefore a Second can- not be. at all, becaufe the Firft is fup^ pofed to be Infinite, and to have alrea- dy filled all the infinite Space.

Bu T

Sermon V, 120

But farther, The Idea of Power ftfcks clofe to our Idea of the Self-ex- iftent Being, and yet our Ideas will not allow of halfing or dividing the Pow* er between Two ; becaufe this would be to admit Two Powers that could con- troul one another, and difturb each other in their Operations ; which furniilies out a very faint Idea of Power, too much limited and retrained to be given -to a NecefTarily-exilknt and Infinite Be- ing. For in this Cafe, neither of the Self-exiftent Beings would be able to produce any one Thing without the Interpofition of the other. And there- fore every Being m the World would be the Effedt of their oppofing one an- other, and fo receive not its Nature from either, but from both.

As the Appearances of Things are no where pure or unmix'd Good;, nor pure or unmixt Evil, fome Perfons have difcovered a great Fondnefs for Two Contrary and Independent Principles, hoping that fuch a Syftem would per- feOily well account for the Mixture of Good and Evil, as whatever fhould be K produced

I ^o Sermon V.

produced from the Struggle and Con. Aid of two contrary Powers, muft of Courfe partake of the Nature of both. But however fond they may be of this Way of folving the Diiiiculty, they may do well to confider, whether the afcribing to the NecefTarily-exiftent Be- ing fuch a limited Power as evident- ly contradi8:s our clearefi: Ideas, be not a better Proof of the Falfliood of this J^ypothefsy than any Arguments they can bring againft the Being of a God from their Fhxnomenon of Good and Evil, the firfl: we are lure cannot be the Truth, for Reafons I have already gi- ven ; the lall may poffibly be true, al- tho' we cannot clear up every Difficul- ty that may offer itfelf to us, when we are endeavouring to reconcile Good and Evil with a Good God. But,

2^/7, I WILL now fhew, that fup- pofing the PofTibility of the Exiftence of Two or more Contrary, Indepen- dent Principles, that yet they would not, any more than SpnofA's Syftem, account for the Appearances of Good and Evil in tl:e World.

r

Sermoh v. 131

I HAVE, as T before cbferved, a- voidecl entring into a particular Detail of the DiiHculties that are met with in reconciling Evil with a Good B e i i^ g^ becaufe the Learned Dr. Joh/f Clark has lately ex profcjjo examined them ; howe-s ver, I hope, even in this Way of Hand- h'ng the Matter, to fliew, That the Atheiii is an Unreafcnable Pcrfon, if he has left Religion for the Sake of this DiiKcuky. As I have already fliewn, That the Scheme of many Self-exillent Principles, the Refuge of fome Atheijis from this particular Dificulty, is incon= fiftent with our plaineil Ideas : If I t'an alfo fneW, That fhould we give jiim any of his Schem.es on the Foot of Plurahty, yet he would not be able to account for the Difficulties ; v/e fliall ^ leave him without any Shew of an Ex- cufcj if he pretends to have hft us^ tliat he might itand clear of Di&ulties.

Supposing then for once, the Pof- fibility of the Exigence of Tv/o or more Independent Principles of contrary Na-- tures • thefe Principles mull either havd sn equal or unequal Force. . If they v/erd • K 2 unequal

132 Sermon V.

unequal Powers, tlien the fuperior Pow- er adiiig necefTarily and to the utmoft Stretch of its Power, muft, in an eter- nal Duration, have deftroyed all the Effects of the weaker Power ; And then if the fuperior Force were Good, there could be mw no fuch Thing as Evil; or if Evil, no fuch Thing as Good; neither of which will anfwer to the true Appearance of Things. The Atheifi cannot defend himfelf by the Ancients, who fuppofed unequal, con- trary Powers to have always had an Ex- iftence, without deftroying one ano- ther : For altho' the ancient Theology of the Pagans J as we find by the Poets and other Mythologies^ confiftcd of many contrary Principles endued with une- qual Powers; tho' the good Beings, fuch as Jupiter J ^c. were fuppofed by them to be fuperior in Power to their Ve'joi'e^ : yet they might eafily beheve the eternal Co-exiftence of fuch unequal Powers, or that the leffer were not de- ftroyed by the Greater; becaufe they fuppofed "Jupter and the rcll of the Good Principles to be hee' jfgenty that

aded

Sermon V. 133

a£ted with Views and for Ends, and might therefore believe that the Good, the' a fuperior Principle, had permitted the Aftion of the inferior Evil Being, in a Way of Punifhment to fuch as had broken the Laws- of thofe Beings, whD were the Principles of Goodnefs. But as to the Atheiftick Principles which a6t neeeffarily, or becaufe they can't help it ; and confequentiy, a£t to the utmoft of their Power, the eternal Subfiftence of unequal contrary Forces muft be impoffible, for the Reafon al- ready given 5 and therefore they can- not account for the State of Good and Evil in the World. But,

2dly^ I F we take two contrary Prin- ciples of equal Force to account for Good and Evil, then as they 2.8: necef- farily, and therefore to the utmoft of their Powers, their continual Oppofitiori to each other muft either produce no- thing but Confufion ; that is, the evil Principle muft deftroy as faft as the Good Principle produces any Thing, becaufe the Evil Principle is fuppofed to have as much Power, and to be K 5 under.

J 24 S E R M O M V.

uflcter as great a Ne^^elTity of ufmg th^t yovver as the Good One: Or elfe an equal Mixture of Good and ^vil n?iujfl: run thro' all Things, as the neccfTary Refult of the Equality of liieir mutual Op- pofition. For there is no third Way of conceiving the Effect of the Ageney of two neceiXary, equal, and contrary Pow- ers. But if neither of thefe be agreeable to the truth of Things, then the /Itheiji is not to be juftified in. rejcding Rehgion for the Difficulty of folving the Appear- ances of Good and Evil, becaufe every pretended Solution upon the Foot of Jtheijm^ will then appear to be lalfe.

i/, The Appearance of Good and Evil cannot be accounted for by Two contrary, equal Principles; becaufe if they aded NecefTarily, the Effed of their mutual Aclioii would be nothing but Diforder and Confuilon, as Two equal, contrary Powers mull of Ne> celRty deftroy the Operations of each other. Monfieur Bayle^ as fond as he fliews himfelf upon all Occafions of the H^pothefii which pretends to account ibr Good and Evil by Two contrary

Principles:

Sermon v. 135

Principles; was yet fenfible, that Two fucli contrary Natures, unlefs they aft- ed with fomething Hke Freedom, could never account for Good and Evil ; and therefore v/hen he is making an Apo- logy for Zorodjier^ he reprefents him as juftifying his Two Principles in this Manner : " That it was with his Two Principles for fome Time, as it was with " Mr. Hobbs's Men in a State of Na- ^' ture, and before the Eftablifhment " of Societies ; that every Man was an " Enemy to every other Man, and did " each other all the Miichief they " could ; and thus, fays he, it was with ^' the Two Principles at firll, till they, ^' as well as Mr. Hohbs^s Men, weary *' of fuch a confufed State of Things, •■' in which one Principle was conti- *^ nually overturning what the other *^ • was building up, came at laft to an ^' Accommodation, and joyned arnica- ■^ bly together for the future, in the '* feveraj Produdions of Nature *. " K 4 Mr.

* 'Hlftcr. DiS:. in voce Zoroaflier,

I 3<^ S E R M O N V.

Mr. Baj/le enters into fo many Particu- lars in Iiis Vindication of this Dodrine of X^ronfie-^^ that we may believe he look'd upon it as the molt rational Soluti- on of the prefent Difficulty. But from hence we may obferve, That Two con- trary Principles, fo long as they aded NeceiTarily and to the utmoil of their Power, could produce nothing but a State of the utmoft Confufion and Diibrder ; bccaufe this is fuppofed and allowed to have been the State of Things previoufly to the Agreemenf of the Two Principles : and then without fuch Agreement, every Thing muft have been ftill in. Confufion, and different from what we fee at pre- fent J and therefore were it polTible that this Account of Things could be the Truth, yet it would do the Atheijl no Service, unlefs he would allow the Exi- gence of Beings that ad upon Choice, which he always fteadily denies, and while he does fo, can have no Right to any Advantage from this Bjpcthejis,

If it be faid, That fuch an Accom- modation is confident with NecefTity, and that a good Principle is necelfarily

determined

Sermon V. 137

determined to fuch an Accommodation, as a Mixture of Good and Evil is bet- ter than no Good at all ; the Anfwer is, That fuch a Determination muft be the Efted of Choice and of a Free- dom of ading, and not of any abfolute Neceflity of the Nature of the Being; becaufe the Operations of a Being that ads from a Neceflity of Nature, will always be as invariable as its Nature ; and therefore if they both aded from a Neceflity of their Natures, the EfTed of their acting muft be always the fame, and no Room for Variation, which this Accommodation fuppofes. 'Tis true, the Jtheiji allows Men the fame Pow- er of tranfading with each other for their mutual Benefit, and yet denies them a Liberty of Adion : but I am perfuaded they would not perfift in denying fuch mutual Agreements be- tween Men, to be an Argument of Choice and Freedom, if they could fee any Poffibility of reconciling Liberty with their Material Scheme. For they cannot but fee a Difference between ]Moral and Phyficai Motives, between

being

1 q8 Sermon v,

being moved to a£b by a Reafon, and being forced into Action by an exter- nal Impolfe ; and that this Difference exilb in the Nature of Things, and therefore they would never have made them to be the fame, if they could have fetched them both from Matter, and yet fuppofed any Difference between them. But,

T o proceed, If the Atheift finding he can make no Advantage of this ima- ginary Accommodation between the Two Principles for a Solution of the prefent Difficulty, fliould rather take up with another, which the fame Mr. Bnyie propofes in the Title Paulkians^ viz,. That the Good Principle oppofes with all its Might and without ceafing the Sin and Mifery of the Creature ; but that the Evil Principle ading on its Side with all its Strength inOp- pofition to it, there refults from this continual Shock of the Two Prin- ciples, that Mixture of Good and Evil which we fee every where, as the Action and Reaction of two contrary Qualities produces a third Quality par-

" taking

Sermon v. 139

^^ taking of the Nature of both : " If, I fay, he has any Hopes fcom this Way of folving the Difficulty, we will fhew, that tliis cannot be the true one, Be- caufc fuppofing fuch a Conflia between Two contrary Principles, if they did not, as I have already obferved, turn all into Confufion, then the Confequence would be, that there muft be an equal Mixture of Good and Evil running thro' all Things ; whereas if this were the Cafe, there muft be an invariable and uniform Appearance of Good and Evil; the Mixture of Good and Evil muft be the fame in every Part of Space, as well as every Part of Time, b^caufe it pi*oceeds from Two contrary Caufes ading necefTarily and to the ut- 'moft of their Powers ; and therefore no Reafon can be given why their AQrion and Reaftion, or the Refult of them, fhould not be the fame ^n every Part of the infinite Space, their Powers be-- ing fuppofed to be equal. But if the fame Qiiantity of Good and Evil had been blended together from Eternity, -and uniformly diHufed thro' the Infinite - ■ Extenfiouj

140 Sermon V.

Extenfion, there could have hcQn no fuch Thing as human Condud or Wif^ dom, no PofTibility of chufing the lefs Evils or Inconveniencies to avoid great-» cr ones; becaufe the Inconveniences muft be equal which Way foever we aQ:, i£ the Evil be equal or as much in every Part of Infinite Space as the Good is»

Away then with all the Maxims of Wifdom which Men have hitherto pretended to diflinguifh themfelves by, i£ the fame Degree of Evil muft be cxpc8:ed, 2.Q: as wifely as we will. But if the real State of Things proves 9 that there js more evil in one Way of afting than in another, this fhews that the Mixture of Good and Evil did not proceed from Two contrary Principles acting neceflarily ; but froni One Free and Intelligent Being, that has judi- cioufly annexed different Degrees of Evil or Inconvenience to different Ways of afting, in order to make a Trial of our good Senfe in chufing the leaft Inconve- niences. In this Way of accounting for Good and Evil, we can fyppofe them

mixed

Sermon v. 141

mixed together, and yet leave Room for the Exercife of good Senfe : Becaufe a Being that ads not from any Ne- ceflity of Nature, but with every De- gree of Freedom which is confiftent with aQ:ing wifely, may fo order the Conftitution of Things, as to leave it in the Power of fome Beings, if not en- tirely to feparate the Evil from the Good, yet, at leaft, when there are dif- ferent Degrees of Evil, to take the lejffer : Whereas if Good and Evil proceeded from two diflerent and contrary Caufes ading neceffarily with all their Force, it could never be in the Power of any particular Beings, fuch as Men, to alter fo far the Original Conftitution of Things as to take Good without taking an equal Portion of Evil ; becaufe it cannot be fuppofed, that what has been joyned together by two infinite Pow- ers, can pofTibly be feparated by Man. But lince all the World allows a Dif- ference between wife and foolifli Con- duQ:, the Appearance of Good and Evil fuch as it really is, cannot pofTibly be

reconciled

14.2 Sermon V.

reconciled by an Hypothefis of Two con* trary Principles a8:ing neceflarily.

Again, as Wifdom and Folly are not reconcileable with Two contrary Principles afting necefTarily; fo neither will the linequal Allotment of Good and Evil to fome Sorts of Men, receive a Solution from Two contrary Pi'inciples ; for Beings that a6t necefTarily, it mufl be granted, cannot be Refpefters of Perfons, but muft difperfe their Favours or Refentments promifcuoufly to all that come in the Way of them, and not fingle out particular Perfons for that Purpofe. This is fo plain a Dedutlion from the Atheipck Scheme, that Lucre- tius could not deny it ; and therefore when he comes to that Part of Na- ture which relates to the Difpenfation of Good and Evil, he plainly gives lip the Caufe of Atheifm^ in acknowledg- ing that this was not to be accounted for by any Laws of mere Matter and Motion ; for Ipeaking of the Misfortunes of great Men, of which the Hiftories of all Times had furnifhed great Num- bers of Inftanccs^ he drops his Atoms,

aud"

Sermon v. 143

and has Recourfe to I know not what hidden Power that took a Delight in making a Jeft of all human Grandeur. %)Jc^ue adeo res humanxs vis ahdita quadam Ohterity dr fulchros fafces jUvafyue jecures^ ^roculcare i^ ludibrio fthl habere videtur *. We may by • the Way obferve, That Lucretius does here the fame Thing for which he and other Atheifis have thought fit to laugh at the Religious Man \ becaufe his Material Caufes were found by him not fufficient to anfwer this ?h^nomenon of Nature, he is con- tented to take Refuge in an unknown Caufe, a ®-M ^ ^MX*f'"fj and yet when we have recourfe to a God, they wii! allow it no better a Name in us than a Cloak for our Ignorance. But if the Atheifl v/ould declare as fairly with regard to feveral other ^ImmnmiA as Lucretius has done in this particular one, he would find as much Want of a G o D for extricating him out of other Difficulties, as Lucretim did hi tliis concernino: sood and Evil,

If

* Liicrr-r lib- 5,

144^ Sermon v.

If the Religious Man meets with ibme Difficulties in reconciling the Misfortunes of great and good Men with a Good Being, yet nothing has been thought clearer than that Something befides the necefTary Laws of Matter and Motion njull: have had a Hand in human Affairs. There was always fo much feeming Caprice, fuch Inconftancy, and Changes fo fud- den, and fo unaccountable in the Hi- ftory of great Men, particularly of fuch as had been great and good Men, th at it has been always thought necefTary to have Recourfe to fome Agent that go- verns all Events with perfeft Freedom, and not to Matter in Motion, whofe Laws were too fteady and too regular to account for them. For 'twas eafily feen that the Workings of NecefTary Agents mull be as unchangeable as their Natures. And therefore a more regular Courfe of human Affairs than the prefent, mufl have arifen from the Adion of a Being or Beings that brought Things about from a Necef- fity of Nature.

Thus

Sermon V.

Thus we fee the Jtheift is never the nearer towards giving himfelf Sa- tisfaction concerning Good and Evil, when he exchanges Religicn for Atheifm : but if he deals fairly with himfelf, he will only find this Difference, That whereas he tumbled at fome Appear- ances of Evil which he could not re? concile with Goodnefs or the Exiftence of a Good Principle, he muft now fee every Solution he can give of this Fhammenon upon the Foot of Atheijm^ plainly impoflible to be th-e Truth,

H$

L

S E R M.

'J.- .-^fcg^jsfea*

SERMON VI.

Acts XVII. 28.

For in Him we live^ and mo'Ve^ and have our Be- ing.

147

HESE Words are Part of a Speech St. Faul made upon Mirs-YiiW at Athem in Juftification of himfeif againil the Charge of en- deavouring to introduce a new Reli- gion into that City ; he tells them , That he had Preached no ftrange Gods, but the very fame God whom they them- fclyes \vorJhipped, under the Title of L z tlie

Sermon VI.

(he Unknown God, tho' they were entirely ignorant of his Nature, as was plain by their ereQ:ing Temples to Him for his Habitation and Refidence. Whereas himfelf had ereded this {late- ly Frame of the Univerfe, and there- fore could never be in Want of a Room or Place to dwell in ; neither could He want the Afliftance of Men for making Him Altars and Images, for that He had given Life and Breath to thofe ve- ry Men by whofe Skill and Workman- lliip they pretended to honour Him. We find by the i8th Verfe, that the Epicureans made a Part of our Apo- ftle's Congregation, for they went along with him from the Market-place, where -they had been Difputing, to the Areo- fagus, Thefe Men had wilfully mif- taken the Nature of G o d, and impi- oufly ftripp'd the Deity of all the Privileges that had been univerfally al- lowed to belong to it ; for the God of Epicurus had no Hand in , the making the World, he neither moved the Mat- ter of the World, nor directed its Mo- rions, he was neither concerned in the

Inanimate

Sermon vi. I49

Inaminate nor Animate Part of it, and muft be therefore fliut out of all. For as to the Motion of Matter, from Whence all its Variety arifes, that was fuppofed by them to ' have been Eternal ; and as for Life, that was nothing more than the particular Organifation or Structure of the Parts, fuch as is feen iil Animals ; which Organifation too was entirely owing to Chance or Fortune, without the leaft Interpofition of their Gods. And as to the Nature of their Gods, we find by Democritus (from whom Epicurus took a great Part of his Ph^- lofophy) that they were beholden to Matter for their Exigence ; for he fup- pofes them to be nothing but the I- mages of Objefts, which according to his Way of Thinking, were continually flying off from all Corporeal Objefts ; as appears by lully ^. Had this been the real Truth of the Cafe, a Worfhip,

L 3 fuch

.* Democritus qui turn imagines earumque Circu- ,, ki^s in Deorum Numero refert. Cicer. de Nacura peorum. i,ib, i. p, :S.

Sermon VI.

fuch as that at Athens by Images, had been worthy enough of fuch imaginary Beings, or rather more than they de- ferved : But St. Paul tells them, That this was to miH-ake entirely the Na- ture of G o D ; for that He was the fole Caufe of all Things, and the fole Giver of all our Powers of Adion ; for that 'twas in Him We all of us both lived, and moved, and had our Beings.

Having already confidered fome of the moft material Objeclions which the Infidel is wont to urge againft the Be- ing of a God, and fliewn that they cannot be a good Reafon for denying Him, becaufe the Appearance of Things will neceflarily require the Exiftence of fuch Powers and Properties as we afcribe to Him, and which the Atheiji pretends to find Fault with ; I am now to reprefent fome of the Arguments on which the Religious Man grounds his Belief of a God, drawn from the moft confiderable Phenomena in Nature, fuch as Motion, Thought, and the Oi'der of Things, ^\Mc\\VUio calls the Ti<iO' k^ Kuh2<.

I

S E R iM O N VT. I 5 I

I will begin with that of Motion, and Ihew, That there is no pofTible Way of accounting for its Exigence, unlefs we will admit a G o d, or which is the fame Thing to the Jiheifl, a Being di- {tmdi from JVlatter, and yet aSing upon it«

There are but three pofRble Y/ays of accounting for Motion, either by fupppfing that there has been an in- finite Succeflion of Impulfes communi- cated from one Body to another from Eternity, without any adive Principle either /> Matter or without It ; or that there is an A8:ive Principle in Matter, that it is Self-aclive, and Motion eilen- tial to it, or elfe that there is fonie Be- ing diftinci: from Matter, that is the Caufe of its Motion. I will (hew, that neither of the two firft ^Yays of ac- counting for Motion, can poiTibly be the Trath ; and therefore that the Caufe of Motion, muft be fome Being diftind from Matter, the fame Being, which our Apoftle made the Subjed of his Difcourfe to the Athemans^ the God that made Heaven and Earth; the L 4 fole

1^2 Sermon VI.

idle Giver of Life and Animal Motion, for that 'tis in Him we live, and have a Power of moving ourfelves. And,

i/, A N infinite Succeffion of Im- pulfes without an Active or Moving Principle, will never give Birth to Mo- tion, becaufe this would be to bring an Effect upon the Stage without the Help of a Caufe. And yet abfurd as this is, Sjfinofa was able to give no better an Account of Motion, or at leaft thought this to be better than to fuppofe with fome, That Motion was a necefTary At- tribute of Matter. And tho' all the "World agrees. That in a finite Time 'tis abfurd to fuppofe an Eifed without a Caufe, which mufl: be the Cafe, if Motion was not an eflential Attribute of Matter ; yet Spinofa, would never un- dertake to fliew how an infinite Time would make any Senfe of it ; and there- fore always avoided giving a dire(Et Anfwer, when he was prefb'd by his Friends to explain how Matter could ever come into Motion, if Motion was neither elfential to Matter, nor proceed- ed from any external Caufe. This laft

he

Sermon VL 153

he could never own without giving up the Caufe o^ Atheifm^2ind therefore would never fpeak plainly to this Point, as appears by the Sixty-third and follow- ing Epiftles m his Poftliumous Works. This Behaviour of Sfwofa\ makes it reafonable to believe, that he himfelf would have given up his Account of Motion, if he could have faved his Scheme and his Reputation. And as Toland too has thought fit to rejed it as indefenfible, I fhall take no farther Notice of it, but proceed to the other Atheipck Account of Motion, which ToUnd thinks will be fuiiicient, with- out troubling the Supreme Being, viz. That Motion is efTential to all Matter, and Aftion as much an Attri- bute of Matter, as Extenlion or Soli- dity ; and confequently, every Atom of Matter is necclTarily Self-moving, or adlive from the NecefTity of its own Nature.

The World has had fo flrong an Opinion of the natural Ina^livity of Matter, that Sphofa had not Courage Enough to oppofe it; but ToUf/d fi tid- ing

1^4- Sermon VI-

ing Atheifm was not tenable, if Matter was really Inadive, was refolved to try whether he could not defend its Acti- vity, as the only Refuge left for the finking Caufe of Atbajm, The Argu- ments he makes ufe of to prove the Activity of Matter, are thefe :

ly?, '^ B EC Aus E, he fays, Motion, " as well as Extenfion and Solidity, is " included in our Idea of Matter ; that " whenever we feparate Motion from ^' Matter in our Idea of it, 'tis only a " partial Confideration of it, or an ab- " fi:ra£led Notion of the Mind ; and " therefore no more a Proof that Mat- " ter can exift without Motion, than " that Mathematical Lines, Surfaces " and Points, have any Exiftence in " Nature, becaufe they are in the *' Heads of Mathematicidns,

2dly^ Another Reafon he urges for the Activity of Matter, is, " Be- *' caufe in Fad all Matter is in Mo-

*' tion.

A THIRD Reafon is this : " That *^ tho' there fliould be fome Objedi- " ons againft it, that much greater

** ones

Sermon vi. 155

*^ Ones would lie againft an External " Mover of Matter. "

In anfwer to thefe Arguments of his I will fhew,

ift-, That our Idea of Matter, when we leave Motion out of it, is no ab- ftraOied Notion of the Mind, but a compleat and adequate Idea of it.

2dty^ That tho' all Parts of Mat- ter were in Motion, it would not fol- low that Motion was an elfential At- tribute of Matter.

5%, That the Adivity of Mat- ter is inconfiflent with fome Appear- ances in Nature.

^thly^ That the Obje8:ions againfl God's being the Author of Motion, are not fuch as fhould difcourage any- rational or unbyafs'd Perfon from ac* knowledging, That 'tis in G o d we live, and have our Animal Being.

i/, I am to fhew. That our Idea of Matter without Motion, is not a partial Confideration of Matter, but a compleat Idea of it.

The Reafon which has always deter- mined the >Yorld to look out for a Caufe

of

Sermon VI.

of Motion extrinfical to Matter,was this : Tho' they could eafily conceive it ca- pable of being moved and divided ; yet the conceiving it to be undivided^ undiverfified, and unmoved , was a more fimple Notion of Matter, than the conceiving it divided and moved. This being firfl in Order of Nature, and an adequate Conception of it too, they thought it neceffary to enquire and give themfelves an Account how it came out of this State, and by what Caufes Motion, from whence this Di- verfity in Matter arofe, could come into the World ? Defcartes , altho' he allowed the Infinity of Matter as well as ToUffd, was yet fenfible that even this would not alter the Nature of Matter, nor the Idea that every Body had of its Inactivity, and there- fore could fee no other Way of alter- ing its primitive Idea, and reconciling it with the Motion of Matter, but by introducing another Infinite Being, 'viz. a God that had fufficient Power to roufe Matter out of that fleepy, in- a^ive State in whicli its Original Idea

had

Sermon vi. 157

had reprefented it. And ToUnd^ would have found himfelf under the iame Neceflity of admitting a God for the Mover of Matter, if he had not endeavoured to impofe upon his Reader by confounding Divifibihty and Mobility, with actual Divifion and an a£live or moving Power, as we fhall fee prefently. For he acknowledges, that the true Conception of Matter is this : That it is every-where the fame, and only diverfified by Motion; fo as by his own ConfeiTion, the conceiving Matter in Motion, is a departing from that Unity of Subftance, that Samenefs of Nature in. which our Ideas repre* fent it to us. For all Diverfifications of Matter muft of Necellity be fo many Removes from the natural Unity and Identity of Matter, according to his Conception of it.

Aristotle, who was confeifedly the beft Reafoner among the Ancients, and not thought to be at all preju- diced in Favour of Religion, is yet ve- ry clear in this Point : in his firfl: Book of the Met/ifhyfukSj cap, 3. he condemned

thofc

158

Sermon vi.

thofe who ftop'd fhort at the material Caufe of Generations and Corruptions, without looking after the Efficient Caufe. " For, fays he, altho' all Cor- " ruptions and Generations, are vari- " cully produced from Beings more " or lefs compounded, yet 'tis necef- *^ fary to enquire. How this happens, ^' and what is the Caufe? For the " Subject of all thefe Changes cannot *^ poffibly change itfelf, "jU. The Wood " and the Brafs cannot be the Caufes ^ that one of them is turned into a " Bed, the other into a Statue ; " but " Something elfe muft be the Caufe " of thefe Changes. But to enquire " after this, is to enquire after a Prin- " ciple of Motion, or fome Being that " has a Power of beginning Motion, " and communicating it to Matter *. " For he could fee nothing in the Idea of Matter, that would qualify it for a6:ing upon itfelf Mr. Hajle 'm voce hmci^^us^ confefTes, " That our Idea of

" Matter

!. Vid. Ariflot. Metaphyfic. Lib. i. can. 3.

Sermon vl

*' Matter is compleat when it repre- " fents nothing to us but Extenfion " and Solidity, and that Motion is not ^* included in it, but is a perfect exo- ^' tick, a foreign Idea, that has no '^ more relation to Matter , than ^' Thought or . Underftanding. " The Evidence againft the Adivity of Mat- ter from its Idea, is fo clear and ftrong, that one would hardly have ex- pected that this Idea fliould have been prefsM into a contrary Service , and made to ipeak m behalf of the Adi- vity of Matter. And yet Mr. ToUnd has attempted to prove Matter an adive Being from its Idea.

As 17?, " From the Divifibility of "Matter, which always makes a Part '' of our Idea of Matter. And,

2dlyy " Because our Idea of Mat- " ter always contains fome Quahty or " other, which necelTarily fuppofes Mo- " tion. "

ifty Fp.om the Divifibility of Matter, his Argument from hence is founded upon this ; becaufe, as he fuppofes, we caiinoi; conceive Divifibility without

Motion;

i6o Sermon VI.

Motion j therefore we cannot conceive Matter which is always conceived as divifible, without conceiving Motion as infeparable from Matter. But this is plainly to make Mobility or the Capa- city of receiving Motion, and Motion itfelf, or the Vis moirix, to be one and the fame Ideas. For altho', mdted^ we cannot conceive Matter to be adually divided, without adding Motion to our Idea of Matter ; yet nothing more than a Capacity of receiving Motion is ne- celTary to the making up our Idea of Divifibility : But this laft has a plain and evident DiiHnftion in our Concep- tions of Things from the former. For we can conceive a Thing to be divifi- ble, tho' it never fhould be adually divided ; and when we conceive Mat- ter as divifible, we at the fame Time as well fuppofe it capable of continuing in an undivided State, as of changing it into a divided one. And therefore Mo- tion is not necefTarily included m our Idea of Divifibility. And confqquently to fay, That Divifibility makes a Pare of our Idea of Matter, would be no

Proof

Sermon VI. i6i

Proof that Motion too muft belong to our Idea of it.

But Toland goes further , and would prove, That Motion muft ne- ceiTarily be included in the Divifibihty of Matter ; becaufe whatever, is divi- fible, mufl: have within itfelf a Power of dividing itfelf; for thus he fpeaks in. his Letter concerning Motion * ; *' li^ " fays he, there was no Internal Ener- ** gy. Matter would be incapable of " Alteration or Divilion. " But this can never be proved by him, unlefs he takes it for granted, that there is no- thing in Nature befides Matter ; which would be to beg the Queftion in Dil^ pute between us and tho Athttft: For 'tis plain if any Thing befides Matter had an Exiftence, he might have con- ceived Matter to be divifible without thinking of the internal Energy of Mat- ter, becaufe Matter would be as truly divifible, altho' we fuppos'd it divided by fomething ' elfe, as if we fuppos'd it divided by itfelf, and the Idea of M Divifibility

• Page 194.

Sermon VI.

Divifibility would be exadly the fame in either Cafe. As to what he fays,> ^* That Motion is contained in our Idea ** of Matter : Becaufe .1

s^/j/, " \V E can never form an Ideaj ". of Matter devoid of all Qualities ;^ " and all Qualities are an EHed of ^^ Motion ; confequently Motion is not " to be feparated from our Idea of *' Matter : " If by Idea, he means an Image or what may be an Objed of our Senfes, 'tis agreed, that in this Senfe we can form no Idea of Matter divefted of all Qualities ; but this is to fay nothing more than this, That we can't form an Image of a Thing which has no Image, or is no ObjeQ: of our Senfes; but ftill the Idea of folid Ex- tendon remains a diftinO: Idea from that of Motion, and therefore from all the Qualities that are a Confequence of Motion ; which ihews tliat there is nothing in tlie Nature of the Thing that fliould have hinder'd Matter from exifting without Motion. And Toland himfeif acknowledges, " That ^' Motion is not included in the Idea

" of

Sermon VI. 1^6^

" of Extenfion, nor any ways dedu- " cible from it ^. " And therefore if we can have any Idea of Solidity, a foh'd extended Subftance may be con- ceived to exift without Motion, or without any Quahties that fhall affedl our Senfes. Whereas there is no con- ceiving Matter to exift without Soh'* dity and Extenfion, which fliews them to he efTential to Matter, and at the., fame time fl:iews Motion to be not ef- fentiaL And therefore he has plainly beg'd the Qiieftion in Difpute, in cid- dmg to the Idea of Matter a new At- tribute, without any Proof tliat 'tis one.

He was fenfible that the univcr- fal Belief of a Cljaos, was an ugly Ar- gument againft him , and therefore takes fome Pains ia ridiculing the feve- ral Methods the Ancients took of bring- ing Matter out of that Confufion,. m which all Things were fuppofed to b*

while the Chaos lafted. But how ridi-

»•■

M 2 culous

■:e /;.":• Letf;r emarnlnz Mstimi,

1 64 Sermon

culous foever their Schemes might be^ yet this is evident, that they could and did conceive Matter to have an Ex- igence altho^ unmoved, and of courfe without any of thofe Qualities that re- fult from the Movement of Matter. Ovid ia defcribing the Chaotick State, tells us, " That there was no Kind '^ of Diverfity, but the fame Face of ^^ Things thro' the infinite Extenfion.^ " That the whole was rudis mdigeftac[ue moleSy nee quiccj^uam ntft fondus iners. By which the Poet intended to exprefs the lazy and ftupid State ia which Matter lay during the Chaos ^ and till the Chaotick Matter began to be ftirr'd. Mr. Ba.yle was as much out of Humour with the Account that Ovid had given of the ancient Opinion concerning a Chaos^ as ToU'/fd^ and therefore un- '^feafonably falls out with the Defcrip- ^on he has given us of it. That he

may

* Ante mare Sc terras, 8c quod tcgit omnia Coc-

[lum, Unus erat toto Naturx yultus in orbe, Qucm dixere Chaos. OviH.Metamor. L. J.

?i

Sermon VI. i6^

may make his Account inconfiftent with itfelf, Ovid is brought in reprefenting all the Variety in Nature as if it had an aftual Exiftence, before there was any fuch Thing as Motion; when he fays, fpeaking of . the Chaotick State, Frigida fugnxbmt calidis, ■ humentia jtccis, moUia cum duris^ l^c, and yet he had jufl before told us, that the Whole was an homogeneous Subftance , Vmis trat Natura vtdtm ; whereas what Ovid fays is very confident. He fuppofes the QhAos ta be an homogeneous Subltance, which, upon its being moved, was di-» verfified into Bodies of very diJerent Natures, and not that any fuch Di- verfity had any other than a poffible Exiftence, till it was moved. And if Mr. BiiyU had not been prejudiced a- gainft a Qhnos^ it ought to Jiave pafs'cl with him for a fine Piece of Imagery, when the Poet reprefents the Change that was made hy Motion, that Earth, Air, Fire and Water, which had been hitherto blended together, were then feparated from each other. For the beft Philoi©phers are agreed, That all M I Matter

1 66 Sermon Vl

Matter is really the fame, and that all^j the Diverfity that appears in it, is ow- ing to Motion. And thtreibre a Pcet might well reprefent the fimple and uniform Face of Matter, as containing within itfelf all thefe Diverfities, even before it was moved, becr^ufe it was capable of receiving them ; without, i fuppofing them to have had an adlual; Exigence till tlie Chaos was put into,i Motion : which is enough to clear tlie>t Poet from the Inconfiftency which Mr^| Bajle would charge upon liim^ and at ' the fame time to fatisfy us, that the Ancients had a Conception of Matter as an uniform Being before it was moved. And confeqaently, that To-- Ufid's Conceiving Faculty was very dc- fectiv'c, if he could not conceive Mat- ter without Motion. But,

2^/;, I AM to flicw the Weakncfs of another Argument he brings for the Adivity of Matter, viz,. " That ** in Fad all Matter is in Motion." And fuppofing it true, it would not follow that iVlotion was an eilenti- af Attribute of Matter, For ii Mo- tion

Sermon VL' i6y

tion is not, as we have alrea<ly fhewni'' included in oar Idea of Matter, but we can as well conceive it at Reft as in Motion; altho' there fnould be no Bo- dies perfedly at Reft, it w^ould not yet follow that Motion is efT^ntial to Mat- ter; but on the contrary, for this very Reafon, {viz. That Motion is not con- tained in the Idea of Mutter) v/e ought to look fomewhere elfe than in Matter for a Caufe of its Motion ; and as 'tis proved to be foreign to our Idea, to look abroad for a Powerful Gaufe, fuch as God, that had imprefs'd Motion up- on Matter. But ToUnd lays Strefs upon this Argument, and fays *, " Seeing " every Part of Matter is always in " Motion, you fhould conclude that " Motion is eiTential to the Whole, for " the fame Reafon that you think Ex- " tenfion to be fo ; becaufe every Part *' is extended. " But the Cafe fure is very different between Motion and Ex- tenfion, becaufe Extenfion is confelledly included in cur Idea of Matter, where- M 4 as

* Page 2c*,

i68 Sermon VI.

as Motion is not fo. Befides, if Tehnci reafons juftly, the Univerfality of Mo- tion can be no Proof of its being ef- fential to Matter, becaufe he allows the Centripetal Force to be univerfal, and belonging to all Bodies ; for he defcrFoes it thus : " 'Tis that by which "all the Bodies of the Earth are drawn *''. or tend towards its Centre, as all "others to the proper Centres of their " Motions. ^ " And yet he does not allow that particular Determination, which we call Gravity, to be effentiai to Matter , and therefore Motion may be- long to every Part of Matter, and not be eflential to it ; it may be univerfal, and yet proceed from an external Caufe that has moved the Whole. But,

'^dlj^ That Motion cannot be ef- fential to Matter, may be made plain from thefe Three Reafons.

ifty Because there could be no fuch Things in the World as Bodies or any Concretions of Matter •, which would render the Face of Things quite

diiferent

'-- 1 Page ic5.

Sermon vi- 1^9

different from what it appears at prc,-

Q-dly, Because there would be no Variation as to the Quantity of Motion, 1^ all Matter was Self-a£tive ; and yet we think it very evident that the Quan- tity of Motion does and muft conti- nually vary.

^^/j, A THIRD Reafon that demon- ftrates the InaQiivity of Matter , isy That Bodies of equal Bulk or whofe Surfaces are equal, do yet weigh un- equally.

i/, Because there could be no fuch Things in the World as Concre- tions of Matter, if Matter was felf- adive. The prefent Face of Matter appears to us to be divided into Mther^ and an infinite Number of large Com- binations of Matter floating in that jEther ; whereas if Matter had been felf-aftive, it could never have concre- ted into fuch Globes as thofe of the fix'd Stars, Planets and Comets; but mufl: have every-where appeared in. the higheft State of Fluidity, as fine as the prefent 4^ther in which they fwim. For

if

fjo Sermon VI.

if Motion were elTential to Matter, it mull belong to every the fmalleft Part of Matter, and confequently muft be : equally fpread thro' the whole Mafs of l Matter, and then no pofTible Reafon to be given why fome Parts of A4atter iliould be more divided than others, llnce every Atom of Matter muft e- qually partake of the dividing Princi- ple. This fhews that there can be no Reafon given upon this Hypothefs, why the dividing Eifed of Motion fhould '' ever ceafe till Matter was ground (b fmall as to be incapable of any fur- ther Divifion ; the Confequence of which would be a World not at all like what we hve in; and therefore ours can never be accounted for by any fuch Scheme as Toiand^ ; but the AfTiftance of a God will be necelTary for moving the Matter of the Univerfc, if we pretend to account for the Diverfity that is feen in the different Portions of Matter. But,

idiy^ A Second Reafen why Mat- t-cr cannot be felf-adive, is this ; Ee- caufe there , could be no Variation as,

to

.ZiOi-'QV

Sermon VI. 17 1

to the' Qtiantity of Motion, no increaf- ing nor lelTening tli£ Qijantity of it ; for i!^ Motion be elTential to every Particle of Matter, no one Particle of Matter can any otherwife lofe its Mo- tion, but by lofing its Being in the Univerfe ; and yet we think it very evident, that the Qiiantity of Motion does, and muft continually diminifh. 'Tis certain the greateft Philofopher that ever this Globe produced, is ful- ly perfuaded that Motion muft vary, that 'tis Generable and Corruptible: " But, lie fays, what by the Tena- " city of fluid Bodies, the Wearing of " their Parts, and the neccfTary im- ' ^^ pairing of the elaftick Force in fo- • " lid Bodies, the Quantity of Motion " muft diminifh rather than encreafe, ^^ unlefs the Lois of Motion be repair- " ed by. an A(^ive Being that can '' fupply thofe LciTes *. " And 'tis certain, that he is fupported in his Perfuafion by a plain Matter of Fad, as in the Cafe of two hard Bodies of

equal

■■

* Newton's Opdcks.

172 Sermon VI.

equal Force, that are not elafticaljwhen fuch Bodies meet together, they Jofe all the Motion they were before pof- feiTed of. And if this be true, the next Enqui/y to be made, is. What be- comes of this Morion or adive, im- pulfive Force? If it cannot be dif- perfed among the Parts of fuch Bodies, 'tis plain, that then all the Motion is entirely funk and loft. That it cannot be To difperfed, is as plain ; becaufe the Parts of fuch Bodies are incapable of any tremulous Motion for Want of Elafticity ; and if it fhould be denied that the Parts of thofe Bodies would lofe the Motion of their Wholes, there is this plain Argument againft it, That it would then follow, that Bodies per- fedly hard and elaftical would refle£l: with a double Force, vtz, the Force arifing from the Elafticity, and more- over ail, or at leaft, part of the original, direO: Force ; which, as the very Learn- ed Dr. Samuel Clark has obferved in his Letters to Leibmzy is contrary to Experience.

I CA K^

Sermon VL 173

I CANNOT but obferve by way of Inference from the lofs of Inanimate Motion, that as the Original Laws of Motion could never have taken Place; or had any Being in the World, unlefs there did Exift fomething Superior to Matter that had ImprefTed thofe Laws of Motion upon it ; fo thofe Laws could never have continued, unlefs there were an Active Being in Nature, that was always ready to Exert upon Matter a certain Force or Adivity, in proporti- on as the Motion was diminifhed ; which proves the Exiftence of a Be- ing, that not only gave Motion to Matter, but alfo of a Being that ftill continues conftantly to repair the weakning by Time of the firll Im- preflion of Motion. And this fhews the Neceflity of admitting a Governour of the World, who by his Providence may Interpofe in the prefervation of it, as well as of an Original Author of Motion, and of this World, which is an EtTeQ: of a wonderful Direction of that Mo- tion. From whence it follows, Thar the Notion of fome Perfons who be- lieve

174 Sermon vi.

b'eve that God had ImprefTed a cer- tain Quantity of Motion upon Matteif at the Creation, and then left it to fliift for itfelf, beheving this to be a fufficf- ent Account of the Appearances of Things, cannot polTibly be true ; be- caufe we have already fliewn, that the Qiiantity of Motion muft necelTarily di- minifb, unlefs there was fome A6i:ive Being that could conjlamly keep it up in the fame State and Condition. And if the Inanimate Part of the World could not have been preferved in Motion without the continued Acti- on of fome Being putting forth its Force according to thofe Original Laws of Motion, mucli lefs could the Bodies of Plants and Animals , which are vaftly the moft confiderable Parts of our Earth be formed and preferv- ed by Matter directed at fir ft accord- ing to any whatever Laws of Motion. From hence too it appears, that God does not acl as an Anima, Mtirdi^ not as a Part, but as a Governor of ths World ; becaufe fuch a Being would be nothing but Fate and Nature, which

can

S E R M O NT VI. 175

can never be reconciled with the ap- parent Diminution of the Quantity of Motion in the Univerfe; as Fate or Nature muft always a6t to the utmoft of their Powers ; and therefore it tlie Effe(9: of their Activity could be at any Time abated, it could never be reftored or repaired egain. Confe- quently we have gained a Being that not only made the World, and efta- blifhed at the Beginning the Laws by which it fliould for the future be go- verned ; but alfo a B e i n g that ilill watches over his Workmanfhip, repairs any Failures in it^ and continues it in its State as long as He thinks fit: Which is the Religious Man's Notion ofaGoD, a Being that is not far from any of us ; For 'tis /> Him we live, movBy and have our Beings,

SERM.

Ki)^ ■

SERMON VII

Acts XVII. 28.

Fbr in Him we live^ and move^ and have our Be- ing.

177

AVING already ibewri , That if we will not admit a God for a mover of Mat- __ ter, there will be only thefe two poflible Ways of accounting for its being in the World, either ik fuppofing an Infinite Series of Impulfes or Communications of Motion from one Part of Matter to another, without a- ny Original Caufe of thofe Impulfes, N which.

Sermon VII.

which is fuppofing an EfFed without fup- pofing any Caufe of that Effe£l : Or,

2dly^ That Motion is an efTential Attribute of Matter, and therefore all Matter an adive Being.

In anfwer to the fuppos'd A6livity of Matter, I proposed to fhew,

i/, Th AT our Idea of Mattel', is a compleat and adequate Conception of it when we leave Motion out of it.

2dly^ That it would not follow, that Matter was an adive Being, were it, never fo true, that every Particle of Matter was in Motion. And

j^/j, That the Aftivity of Matter js inconfiflent with fome Appearances ^.Nature: As,

ijt^ With the great Diverfity that appears in the Face 6f Nature, that fome Parts of Matter are condensed into folid Bodies, and others in a high Degree of Rarcfadion ; whereas if Mat- y^ was felf-aclive, the Whole muft ne- ceifarily be reduced into the fmalleft Particles into which Matter is capable of being divided. A llcond Reafon I

avc, why Motion could not be an

ejOfential

^^

Sermon VII. 179

efTentkl Attribute of Matter was, be- caufe there could then be no Variati- on as to the Quantity of Motion in the Univerfe, and yet 'twas evident that the Qtiantity of it muft gradually di^ minifh, unlefs its LofTes were conftant- ly .repaired by fome adive Being* Thus far I proceeded in the laft Dif* courfe.

A 3d Reafonby which I propofed to ihew the Ina6livity of Matter was from hence, That Bodies of equal Bulk or whofe Surfaces are equal, do yet weigh unequally; for if there is no account- ing for this Ph.-znomenorf^ without fuppo-^ fing the heavier Body to contain more Matter than the lighter one of the fame Bulk, then 'tis plain, that Mat- ter muft be an inaftive Being, fince the encreafing the Quantity of Matter ifl any Body, tho' there be no encreafe of its Surface, by which its Motion might be retarded, {hall encreafe the Difficulty of putting it into Motion; This very Argument will hang as a Milftohe upon the Neck of the Jtheifly as it makes it impoflible to reconcile this N a Fh^nomerion

180 ^^^^^^ Sermon VII.

Fh^nomenon of Nature with the Me- chanical Laws of Motion, which is all that the hjfidel has to depend upon for the Support of his Hypothefts. For 'tis certain that all Mechanical Caufes do a6l in proportion to the Surfaces of the Particles that they ad upon ; where- as 'tis as certain, that Gravity, whate- ever be the Caufe of it, afts propor- tionally to the Quantity of folid Matter, without any regard to the Superficies of the Bodies ; fo as Bodies which are the fame in Bulk, fliall be very diffe- rent in their Weight. Lucretius faw plainly that there was no accounting for the different Gravity of Bodies of equal Bulk, without having recourfe to a y^acufdntj and fuppofing a greater Quan- tity of Matter in the heavier Body. He indeed, very weakly fuppofes Gravity to be an inherent Quality m Matter, •and that all Bodies had a natural Ten- dency downwards, tho' we are fure there could be no fuch thing as down- ward or upward in an infinite Space, But however, he faw evidently that the general Activity of Matter, which he

believed

Sermon VII. i8r

believed as well as ToU^d, would not account for tJiis Ph^mmenorf^ without ad- mitting another Principle of Adion, 'viz.. Gravity; he believed his Atoms had been in. Motion from JEternity, but did not think that Motion fufficient to account for the different Gravitation of Bodies towards a Centre ^. "

L E T us now fee how Toh^d would derive this peculiar AffeQiion of Matter, viz, of moving towards a Centre, from the general Adion of Matter ; or how he would account for the umqual Re* fiftance of Bodies of equal Bulk. It will quickly appear that he is fo far froni being able to derive Gravity from the N 2 general

* Denique cur alias aliis pr^fliare videmus Pondere res rebus, nihilo majore figura. Nam fi tantundem eft in Laiiacglomere quantum Corporis in Plumbo eft, tantundem penderc

fpar eft, Corporis Officium eft quoniam premere omnia

[deorfum : Ergo quod magnum eft xque, leviufque videtur , Nimirum Plus efle fibi declarat Inanis : At contra gravius plus in fg Corporis efleu yidq Liucretium. Lib. I,

1 82 Sermon vil.

general Adion of Matter, that this ve-; ry Gravity proves to a Demonfl ration tlie Inadivity of Matter. 'Tis plain, as I have ah'eady obferved, that all Mechanical Caufes ad by Contad, and upon the Surface of Bodies ; and 'tis as plain, that Gravity acts quite other- wife, and afteds the folid Contents of Bodies, by penetrating the very Sub- fiances of them, and therefore can ne- ver be produced by the general Adion of Matter, becaufe that is fuppos'd to ad fuperficially , as all Mechanical Caufes are wont to do. But fuppo- fing it polTible to derive Gravity from the general Adion of Matter, which ToUnd aims at, it would do him no Ser- vice, becaufe he cannot avoid making an increafe of Gravity, and confequent- ly of Refiftance to Motion, to depend upon an increafe of Matter : For he fuppofes the Centripetal Force to be, not indeed as Lucretius^ a Qtiality inhc- rent in Matter, but one of the Modes of ABion in general, or a particular Determination of the general Adivity of IVJatter, . Let it be foj lince 'tis

evident

Sermon VII. if ^

evident, that the Quantity of Motion in the Body muft be the Sum of the Motive Forces of all the Particles of Matter that are in that Body ; i[ this Centripetal Force be only a particular Determination of the general Adion of Matter , there would be no giving a Reafon why the Quantity of that Force, or of that particular Deter- mination too, fhould not be computed after the fame manner ; and be the Sum of all the felf- moving Atoms in any Body ; the Confequence of which would be, That whenever we obferved two Bodies of equal Bulk and Gravi- tating unequally, or tending towards a Centre with unequal Force , if we would account for fuch a Fh^mmemn confidently with Tolan^s Account of Gravity, we muft fay, that one of the Bodies had a greater Number of the Self- moving Atoms than the other, which necelTarily fuppofes in the lighter Body a Space void of Matter, which levels one of the ftrongeft Retrenchments of the Infidel^ vtz. The Infinity of Matter, ^uA at the fame time its Adivity : Be- N 4 c^jUfe

1^4 Sermon VII.

caufe Experience tells us, That the more weighty any Body is, tho' no- tiling be added to its Bulk, the more it reiilb to Motion ; whereas if Matter was an adive Being, an increafe of its Quantity could never- increafe itsr'i Refifbance, unlefs its Surface, by which alone Bodies could be retarded, was increafed too. All that ToLt?id has to fay for , himfelf, is, *' That this Difte- " rence of Refiftance in Bodies of equal '^ Bulk, may poiGTibly arife from the dif- " ferent internal Contexture of thofe Bo- ^' dies " ; and all the Reafon for fuch a Sufpicion is drawn from the great Re- finance that fome Fluids are obferved tQ make above others, altho' of near the fame fpecifick Gravity, and confe- quently near the fame Quantity of Mat- ter ; which can be refolved into no- thing, but a Difference in the internal Contexture of fuch Fluids : But this Plea can have Force only in fuch Bo- dies as are not equally fluid. For what- ever be the Figure of the Internal Parts of Fluids, if they are equally devoid of Tenacity, their Force ^f Jlefiftance to

Sermon Vll. 18$

any particular Determination as well as the abfolute Force of Motion, can be only the Sum of the Forces of the Self- moving Particles in thofe Bodies. And therefore if a Cubical Inch of Water, and the fame Qiiantity of Quick-filver, which are fluid Bodies, and free from Tenacity, did really contain the fame Number of Self-moving Particles, whatever were the Figure of thofe Particles, they would €c[ually refill: to any Change that fhould be made of the Determination of their Motion. But as Experience fhews this to be falfe; confequently, that fluid which makes the greateft Refifl:ance to Motion, mufl: have the greatefl: Quan- |:ity of Mattel- ; and then the different internal Contexture of Bodies will not account for their different Weights, nor clear Matter from the Imputation of being inactive. But,

^thly^ I AM now to fhew. That the Objeftions againft God's being the Author of Motion, are not fuch as fliould diicourage